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CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY IN PERFORMANCE-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF SCHOOL AND DISTRICT DECISION-MAKING APPROACHES
Jessica K. Beaver
Richard M. Ingersoll
Performance-based accountability systems provide schools and districts with detailed student
performance data on the front end and demand that schools meet rigorous minimum proficiency
thresholds on the back end or face a set of sanctions that ratchet up year after year. The process by
which schools and districts make decisions for improvement in order to meet these requirements,
however, is opaque at best. Each district is like an island unto itself, with its own political context, financial
constraints, demographic and economic makeup, human capital, and social dynamics. Especially given
the immense amount of money spent every year in improvement grants to districts, as well as the
plethora of vendors touting new products, there is a clear imperative to understand how schools and
districts select particular programs or strategies for improvement above other options.
In this dissertation study, I apply the literature on search and decision-making in other disciplines to the
field of public elementary and secondary education, paying particular attention to schools and districts
under pressure to improve from performance-based accountability systems. I employ a comparative case
study approach, using three consecutive years of data from a stratified random sample of eight schools
(nested within their districts) in Pennsylvania. I find that schools and districts are under immense
pressure to demonstrate student achievement gains, and that this pressure extends to all phases of the
decision-making process, including problem identification, search, and the decision point. Despite this
pressure, I find that schools do not descend into chaos when making decisions for improvement - they
generally approach the decision-making process in a linear manner and let building-level administrators
employ a "middle-out" approach to decision-making. But on the other hand, schools are far from purely
rational organizations, as there are forces internal and external to the school or district that constrain
decision-making processes. Although these constraints affect all stages of the decision-making process,
they have the most severe influence on the search phase. Finally, I create a framework that advances the
literature on decision-making in education by establishing four distinct typologies of decision-making
approaches.
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ABSTRACT

CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY IN PERFORMANCE-BASED
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF SCHOOL AND
DISTRICT DECISION-MAKING APPROACHES

Jessica K. Beaver
Richard M. Ingersoll

Performance-based accountability systems provide schools and districts with
detailed student performance data on the front end and demand that schools meet
rigorous minimum proficiency thresholds on the back end or face a set of sanctions
that ratchet up year after year. The process by which schools and districts make
decisions for improvement in order to meet these requirements, however, is opaque
at best. Each district is like an island unto itself, with its own political context,
financial constraints, demographic and economic makeup, human capital, and social
dynamics. Especially given the immense amount of money spent every year in
improvement grants to districts, as well as the plethora of vendors touting new
products, there is a clear imperative to understand how schools and districts select
particular programs or strategies for improvement above other options.
In this dissertation study, I apply the literature on search and decisionmaking in other disciplines to the field of public elementary and secondary
education, paying particular attention to schools and districts under pressure to
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improve from performance-based accountability systems. I employ a comparative
case study approach, using three consecutive years of data from a stratified random
sample of eight schools (nested within their districts) in Pennsylvania. I find that
schools and districts are under immense pressure to demonstrate student
achievement gains, and that this pressure extends to all phases of the decisionmaking process, including problem identification, search, and the decision point.
Despite this pressure, I find that schools do not descend into chaos when making
decisions for improvement – they generally approach the decision-making process
in a linear manner and let building-level administrators employ a “middle-out”
approach to decision-making. But on the other hand, schools are far from purely
rational organizations, as there are forces internal and external to the school or
district that constrain decision-making processes. Although these constraints affect
all stages of the decision-making process, they have the most severe influence on the
search phase. Finally, I create a framework that advances the literature on decisionmaking in education by establishing four distinct typologies of decision-making
approaches.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Why Study Decision-Making in Education?
The culture around school improvement is both expensive and complex.
Walk into an exhibition hall at any education-related conference and scores of
vendors are eagerly hawking their products, asserting that their products are
aligned, research-based, and will measurably boost student achievement. Not only
do these products come with hefty price tags, but there is also a great deal of
complexity involved in selecting a particular product as a strategy for school
improvement. New programs typically require that schools provide professional
development to teachers and other classroom-level personnel, meet community and
school board expectations, and contain the appropriate mixture of components that
– school leaders hope – will improve student achievement.
Given the high stakes associated with decision-making in schools and school
districts, one might assume that administrators spend a great deal of time and effort
selecting the right programs to fit the needs of their students. In some cases, that
assumption is correct. Some schools task a team to look at student performance
data, conduct brainstorming sessions for possible solutions to identified problems,
bring in various vendors for hands-on demonstrations of new potential products,
and formally present their choice to the school board before they adopt a new
improvement program. But there is an alternative scenario as well, one in which an
1

administrator discovers that her school has failed to meet performance targets one
year, and solves this problem by calling a friend in a neighboring district and asking,
“what do you use?” She then unilaterally purchases the same product, with very
little vetting of the new program’s alignment or fit with her district’s unique context
or needs.
The variation in these two approaches – and there are, of course, many more
approaches to decision-making than just these two – may not seem striking if one
were to view schools as akin to small businesses. After all, some businesses run
their operations in a tightly controlled manner with formal frameworks that guide
their decisions, whereas others operate in a more laissez-faire manner, letting new
trends and ideas influence their decisions. But schools are not businesses; they are
special types of organizations with unique contextual factors that shape their
operational characteristics and abilities. Because public schools are funded by
taxpayers, they must answer to taxpayers. Because they serve an underage clientele
whose participation in the system is mandatory, they have a certain amount of
freedom in their decision-making process, but certain restrictions as well. And
because the organizational hierarchy of public education is notoriously flat, schools
often develop a divide between administrators and teachers that can create
disconnects during the decision-making process. Perhaps most importantly,
because schools must answer to districts, states and the federal government, there
exists strong top-down pressure to improve performance on a specific and targeted
outcome measure: the state standardized test. Performance-based accountability
2

systems demand that schools meet rigorous achievement thresholds on these tests
or face a set of sanctions that ratchet up with each passing year of
underperformance. The fundamental assumption of performance-based
accountability is that providing information to schools and districts about their
students’ academic performance will push them to improve, so long as this
information is coupled with strict performance guidelines and benchmarks, as well
as incentives to change.
In this dissertation, I examine in depth the relationship between
accountability pressure and the decision-making process in schools and districts.
This area is ripe for inquiry, as the means by which schools and districts process
top-down pressure for improvement, search for solutions to identified achievement
problems, and ultimately make decisions for improvement remains somewhat of a
mystery. The reason for this is that performance-based accountability systems
leave this process intentionally vague, assuming that states and local education
entities know best how to improve the academic performance of their own students.
Because each district is like an island unto itself, with its own political context,
financial constraints, demographic and economic makeup, human capital, and social
dynamics, the resulting decision-making processes may range from collaborative,
evidence-based decisions to uninformed word-of-mouth recommendations and
everything in between. But although the law might encourage a diversity of
approaches to decision-making for improvement, it can be very frustrating trying to
understand just how a particular program or strategy for improvement was selected
3

above other options. Especially given the immense amount of money spent every
year in improvement grants to districts, as well as the plethora of vendors touting
new instruments, curriculum materials, and other tools, it would be useful to
understand how schools and districts make decisions for improvement. More
specifically, it would be useful to understand how schools and districts search for
solutions to identified problems and then translate that search process into
decisions about new programs or strategies for improvement.
Unfortunately, the literature on search and decision-making in public K-12
education is fragmented at best, and at worst is even contradictory. For example, if
we are to take accountability theory at its word, the decision-making process in
schools and districts is logical, orderly, and strictly guided both by input data and
desired outcome measures. On the other hand, another popular line of thinking
describes decision-making in public education as completely chaotic and lacking any
real forethought or methodology. Accepting one theory over another has important
implications for policymakers and educators alike: If we believe that the decisionmaking process is rational and logical, then it follows that schools and districts with
similar characteristics will follow roughly the same path toward their eventual
decisions; but if we believe that decision-making is utterly chaotic, it seems that
very few conclusions can be drawn at all.
Although some literature exists on the various barriers to successful search
processes in organizations, few studies pay specific attention to the search process,
choosing instead to analyze the decisions themselves or their implementation. This
4

dissertation attempts to fill those gaps by applying the literature on search and
decision-making in other disciplines to the field of public K-12 education, with
particular attention paid to schools and districts that are under pressure to improve
within the context of performance-based accountability systems. The theoretical
framework draws upon several different frames for analyzing decision-making in
public education, including rational choice theory, bounded rationality,
organizational theory, sense-making theory, and the garbage can model of decisionmaking. The primary goal of the study is to create a framework that integrates the
various lines of thinking into a coherent and comprehensive model for analyzing
search and decision-making in schools and school districts.
Accordingly, I investigate three main sets of research questions. The first set
of questions asks descriptive questions around each of the phases of the decisionmaking process – problem identification, search, and the decision point. I pay close
attention to the search phase in particular, asking how schools and school districts
search for solutions to perceived or formally identified needs for improvement. The
second set of questions asks about the degree to which decision-making in
education can be characterized as chaotic. Accordingly, I ask about the various
factors that constrain the decision-making environment. Finally, I offer a third
question, which is whether a new framework might be created that characterizes
school and district search processes based on the underlying characteristics of the
organization.

5

To answer these questions, I employ a comparative case study design. The
sample for my study is eight schools and their corresponding district offices in
Pennsylvania, the majority of which were identified by the state as “in warning” for
failure to meet accountability targets following the 2007-2008 school year. I use
three consecutive years of in-depth case study interviews from school and district
administrators, staff, and teachers to home in on how these people approach the
decision-making process, as well as the factors that support or hinder their efforts.
In total, there were 212 interviews with 144 individuals over the three-year period.
For my cross-case analysis, I use a series of case-ordered descriptive matrices,
which allow me to detect trends and differences across cases. The variables for
case-ordered descriptive matrices correspond directly to my research questions.
The structure of my dissertation is as follows: In this chapter, I review a
range of decision-making approaches – from the rational to the chaotic – that are
presented in the vast, multi-disciplinary literature on decision-making. I explain
how each approach treats the search component of the decision-making process. I
also explore the decision-making literature that is explicit to schools and districts
that operate in the context of federally mandated accountability policies, such as the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and No Child Left Behind. In
Chapter 2, I turn my attention to the particulars of my dissertation study and
present my research questions and my qualitative comparative case study approach
to addressing them. These questions aim to fill existing gaps in the literature base,
particularly with regard to the search component of decision-making in public
6

education. I also detail my study sample, data collection, and analysis approach. In
Chapter 3, I present each of the eight case study districts in my sample. Chapters 4
and 5 detail the findings from my research, both the descriptive work and the
analytic task of establishing typologies of school approaches to decision-making. In
Chapter 6, I present a framework on school decision-making. Finally, in Chapter 7, I
discuss the various implications of my work for policymakers and practitioners and
identify areas for further exploration in the future.

Conceptual Framework
To frame my work, I first explore the general literature on decision-making,
which is grounded in several different disciplines, including economics, sociology,
and psychology. I then explore the specific literature on decision-making in public
K-12 education.

General Decision-Making Literature. There exists in the literature a broad range
of views about how individuals and organizations are impacted by their
environments as they make decisions. To explain the range of theories, I create a
“Rationality-Chaos Spectrum” (Figure 1.1) and begin my discussion at the left of the
spectrum and make my way to the right, taking care to explain the inherent
assumptions of each theory, as well as the implications that each theory has for
search and decision-making in organizations.
7

Figure 1.1
The Rationality-Chaos
Chaos Spectrum

The “classic” model of decision
decision-making – Rational Choice Theory – presents a
perfectly rational individual who
whose sole focus in decision-making
making is to optimize his
behavior so that the decision itself is the best possible outcome (Simon, 1955).
There are a number of assumptions that Simon outlines about this individual: he has
perfect information about his environm
environment,
ent, he has a set system of ordered
preferences (that is, he knows what he likes and never wavers), and he is capable of
performing whatever calculations are necessary to come to the optimal solution.
Simon also outlines some assumptions about the environ
environment
ment itself, in which the
number of options on the table is limited, payoffs are clearly defined, and the
preference ordering of those payoffs is set and stable. Given these conditions, the
individual is expected to examine the various options on the tabl
tablee (his
“alternatives”), perform any necessary optimization calculations, and then arrive at
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the optimal solution. Furthermore, the decision-making process follows a strict
order (Bass, 1983; Simon, 1955): The recognition or acknowledgement of a
deficiency; the search for solutions; a decision point; and, finally, action. The order
of operations is fixed, and the improvement process always begins with the
identification of the problem.
The many critiques of Rational Choice Theory have been dubbed part of the
“soft rationality” literature (Bryman, 1984) because they tweak the assumptions
inherent in the purely rational model. To simplify what is an extremely large body
of literature on soft rationality, I organize the literature into two distinct categories.
The first category presents the flaws of rational choice theory at the level of the
decision-maker, pointing out the many ways in which human beings are incapable
of making perfectly rational decisions due to their inherent biases and mental
limitations. Simon’s (1972) concept of “satisificing” or Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1974) description of decision-making heuristics would all fit into this first category.
The second category tackles the same topic at the level of the environment,
illustrating how the decision-making context can become constrained by various
contextual elements. Although both perspectives present valuable contributions to
the decision-making literature, I focus primarily on this second category because it
is more readily applicable to the context of decision-making in organizations, such
as schools and school districts. This environmental view posits that, even if
decision-makers were perfectly rational (that is, completely unaffected by the biases
and mental limitations discussed above), their ultimate decisions might be
9

suboptimal because the environment limits their ability to make informed decisions.
Soft rationality theorists assert that the luxuries of information and optimization are
rarely present in actual decision situations (Gross, Kirst, Holland & Luschei, 2005;
March, 1994; Simon, 1972). Very often, decision-makers are forced to do the best
with what they have, which may involve an incomplete set of options, constraints or
biases regarding optimality (i.e. the “politics” of organizations), or incomplete
information about the implications or implementation of decisions (Forester, 1984).
Simon (1972) combines the dual features of soft rationality – internal
preconceptions and external contextual constraints – into one cohesive theory
called Bounded Rationality, which has become a grounding theory in the search and
decision-making context of organizations. The fundamental assumption of Bounded
Rationality is that decisions occur under conditions of uncertainty (March, 1994;
Simon, 1972). Simon (1972) identifies several ways to conceptualize the theory:
First, the organization might not fully understand the consequences of the decision,
which may lead to inaccurate problem identification; second, the organization might
have imperfect or incomplete information about the potential alternatives, which
indicates a search deficiency; and third, the complexity of the environment itself
might obscure the organization’s ability to make a rational choice, which may lead to
a poor decision. Given these constraints, the organization is highly likely to satisfice
(Guth, Levati & Ploner, 2010; Simon, 1972) and a suboptimal outcome may result.
The theory of Bounded Rationality is intuitively appealing – it makes sense
that contextual factors would influence behavior, preferences and, ultimately,
10

decisions. Numerous theorists have expanded upon the theory as well, explaining
how it might affect the decision-making process. For example, Vanberg (2008)
posits that a person or organization might be bounded by societal norms and rules
in addition to the traditional bounds of information and time. Sen (1972) goes even
further, asserting that, even if the purely rational optimizer were to exist, he would
be a profoundly foolish individual whose actions would most certainly land him in
undesirable positions. In a different application of Bounded Rationality, Forester
(1984) presents a formal framework for determining the degree to which politics
can affect organizational decisions, particularly for public administration and
management organizations. He presents four different variants of bounded
rationality: BR I, II, III and IV, which range from a scenario with only one decisionmaker and a setting that is partially open to the environment, to a scenario with
multiple actors in which conflict is ubiquitous and one interest group usually has
more power over others, leading to coercion. Forester’s model shows that bounded
rationality is not a uniform concept; rather rationality can be bounded both by
organizations and by context, and it matters greatly who are the members of the
decision-making group, how the problem is defined, the organization’s structure
and hierarchy, and the politics of the decision itself.
Unlike Bounded Rationality, organizational theory is less concerned with
environmental bounds on behavior than it is with the internal constraints and
norms that influence organizational behavior. Organizational theory holds that the
primary bound on organizational behavior is bureaucratic structure. According to
11

Weber’s (1947) model of bureaucratic behavior, organizations are likely to turn to a
bureaucratic structure as a means of imposing order and rationality on their
decision-making and production processes. Bureaucracies are organizations with
strict hierarchies, clearly delineated worker responsibilities, formalized rules and
regulations, and standardized training for workers. In essence, Weber’s
bureaucratic theory describes an organization that has placed bounds on its own
environment so as to ensure rational outcomes.
Bureaucratic organizations may not be aware of the degree to which their
internal structure limits their decision-making ability. Weick (1976) describes
public bureaucratic organizations as “loosely coupled,” which he defines as the
sizeable difference between the intentions and the actions of bureaucratic
organizations. Organizations tend to over-rationalize their actions and it therefore
becomes very difficult to determine whether the decision-making process in a
public organization is highly rational or, as he suspects, highly irrational and chaotic
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weick, 1976).
In his later work, Weick (1995) suggests that organizational theorists should
adopt a “sense-making approach” to studying organizational decisions. The goal of
sense-making, he says, is to explain loose coupling by characterizing the entire
process by which organizations come to a decision. Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld
(2005) state that the sense-making process, though non-linear, usually begins with
chaos. In this scenario, members of an organization are faced with an issue or event
that may be poorly understood or even ignored, then they begin to make sense out
12

of that which they do not completely understand, then they begin to take into
account the social and cultural context in which they operate, and finally they ask
the essential question: “what should we do next?” With these concerns in mind, the
organizational actor must use various forms of communication to try to bring other
organizational actors into a shared understanding of the problem and potential
solutions.
Although the steps involved are not terribly different from the Rational
Choice model of decision-making (i.e. problem identification, search for solutions,
action, and implementation), the sense-making process is different because it is
decidedly non-linear (Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick et al., 2005). In other words, the
decision-making process is dynamic, iterative, and fluid – just like the people
making the decisions.
Finally, I arrive all the way to the right of the spectrum, where Cohen, March
and Olsen (1972) offer a formal organizational decision-making model based on the
premises of bounded rationality and loose coupling, which they call the “Garbage
Can Model” of decision-making. Their premise is similar to that of Weick and Meyer
and Rowan, but more extreme. They state that organizations are little more than
organized anarchies where preferences are problematic, technology is unclear,
participation is fluid, and, as a result, choices are fundamentally ambiguous. In their
model, the decision situation or “choice opportunity” is described as a garbage can
in which both problems and solutions are dumped. The decision – or output –
therefore depends on what the garbage consists of at the particular moment, the
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mix of cans available, and the speed with which garbage is collected. As the image of
a garbage can suggests, decisions made under conditions of ambiguity represent an
indistinguishable mix of the various different “streams” that contribute to decisionmaking within an organization, which include problems, solutions, participants, and
choice opportunities.
Cohen et al. use the Garbage Can Model to explain how straying from the
rational model affects decision-making in organizations. They assert that, while
some problems might receive full consideration by the organization and attempt to
follow a set procedure, these resulting decisions are likely to be haphazard in
nature, and are not necessarily aligned to organizational goals. Another effect on
decision-making is that the streams going into the garbage can – again, the
problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities – may interact with one
another. Adding a participant or putting a new option on the table, for example,
could drastically change the nature of the output. This view stands in stark contrast
to the traditional deductive model, in which the decision-making process is cyclical
and distinctly non-interactive. Thus it becomes clear that organizations operating
under the garbage can model do a poor job of resolving problems, as choices are not
made by preference-ordering or optimization, but rather by chance and pre-existing
conditions.

Decision-Making in Education. Turning now to public education, it is clear that
schools and school districts contain a fair amount of organizational complexity.
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First, educational decisions usually involve multiple decision-making entities,
including school and district administrators, school board members, PTAs, and
teachers unions. Additionally, public education is subject to government oversight
at the federal, state and local levels. Top-down mandates may conflict with local
decisions, and there are various structures or “bounds” that shape the ways in
which local decision-makers can act. Federal performance-based accountability
measures, for example, mandate a strict accountability system that sets proficiency
minimums linked to student performance on state standardized tests, even though
this proficiency threshold may conflict with the educational goals of school and
district personnel. Finally, there are numerous other bounds on the decisionmaking environment in schools and school districts that lend additional complexity,
for example the length of the school year, school budgets, and leadership structures.
In an effort to relate the vast literature on decision-making to the educational
sphere, it is important to begin again with Rational Choice Theory. In the
educational paradigm, the theory of accountability can be seen as a practical
application of Rational Choice Theory, because it assumes that a clearly identified
problem will cause schools and districts to optimize their behavior. The theory of
performance-based accountability holds that public attention to student
performance on standardized measures will motivate teachers and school leaders to
adopt strategies that will be more successful for their students (Stecher et al., 2008;
Hamilton, Berends & Stecher, 2005; Linn, 2005). Accountability theory’s linear
framework describes how the inputs from performance-based accountability
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systems lead schools and districts to select improvement strategies for their
classrooms, all of which are intended to generate positive change in student
performance.
Since performance-based accountability measures have become the norm in
education policy, many education experts have exposed the unrealistic expectations
and unintended consequences that these systems place on schools and school
districts. Among the assertions are that they limits instructional content to tested
concepts (Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2006); give incomplete or confusing information
to the implementers of new policies (Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002); place too
much attention on students in the middle of the ability spectrum while ignoring
those students on the either ends of the spectrum (Kreig, 2008; Booher-Jennings,
2005); and stigmatize poor, learning disabled, non-English speaking, and racial
minority students (Kantor & Lowe, 2006). These critiques suggest a fundamental
misalignment between the goals of accountability theory and the realities of
schooling. Looking back at the Rationality-Chaos Spectrum, it is possible to identify
various internal and external bounds on decision-making in public education that
might compromise the decision-making process outlined in accountability theory.
First, schools and school districts are bound by their status as a special type
of bureaucracy. Although they may appear to be Weberian bureaucracies, the
hierarchical structure in schools is actually quite flat. Efforts to make schools into
“rational organizations” are therefore thwarted due to the very nature of the schools
themselves. The average school most likely has multiple conflicting goals, multiple
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actors and constituents who have a stake in the process, a deeply entrenched social
culture, and unclear methods for how to best meet their goals (Ingersoll, 2003;
Bidwell, 2001; Lortie, 1975). As a result, the school in general – and the teaching
profession in particular – are likely to fit with the “loose coupling” scenario that
Weick (1976) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) predict.
Second, the specific characteristics of the school or district can shape the
decision-making process. Abelman and Elmore (1999) assert that the personal
preferences, responsibilities, and relationships of school and district staff – what
they call the “internal accountability” of an educational organization – is separate
from externally-generated performance-based accountability. Sense-making
theorists echo these claims and explain that people come into new situations with
their own understandings, values, beliefs, knowledge, and attitudes (Coburn &
Talbert, 2006; Spillane et al., 2002). Accordingly, the internal culture of a school or
organization can shape the decision-making process by redefining the problem
(Abelman & Elmore, 1999), limiting the search process to familiar solutions
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and opting for familiar solutions at the decision point
(Coburn & Talbert, 2006; Spillane et al., 2002).
Third, forces external to the school building can constrain the decisionmaking process. Because schools and school districts are bureaucratic
organizations, they are subject to multiple levels of governance and oversight.
Schools answer to districts, which answer to states, which in turn are accountable
under NCLB to the federal Department of Education. Furthermore, schools and
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districts are financed almost entirely by public funds, which means that they must
answer to taxpayers and other stakeholders. The decision-making process is
therefore shaped by both policymaking and politics. In terms of policymaking,
decisions about new programs or instructional strategies may be made at levels
higher than that of the school or district, and then simply be handed down to the
local level for implementation. These decisions, which often take the form of
mandates, may conflict with the internal culture of the district or contradict
previous decisions about instruction made at the local level (Abelman & Elmore,
1999). In terms of politics, schools and districts are affected by the political agendas
of policymakers, politicians, and other education stakeholders at all different levels
of government. At the local level, the personalities and leadership styles of school
administrators, district administrators, school board members, and city employees
may shape the problem identification, search, and decision processes regarding new
programs or instructional strategies. Even just one dominant personality can have a
big impact on the direction of the organization (Coburn & Talbert, 2006), and
political schedules (for example, election years) can also influence the degree to
which certain stakeholders place demands on the decision-making process.
Additionally, high-level leadership changes can drastically alter the problem
definition of the decision-making process, as each administrator will likely have a
different strategic plan (Hess, 1999). The collective human capital of the district
office has also been shown to play a role in either constraining or encouraging the
decision-making process at the district level. Hannaway and Kimball (1998) find
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that larger district offices are better at promoting performance-based reform –
including influencing school selection of improvement strategies – than are smaller
districts.
Finally, a host of other external issues place demands on the decision-making
process in schools and school districts alike. Time, for example, is a common bound,
as the school calendar makes it difficult for administrators to meet or for teachers to
train on new materials (Gross et al., 2005). Additionally, limited budgets –
especially during times of economic hardship – hamper decision-makers’ abilities to
select the programs they feel might be the best fit for students and teachers. And
finally, the opinions and attitudes of the community may impact decisions made at
the school or school district level. Parents, community activists, and other
stakeholders frequently raise concerns about the delivery of instruction, leadership,
and school organization issues, which may serve to set the agenda for future
decisions (Kingdon, 1995).
The various internal and external bounds on decision-making affect all four
components (again: problem identification, search, decision point, and
implementation) of the decision-making process in education to varying degrees.
The literature on search, while not as plentiful as that of the other phases, suggests
that it might be the phase most impacted by internal and decision-making
constraints.
First, research shows that the information available to decision-makers may
be convoluted, inaccessible, incomplete, or even incorrect. Gilovich (1991) explains
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that information may be ambiguous, incomplete, or messy, leading people to make
decisions that lack a true foundation of knowledge. In their discussion of researchbased knowledge, Nelson, Roberts, Maederer & Johnson (1987) state that the
meaningful impact of research on practice is limited by the poor presentation of
information and research-based findings. The “two communities” model of
information utilization posits that the research community has a poor
understanding of the practitioner community, and that practitioners would be
better served if research were made more accessible and written more clearly
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nelson et al., 1987). Furthermore, practitioners do not
always have access to high quality, rigorous research conducted by impartial
investigators – and, in some cases, the research findings may even be specious.
Research on teacher turnover by Ingersoll (2003b), for example, contradicts
decades of previously held “research-based” beliefs on the causes of the perceived
teacher shortage crisis, finding that teacher turnover is the culprit for teacher
shortages, and not inadequate teacher recruitment, as was previously believed.
Nevertheless, the education literature focuses on evidence-based decisionmaking, which is the study of how school leaders make use of data, including state
data, school data, and student-level data to inform their decisions. A number of
major studies delineate the various ways that schools make use of technical
information for decision-making (e.g. Kerr et al., 2006; Marsh, Pane & Hamilton,
2005; Supovitz & Klein, 2003; ECS, 2002). Along with these lists, the authors also
name various barriers to effective data use. Coburn and Talbert (2006), for
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example, find that varying perceptions about the utility of data use can impact
districts’ decisions for improvement. Numerous authors (Doyle, 2003; O’Day, 2002;
Stringfield, Reynolds & Schaffer, 2001) find that districts often lack the necessary
skills to interpret data in a way that is meaningful for school improvement efforts.
And Feldman and Tung (2001) find that school and district administrators lack the
necessary time to use data to inform decision-making.
Second, the education literature also suggests that social science research is
only one source of knowledge that school and district administrators may seek
during the decision-making process. Although Gilovich (1991) says that secondhand information can compromise the decision-making process, the education
literature asserts that advice from friends and colleagues can be a valid source of
information. Honig and Coburn (2007) find that district administrators often look
to trusted sources within the district – for example, principals, teachers, or fellow
administrators – to inform their improvement decisions. In other cases, they may
look to external sources in the community such as neighboring districts or parents.
Although some might discount the validity of the information provided by local
sources, decision-makers may highly value knowledge generated from within their
network of influence.
Third, Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) find that organizations limit their
search process both geographically and technologically, opting for solutions that are
both local and familiar. These “exploiter” organizations (March, 1991) look to past
behaviors and experiences to guide their search process rather than looking
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outward for innovative new practices. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) warn that, in
the long run, organizations that look inward for solutions will reach a critical mass
of innovation and then stagnate, closing themselves off to further change. Cohen
and Levinthal (1990) further explain that learning is a cumulative process, meaning
that each bit of newly acquired knowledge builds off of preexisting knowledge in the
organizational context. Organizations possess a limited “absorptive capacity” for
new information, and therefore information that is already internalized as part of
the organizational culture will be prioritized over new externally generated
information. These claims are validated in the education literature as well. Honig
and Coburn (2007) and Honig (2003) find that district administrators may ignore
externally generated information if the information does not fit into their existing
understandings. Similarly, in their study of high school response to accountability
demands, Gross et al. (2005) find that high schools limit their search processes due
to a “benign neglect” of outside ideas. They find that scheduling issues, time
limitations, and the actions of neighboring districts are heavy determinants of the
breadth and depth of the search process in high schools.
Fourth, the search process is highly susceptible to variations in school and
district context. Elmore (2001) suggests that the search process will vary
depending on the setting and context of the search. In his study of high schools,
Elmore says that the search process in “well-situated schools” follows a relatively
stable cycle of improvement, whereas what he terms “target” schools engage in
superficial searches to solve superficial problems. At the district level, Honig and
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Coburn (2007) find that the search process varies depending on who is conducting
the search. Administrators whose job it is to search for new information and
knowledge are more likely to conduct thorough searches, whereas other
administrators may undertake more haphazard and less thorough searches (Coburn
& Talbert, 2006). The search process may also vary depending on the goal of the
search. District decision-makers may use external searches only as a means to
establish the legitimacy of an impending reform, rather than as a true search for
new ideas (Honig & Coburn, 2007). The social capital of the organization may also
have an impact on the search process. Organizational structures that support high
levels of collaboration, mutual trust, and the free flow of ideas are more likely to
engage in robust searches for new ideas than are organizations with low levels of
these characteristics (Honig & Coburn, 2007; Coburn & Talbert, 2006; Honig, 2003;
Spillane & Thompson, 1997). Social capital external to the organization may play a
role as well, as schools and districts with a large social network of trusted colleagues
have access to a greater circle of ideas and knowledge (Honig & Coburn, 2007;
Spillane & Thompson, 1997).

A Conceptual Map. The vast literature on Bounded Rationality, Organizational
Theory, and the Garbage Can Model strongly suggests that the context of schooling
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for rationality to triumph. The degree to which
the decision-making process is constrained does depend, however, on the
complexity of the school or district (its internal bounds) as well as the
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organizational decision-making environment (its external bounds). The conceptual
map (Figure 1.2) depicts the complexity of the relationship between school or
district organizations and their decision-making environments. The map begins
with inputs from the performance-based accountability system and moves through
the district and school levels.

Figure 1.2
A Conceptual Map of Decision-Making Context in Education

Within this frame, the school or district, which is bounded by internal and external
factors, can approach the decision-making process in several different ways. If it
were to follow the Rational Choice Theory order of events, it would begin by
identifying the problem, then it would search for solutions, and then it would make
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a decision. Alternatively, however, the school or district could follow a pattern more
akin to the Garbage Can Model and begin with the decision itself and move
backwards through the steps, or skip the other steps all together. Finally, the school
or district could fail to come to a decision at all. In all cases, the product of this
process will lead to some type of school response (and note that inaction is
considered to be a valid type of response). These decisions can take many different
forms, including decisions about school organization, process, purchases,
instructional focus, and other forms.
In accordance with the sense-making approach, the map depicts an
organization’s navigation of the problem identification, search, and decision stages
as an iterative process. The school or district may refine or revisit any or all of the
three components of the decision-making process as it works its way to a final
response. The map also omits the fourth component of the decision-making process
– implementation – as this component is more of an end product or outcome of the
process rather than an intermediate component.
The school or district’s final response can then be categorized along the
Rationality-Chaos Spectrum on the basis of the following factors: the boundedness
of the organizational structure, the boundedness of the external environment, and
the manner in which the organization approaches the problem identification,
search, and decision process.
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CHAPTER 2: DATA AND METHODS
Research Questions
Although the literature on decision-making in education is vast, there exist
contradictions and evidence gaps in two specific areas. First, authors disagree about
whether the special bureaucratic structure of schooling is a positive or negative
influence on decision-making in education. Some authors (Bidwell, 2001; Weick,
1976) claim that the loosely coupled nature of schools encourages stability, allowing
some changes to occur without toppling the entire organizational structure. March
(1978), on the other hand, states that the flat bureaucratic structure of schools is a
negative force on decision-making because it makes the objectives of the decisionmaking process fundamentally ambiguous. When administrators act independently
from one another, they fail to learn from shared experiences, fail to understand the
technology of schooling, and misconstrue the goals of new improvement efforts.
Along these same lines, there is a lack of empirical evidence about the
relationship between the organizational characteristics of the school or district and
the decision-making environment. Although some authors (e.g., Honig & Coburn,
2007; Coburn & Talbert, 2006; Elmore, 2001) begin to parse apart school or district
characteristics that may lead the organization to make more informed decisions,
more specific work is needed that compares and contrasts the decision-making
behaviors in a wide variety of educational environments. And because most of the
literature on decision-making in education is conducted at either the school level or
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the district level (but rarely examined in conjunction), it would be helpful to study
schools and districts as nested organizations.
Second, the search component of decision-making is under-explored in the
field of education. Although the search process receives some attention at the
school level by Gross et al. (2005) and at the district level by Farley-Ripple (2008)
and Honig and Coburn (2007), existing research leaves some important questions
unanswered. It would be helpful to know, for example, what administrators and
teachers consider to be valid information, whom they rely upon for local
information, who is responsible for the search process, and how much
accountability pressure changes that process.
Furthermore, there is a critical disagreement in the literature as to whether
local information can be trusted. Although some theorists believe that local
information is faulty (Gilovich, 1991) and stymies innovation (Rosenkopf & Almeida,
2003; March, 1991), others believe that local information can be a valid source of
new ideas. Honig and Coburn (2007) find that districts often lean on information
from colleagues both internal and external to the district office when they make
decisions for improvement. In some cases, advice and information from these
trusted sources may be viewed as even more valid than some research-based
findings, because practitioners value face-to-face interactions and easily understood
explanations of new ideas (Honig, 2003; Nelson et al., 1987). Research on the
applicability of locally generated knowledge is sparse, however, and this area should
be explored more fully.
27

To address these gaps, I propose the following research questions for my
dissertation:
RQ1: How do schools approach each phase of the decision-making process
(including problem identification, search, and the decision point)?
RQ2: How chaotic is decision-making in education?
a. What internal and external factors constrain the decision-making process in
schools and districts, and to what degree do they affect the ultimate decision
outcome?
b. Is the decision-making process linear, circular, chaotic, or does it follow a
different pattern? At what point during the decision-making process does
search come in, if at all?
c. Where do schools and districts fall on the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum?
RQ3: Can a new framework be created that adequately and appropriately fits
schools and school district decision-making processes? If so, what organizational
characteristics (size, demographics, etc.) are associated with certain types of
processes?
Methodology
This study is a project nested within a larger research study, which was
funded by a grant from the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) at the U.S.
Department of Education, and ran from June 2008 to August 2011. The study was
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run out of the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) at the University
of Pennsylvania and the Principal Investigator was Dr. Elliot Weinbaum. I was a
Research Assistant on that project for its duration. The goal of the larger study was
to examine schools’ responses to No Child Left Behind, particularly which strategies
and programs they select when called upon by the law to improve student academic
achievement. The larger study had three components. First, we administered a
survey to all principals in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania regarding their
accountability status under the law and the various strategies they employ in their
schools to improve scores on the state test. Second, in cooperation with the
Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE), we used school-level achievement
data to link schools’ selected strategies to their achievement outcomes. Finally, we
conducted two consecutive years of case study site visits to 11 schools around the
state. As part of these visits, we asked school administrators and teachers how the
school addressed its shortcomings in particular areas and student subgroups, what
strategies it had selected for improvement, and how those strategies were working.
For my dissertation study, I narrow the scope of the original study from the
broad question of “what strategies do schools select for improvement?” to the more
focused question of “how do schools come to select a particular strategy for
improvement over others?” In a sense, however, I also expand the scope of the
original study. Although I use the data from the statewide survey and the two years
of case study site visits, I expand the case studies to encompass not just schools but
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also the districts in which they reside, since many decisions for improvement are
made in conjunction with administrators at the district level.
I employ a comparative case study approach to studying the decision-making
processes of schools and school districts. This design is ideal because it allows the
researcher to explore a complex social phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984),
in this case the decision-making processes of educational organizations. Yin (1984)
writes that the case study approach “investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). This is especially fitting for my
research, as my goal is to understand the specific dynamics surrounding decisionmaking that exist within a school and its district, and then widening the scope to
compare schools and districts to one another based on their defining characteristics.
Although the study is primarily qualitative in nature, I also use descriptive data
gleaned from the 2009 survey of principals, which asked principals to identify the
major areas where they are focusing their improvement efforts in light of the
performance-based accountability system set forth in NCLB.
The combination of the descriptive survey data and the in-depth case studies
– including both interview data and document analysis – helps to triangulate data,
which in turn will increase the internal validity of findings (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Furthermore, I approach the case study component of the study design with a
strong grounding in the literature, but without preconceived notions of how
decision-making can or should occur in the public education setting. As detailed in
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the literature review section, there exists a wide range of views about the degree to
which decision-making in education is either rational or chaotic. Following the
advice of Eisenhardt (1989), my goal is to not take sides, but rather to build theory
based on my interactions with my case study interviewees and my review of
internal school and district documents.

Sampling Strategy. The eight schools (and their corresponding districts) are all
located in Pennsylvania. Focusing on one state has several advantages. First,
Pennsylvania is a large state, which makes it relatively easy to select a sample of
schools with a diverse set of economic, demographic, and geographic conditions.
The stratified random sample consists of a heterogeneous set of schools and their
corresponding districts, all with different defining characteristics. Second, hearing
from schools and districts in just one state makes it somewhat easier to compare
improvement strategies and search processes, because administrators and teachers
use a common language that is specific to Pennsylvania. Similarly, schools'
experiences with popular programs (for example, test preparation booklets,
remediation programs, university affiliations, etc.) make it easier to assess the
relative reach of these outside resources to the schools. Finally, the Pennsylvania
Department of Education officially expressed its support for the original IES-funded
study, specifically the administration of a statewide principal survey, use of school
achievement data, and two consecutive years of case study visits to schools.
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Beyond these clear advantages, Pennsylvania also provides a fascinating
context for studying search and decision-making processes. As outlined in NCLB,
states are allowed to determine the pace at which they ratchet up the proficiency
requirements for schools, as long as that number reaches 100% by the 2013-14
school year. In the 2007-08 school year – just before the study began -- the
proficiency requirement was increased from 45% to 56% in math and from 54% to
63% in reading. Accordingly, many schools found themselves failing to meet the
proficiency requirements for the first time, and were declared to be in “warning
status” under the law. This provided an excellent opportunity to study how schools
react to top-down calls for improvement.
The original school sample for the site visits was designed as a stratified
random sample of 48 schools, in which the strata were defined by schools’ failure to
make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) under NCLB in one of the six possible
disaggregated student subgroups that are outlined in the law (see Table 1). The
subgroups were: 1) making AYP in all subgroups; 2) failing for Special Education
students; 3) failing for Limited English Proficient students; 4) failing in a particular
race category of students; 5) failing for economically disadvantaged students; and 6)
failing in multiple subgroups. Both elementary schools and high schools were
included, which allowed for eight schools in each group/category – four elementary
and four high schools – to be included in the sample.
Following the selection of the sample in the fall of 2008, the research team
conducted in-depth phone interviews with principals in each of the 48 schools so
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that we could determine which of the 48 schools would be appropriate for in-depth
case study research, and also to develop a comprehensive protocol for the case
study interviews. Accordingly, we asked principals about the activities underway in
their schools in response to their new “warning status” as well as their general
feelings about performance-based accountability. We did ask some general
decision-making questions during the initial interviews, although generally these
questions didn’t go into the specifics of principals’ search processes.

Table 2.1
Stratified random sample: Number of schools sampled by school type
AYP Status
Made AYP
Failed to make AYP Failed to make AYP Failed to make AYP Failed to make AYP Failed to make AYP -

Whole School (Total)
Special Education
Economically Disadvantaged
Racial subgroup
Limited English Proficiency
TOTAL

School Level
Elementary
High School
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
24

Total

24

8
8
8
8
8
8
48

From this set of 48 schools, we identified 11 schools for in-depth case study
visits. We chose one elementary school and one high school in each of the six
categories. There was no high school in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that
failed to make AYP for the first time that year in the Limited English Proficient
subgroup, which is why the final tally of schools was 11 and not 12. We selected
schools from the original stratified random sample based primarily on the
relationships established with the principals during the phone interviews, but the
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selection process also took into account demographic, economic, and geographic
factors as well. The goal was to create an overall case study sample that was as
diverse as possible, representing many different school environments and student
populations throughout the state. Principals who granted access to their schools
were promised $200 as compensation for the visit, as well as reimbursement for any
substitute teachers they might use while researchers were interviewing classroom
teachers. I attempted to gain access to each of the 10 districts that were associated
with the 11 schools in the original case study sample. Two districts declined to
participate in my study, which left me with eight districts in my final sample. The
declining districts were at the extremes of the spectrum in terms of urbanicity – one
declining district was a very urban district, and the other was a very rural district.
Table 2.2
Range of School Characteristics across the Study Sample
District Per%
% Prof.
% Prof.
Pupil
NonMath*
Reading*
Expenditure
White
HS 1
6.8
Large
Suburban
$10,103
11.8
70
88.5
HS 2
19.4
Small
Suburban
$9,687
6.1
52.6
63.5
HS 3
18.0
Large
Suburban
$9,075
19.3
64.1
74.7
HS 4
34.0
Large
Rural
$12,057
0
49.2
70.1
HS 5
27.0
Small
Rural
$9,859
9.1
83.6
85.3
ELEM 1
74.6
Small
Urban
$10,426
40.7
56.3
51.6
ELEM 2
10.6
Large
Suburban
$9,237
4.8
80.3
74.2
ELEM 3
78.2
Large
Urban
$9,399
95.0
42.3
39.9
ELEM 4
42.3
Small
Suburban
$8,810
2.1
73.9
73.3
ELEM 5
11.7
Large
Suburban
$12,836
19.9
90
84.9
ELEM 6
82.6
Large
Urban
$9,399
86.1
58.4
46.9
* Scores taken from the Pennsylvania state standardized test, the PSSA, from the 2007-2008 school
year. Scores represent the percentage of students in the school scoring at “proficient” or “advanced”
on the PSSA. In that school year, the school cutoff for making Adequate Yearly Progress, safe harbor
and confidence interval measures notwithstanding, was 63% in reading and 56% in math.
School

%
FRPL

District
Size

Location
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While the exclusion of these two districts is clearly a limitation of my study,
the eight districts included in the dissertation study are a fair representation of the
most common district environments in the state, both in terms of size and
urbanicity. Yin (2003) asserts that, when using a multiple case study design, it is
important to carefully select cases that can identify contrasting results, but for
predictable reasons. My final sample accomplishes this goal, which makes the
multiple case study design a robust approach to studying the phenomenon of search
and decision-making in the school and district context.

Data Collection Methods. The primary data source of data for my dissertation
study is in-depth interviews with school-level and district-level personnel. During
the first two years of interviews (spring 2009 and spring 2010), interviews were
with school personnel, including teachers, guidance counselors, support staff, and
school administrators. The goal was to interview approximately 8-10 individuals at
each school, although these numbers varied somewhat depending on school size
and interviewee availability. Whenever possible, we attempted to interview the
same individuals in Year 2 as in Year 1. In total, the numbers for the first two years
of interviews were 119 individuals and 185 total interviews. In contrast, the Year 3
interviews were almost entirely with district-level personnel, and most often
included curriculum coordinators, business managers, assistant superintendents,
and superintendents. The number of individuals interviewed in each district during
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Year 3 varied greatly depending on the size of the district, but usually was between
two and six individuals in total. In total, I interviewed 27 individuals in Year 3.
According to Patton (1987), “Depth interviewing involves asking open-ended
questions, listening to and recording the answers, and then following up with
additional relevant questions” (p. 108). I used a different protocol for each year of
interviews. We piloted all protocols with school and district administrators before
using them in actual case study settings, which yielded a final product that was clear
and comprehensive. The resulting protocols were also grounded in the research
and the research questions but were not overly structured – interviewees could
guide the conversation in a particular direction if they wished. We ensured the
confidentiality of all interviewees to help ensure that interviewees felt comfortable
being candid about the decision-making processes (or lack thereof) in their schools
or districts – I use neither interviewee names nor the names of their schools or
districts in this dissertation. We gave interviewees detailed consent forms (which
were approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board).
Following the collection of interview data, I password protected all data files,
including recordings and transcripts, and removed identifiers from all analysis
documents. As a result the schools in this dissertation are labeled as “ELEM 1,”
“ELEM 2,” etc. and “HS 1,” “HS 2,” etc.
I built three sources of data from the interviews. First, I drafted field memos
following each visit, which included initial impressions and observations from the
interviews regarding such things as the school or district culture, the organization’s
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search efforts, and/or interactions with staff. Second, the research team took notes
during interviews, which were objective recordings of interviewee statements
(mainly in case there were technical problems with the digital recordings). Finally,
we made digital recordings of most all of the interviews (save those cases in which
the interviewee declined to be recorded) and created transcripts from these
recordings.
Aside from the interviews, I also review relevant documents pertaining to the
schools or districts in my sample. One example is the “Getting Results” document
that the state required each school in “warning” status to complete, detailing its
plans for improvement over one year’s time. Comparing the schools’ stated plans to
the processes that actually occurred in schools (as gleaned from the interviews)
gave some insight into the degree to which schools have formal improvement plans
in place that guide search and decision-making processes. The Getting Results
document is a publicly available resource on the Pennsylvania Department of
Education website, although it is no longer in wide use statewide. Other examples of
relevant documents include any frameworks, protocols, or guidelines that existed at
the district or school levels to guide decision-making practices. For example, a
school might have a formal curriculum review process that guides their search for
new curriculum materials. Whenever possible, I asked for access to these
documents during the interviews, and was given permission to use them as part of
my dissertation research.
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Finally, I use data collected from the 2009 statewide survey of principals.
The survey was administered to the over 3,000 principals throughout the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with response rate of 65%. Questions on the
survey were about the different types of activities underway in schools in response
to performance-based accountability measures at the state and federal levels.

Limitations. There are several limitations inherent in my data collection methods.
First, due to timing, budget, and travel limitations, my dissertation research does
not contain any direct observations of schools or school district decision-making
processes. Observing school board meetings, staff meetings, or vendor
presentations would likely have strengthened the internal validity of my findings,
since it would have provided a data source not based on self-report. Even if I had
conducted observations, however, it would have been difficult to determine what
would constitute a “decision-making moment.” Search processes, for example, often
occur through phone calls or casual encounters with friends or colleagues, or
through individual research conducted at unpredictable times.
The timing of my data collection is potentially another limitation of my
research. Although I was able to build in search and decision-making questions to
the protocols for all three years of data collection, it is possible that interviewees’
memories had faded by the third year of data collection. Ideally, I would have
collected my district data concurrently with the school data, providing a more
complete picture of the decision-making process occurring at a particular moment
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in time. By the time I had finalized the topic for my dissertation, however, it was
past the second year of data collection. I therefore decided to conduct the district
research as a third consecutive year, and ask my interviewees to think back to when
the school in question was first placed in “warning” following the 2007-2008 school
year. In some cases, district administrators were not on staff at that time, which
caused me to modify slightly the nature of the protocol to reflect more current
search and decision-making activities within the district.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, my inability to recruit two of the ten target
districts is a limitation of my study. Although I believe the final distribution of my
sample is representative of the “average” set of districts and schools throughout the
state (see Table 2), I would have preferred to see these three additional schools and
two additional districts included in the final sample.

Analysis. The first step in my analysis plan was to create a detailed case study of
each school district in my study. I present these case studies in Chapter 3. For each
case study, I use data from the site visits, which includes the field memos, interview
notes, complete interview transcripts, and document analysis. To aggregate withincase information, I created a common coding scheme for interviews transcripts from
all three years that includes both deductive and inductive codes. Maintaining the
same codes from year to year allowed me to aggregate responses within the school
or district from one year to the next. I used the Atlas.ti qualitative software program
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to assist in this process of aggregation, with each school or district becoming its own
“family” for analysis purposes.
The individual case studies lay the groundwork for the comparative study of
the districts and schools (Eisenhardt, 1989), which I discuss in chapters 4 and 5.
For my cross-case analysis, I used a series of case-ordered descriptive matrices. As
described by Miles and Huberman (1994), case-ordered descriptive matrices list the
cases in a certain order according to a particular variable of interest. The authors
suggest that ordering cases in this way can become a powerful way to detect
differences both across cases and among high, medium, and low cases. The
variables and meta-variables correspond to points of interest relating to my
research questions.
To adequately capture the various cross-case differences, I employed several
techniques, depending on the variable of interest. If the variable was, for example,
the constraints on decision-making, I organized the cases by the type of constraint
and then created a meta-variable that described a particular force putting pressure
on schools and districts. If, on the other hand, the variable of interest was the people
who made decisions for the school or district, I instead created a meta-variable that
measured the degree of dispersion of the decision-making process or a bivariate
measure of whether the decision-making process can be considered “top-down” or
“bottom-up” in nature. The meta-variables varied in each manipulation of the caseordered descriptive matrix. Although the vast majority of the data for this
dissertation study come from the interviews and document analysis, wherever
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possible I triangulated my data with information from the document analysis or the
2009 survey of principals.
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CHAPTER 3: INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES

Study Sample
This study employs a comparative case study design of eight different
schools throughout Pennsylvania. The sample includes six schools that failed to
make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) following the 2007-2008 school year and two
that successfully made AYP that year. The schools are also representative across
geography, urbanicity, student demographics, and student socioeconomic status
(with the possible exception that the sample does not contain any extremely large
urban districts). Table 3.1 depicts some key characteristics of the sample.

Table 3.1
Study Sample

School

%
FRPL

District
Size

Geography

District PPE

ELEM 1
74.6
Small
Urban
$10,426
ELEM 2
10.6
Large
Suburban
$9,237
ELEM 3
42.3
Small
Suburban
$8,810
ELEM 4
11.7
Large
Suburban
$12,836
HS 1
6.8
Large
Suburban
$10,103
HS 2
19.4
Small
Suburban
$9,687
HS 3
18.0
Large
Suburban
$9,075
HS 4
27.0
Small
Rural
$9,859
*Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2008

%
NonWhite
40.7
4.8
2.1
19.9
11.8
6.1
19.3
9.1

%
Prof.
Math
56.3
80.3
73.9
90
70
52.6
64.1
83.6

%
Prof.
Reading
51.6
74.2
73.3
84.9
88.5
63.5
74.7
85.3

This table, while helpful, cannot adequately convey the complexity inherent
in the specific settings of the eight schools listed above. To this end, I provide short
individual case study write-ups for each of the eight schools in the sample. I used
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three separate sources of information to develop each write-up. First, I wrote field
memos following each school or district site visit over the three years. These field
memos included my initial impressions of the school building, the school culture,
and the main themes that emerged from the interviews. Second, I read through the
entire three years of interview transcripts school by school to get an in-depth idea of
the school’s context, decision-making approach, and relevant constraining factors. I
took detailed notes on each school during this process. Finally, I analyzed any
relevant documents that school leaders made available to me during my visits, for
example curriculum review cycles or the state-mandated Getting Results document.
Since we promised confidentiality, I use codes for each school. High schools
are labeled “HS 1,” “HS 2,” etc. and elementary schools – defined as any school
serving students Kindergarten to eighth grade – are labeled “ELEM 1,” “ELEM 2,” etc.
In each case, I interviewed individuals both in the school setting and in the district
offices.
ELEM 1
ELEM 1 is a medium-sized school located in a depressed urban area. The
surrounding houses in the neighborhood are mainly dilapidated two-family homes,
and I could tell by the number of people outside on a weekday that unemployment
in the area was likely high. During our visit, the school staff spoke often of the
“home problem” that plagues students. They said that students come from broken
homes and have disinterested parents and guardians, which made their jobs as
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teachers and administrators very difficult. When asked what factors were hindering
the school’s ability to make AYP, one teacher put it succinctly and brashly: “We have
a lot of crack babies,” she said. This negativity and blame-placing attitude pervaded
our experience over the two years that we visited the school. Administrators were
more forward thinking and positive, but admitted that the district did have a
problem with parental engagement.
In terms of decision-making, the district pursued a two-pronged approach. It
tightly controlled the decision-making process around major instructional decisions,
such as selecting new curriculum materials, aligning curriculum to the standards,
and reorganizing grades by department. The superintendent, assistant
superintendent, and high school principal seemed to be the major decision-makers
in these areas. The elementary principal was rarely included in the search and
decision-making process, and the district overlooked teacher input all together. On
the other hand, however, the district let the elementary school principal make the
“less important” decisions, such as how to handle PSSA remediation, school-wide
action planning, setting incentives for PSSA performance, and other improvement
activities. When I asked the elementary principal directly about whether decisions
were “top-down” or “bottom-up” in nature, he said that about 70% of decisions
were top-down and 30% were bottom-up.
A good example of the mostly top-down decision-making process in the
district was the district’s decision to change the elementary math curriculum. In the
first year of our visits, the assistant principal had grown worried that the existing
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curriculum was not research-based. The district administrators evaluated a number
of different programs, and ended up selecting Everyday Math for three reasons.
First, neighboring schools were using it with success. Second, it had a research base
on the What Works Clearinghouse. And third, the middle school and high school
principals thought it would synch well with their math curricula. The elementary
principal was later informed of the decision and allowed to try out the new
materials. Teachers were left out of the process completely. Said one teacher,
“Everything seems to be very quiet and then they announce, so we were hearing in
the background this is going to happen, but nothing definite until our last Act 80
meeting it was in March they said this is going to be our new curriculum, look at it
and see what you think, we are going to try and use the new power teaching model,
which none of us have been trained in yet” (Teacher, ELEM 1). Another teacher said
simply, “We are not real sure on who chose it and why” (Teacher, ELEM 1).
As far as search at the district level, the district followed strict protocols for
its top-down decision-making process, but engaged in a very limited search process.
The assistant superintendent used a framework that he adapted from his previous
district that asked the decision-maker to evaluate new programs and strategies
based on cost, timing, and other factors. District administrators also reported that
they leaned heavily on the Pennsylvania Department of Education website when
trying to align their curriculum to the state standardized test or engage in K-12
curriculum alignment. Finally, district administrators reported that they routinely
looked to neighboring districts to see what had worked for others in the past, asking
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these districts for specific evidence of programs’ success as shown on benchmark
tests and other measures. That said, the options under consideration at the district
level were usually determined not by the administrators themselves, but rather by
the vendors who happened to knock on the door. Said the assistant superintendent,
“The vendors basically find you. You really don’t have to search them out too much,
because they’re for profit. So they find you pretty easily. There’s a lot of good stuff
out there. The thing is, you’ve got to sift through it and find what’s right for your
district. And make sure that you’re not duplicating, and it’s meeting your needs.”
(District Administrator, ELEM 1)
In contrast to the more formal (albeit limited) district-level efforts, the
search process at the school level was focused almost entirely on informal
networking. Said the principal at ELEM 1, “Education is all about stealing whatever
works, see if it works for you, if not, steal from someone else” (Principal, ELEM 1).
The principal also looked to data from neighboring districts, but admitted that he
mainly called his friends to see what was working for them. Other networking
efforts happened organically within the school building itself. Several teachers
mentioned that they got together during their planning periods or lunch breaks to
compare what was working in their classrooms, and how best to prepare their
students for the PSSAs. In some cases, these informal meetings resulted in tweaks
to the reading and math curriculum so that it was better aligned to tested content.
Teachers said that the school principal didn’t really get involved in these micro-level
decisions. As one teacher put it, “We have team meetings, we meet as a team once a
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month and usually at those times we discuss any challenges or things we would like
to try and [the principal] lets us try it because we’ve been very consistent
throughout the years with scores so in his eyes he thinks we are the ones teaching it
everyday, we are the ones implementing it in our classrooms he trusts us and lets us
try it” (Teacher, ELEM 1).
The order of decision-making at the district level was fairly linear, with
problem identification as the first step, then the search for solutions, and finally the
decision itself. Administrators did not agree on which of those steps was the most
difficult – some said that problem identification was the most difficult, whereas
others said it was the easiest. Decision-making, while linear, was limited by two
important factors. The first factor was a district culture that did not encourage
collaboration – teachers and school-level administrators alike simply waited for
options to land at their feet instead of actively searching for potential new programs
and strategies. The second limiting factor was time. Nearly all interviewees
mentioned that there simply wasn’t enough time to meet and collaborate about
programming and improvement strategies for the school or the district, which in
turn constrained their ability to make informed decisions.
ELEM 2
In contrast to ELEM 1’s low wealth surroundings, ELEM 2 is a small school in
a high-wealth district. During the first year of visits, the school served students in
Kindergarten through fifth grade, but in the second and third year of visits, the
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district added an “intermediate school” and restructured its elementary schools to
serve only grades K-3. Thus, while ELEM 2 was in warning in our first year, the
teachers and administrators had only one tested grade (third grade) in the
subsequent years of research visits.
In our first visit to the school, we were invited into the “War Room,” which is
the name that the principal gave to his Response-to-Intervention (RTI) and data
review team. The team consisted of the principal, a math specialist, a reading
specialist, the guidance counselor, and the RTI coordinator. This was the first
indication that the staff at this elementary school – and, as I would later discover,
the district as a whole – were extremely data-driven in their decision-making
approach. In this meeting, the War Room team presented a wealth of school-level
data and reviewed the many different interventions and curriculum supplement
programs they had in place to serve the diverse educational needs of their student
body. ELEM 2 took a proactive approach to school improvement – whereas other
schools and districts in the sample would name about 10-15 strategies for
improvement, the administrators at this district named over 30 different programs
or strategies that they were in the process of adopting and implementing either
district or school-wide. By the third year of interviews, administrators
acknowledged that their main challenge was to begin to look at what types of
programs they could eliminate from this list. The assistant superintendent
explained this dilemma:
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“We need to get a little bit better at looking at what becomes the litmus test
for what we take in as the new thing we take in from down the pike. Or
rather, what becomes a litmus test for saying that they are going to adopt
something or pull something in to solve those problems. We’ve had the
luxury of being able to do WalMart shopping – go in and, “oh, here’s
everything. We need this for this, and this for this.” And so you have a
multitude of things out there and now we’ve gotta kind of move toward
Target and eventually back to the mom-and-pop hardware store where we
go in and we have limited choices and limited funds.” (District Administrator,
ELEM 2)
The decision-making process in the district was neither top-down nor
bottom-up, but rather was a truly collaborative process. The district proactively
used its school-level personnel as informants and participants in the decisionmaking process. This process took shape in three ways: First, the district had in
place a Response-to-Intervention (RTI) program that used data to target
remediation to the specific areas in which students struggle; second, the district
used a formal curriculum review protocol to provide supplemental support for noncovered content or skill areas; and third, the district actively “pre-implemented” all
new potential programs in classrooms before formally introducing new programs to
a broader audience.
The goal of the district’s RTI program was to use student-level data to craft a
remediation or enrichment program that fit each child’s unique educational needs.
Data collection was therefore a major effort in the district, and the schools had in
place multiple data collection methods, including regular benchmark tests, fluency
screeners, and computer-based programs. The district’s math and reading
coordinators were in constant contact with the school RTI teams, particularly the
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math and reading specialists. School teams shared information about emerging
needs to district personnel, who then gauged how pervasive the need was districtwide. In this way, student needs were aggregated to the school level, and then
further aggregated to the district level, creating a bottom-up feedback system that
was guided by top-down RTI processes.
The second tool in the district’s decision-making toolbox was curriculum
review protocols. The district administrators in charge of math, reading, and special
education each used a highly detailed framework to review all potential new
programs or strategies. This framework contained six separate “stages”: 1) program
evaluation/philosophy/framework generation; 2) resource review and piloting; 3)
product purchase and pre-implementation; 4) full implementation; 5) monitoring
and evaluation; and 6) refinement. The timeline for this process went out five years
and was for all subject areas in all grades throughout the district.
Finally, the district used a “pre-implementation” strategy, which was also the
third stage of the curriculum review process explained above. The preimplementation process allowed teachers to use new programs in their classrooms
for up to a year before fully rolling them out school or district-wide. Two or three
teachers would use a program in their classrooms for several months, and then
would serve on a “pre-implementation committee” at the district offices. As
committee members, they would present their successes and challenges using the
program in their classroom. The literacy or math specialist at the school would
always be present for these meetings, as would the district administrators for
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reading or math and the assistant superintendent. We spoke to several teachers in
the elementary school who were pre-implementers and all spoke highly of the
practice, saying that it allowed them to proactive participants in the decisionmaking process. Following pre-implementation, the district then made the decision
about whether to fully roll out the program, and how to best support the new
program with professional development and training.
Although the district was heavily reliant on protocols and frameworks as
part of its information gathering system, the district made a conscious effort not to
copy other districts. Several administrators asserted that they saw themselves as
innovators, not copiers. Said the district’s reading curriculum coordinator, “I don’t
want this district to be ‘what is’; I want it to be prepared so that other districts are
looking to us” (District Administrator, ELEM 2). This means that they did not look
for strategies or curriculum materials that had been used in other districts, they did
not rely on the recommendations of the state or the Intermediate Units, and they did
not take the word of vendors that they had worked with in the past. Instead, the
district constantly looked for new and innovative programs on the horizon, scanning
the research journals and clearinghouses to inform their evidence-based processes.
As an example, the reading director explained that when she selected a program to
collect data on a students’ reading fluency (or “Lexile” scores), she visited the Lexile
website and looked at each and every vendor that the site recommended. Then she
cross-referenced each vendor’s product by reviewing the relevant research on
Lexile scoring, relying mainly on her professional journals. Finally, she called in a
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short-list of vendors and interviewed them about how they would add value to the
district’s data-driven decision-making agenda in relation to the others. She selected
Scholastic’s program because that vendor was able to link Lexile scores to parent
resources, including lists of library books in each child’s area of fluency.
Finally, the process by which the district makes decisions was linear. The
purpose of the “War Room” was mainly to use student-level data to identify
problems, such as gaps in the curriculum or instruction. Then, the district
administrators collaborated with school-level personnel (mainly the math and
reading specialists, although they were open to teacher input as well) to find the
right programs that would fit the unique needs of struggling students. The search
process itself involved queries of vendors, technical research, and – to a limited
extent – outreach to trusted sources at the state or regional levels. Once the district
or school made a preliminary decision, it then activated the pre-implementation
process, making sure to gather feedback from the pre-implementers along the way.
Only then did the district finalize its decision and fully adopt the new program or
strategy. Given the deliberate nature of this process, the main constraint on search
and decision-making was time – decisions often took a year or more to reach full
implementation.

ELEM 3
Whereas ELEM 2 exhibited high levels of administrative and teacher
collaboration for improvement, these levels were dismally low in ELEM 3. Although
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there was only one other elementary school in the school district, the administrators
and teachers at ELEM 3 frequently referred to their school as the “red-headed
stepchild of the district.” Their students, they said, came from more impoverished
backgrounds, their PTA was less robust, their programming was not well supported,
and the district looked down on them. Most interesting, however, was their claim
that the school as a whole was less involved in the decision-making process than
was the other elementary school.
For her part, the superintendent recognized the competition between her
two elementary buildings, but said there was little she could do to change the
dynamic because she – and the district – lacked the capacity to do so. The district
was small and her entire administrative staff, from the facilities managers to the
maintenance staff, was only ten people strong. There was no assistant
superintendent and no curriculum coordinator for her to lean on. As the principal of
ELEM 3 put it, “The superintendent in this district does more things than the
superintendent should do. And it’s- I don’t want to say that it’s micromanagement. I
believe it’s high degree of forced management, in that degree…She’s involved in
personnel. She’s involved in curriculum. She’s involved in so many other areas, as
well as that’s a political role” (Principal, ELEM 3).
These two issues – the district’s low level of capacity and the elementary
school’s inferiority complex – made the decision-making process fraught with
tension. The low levels of human capital and scarce resources meant that the
district didn’t consider many new programs or strategies. In the first year after
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ELEM 3 was put on the state’s “warning list,” the principal himself admitted that the
school wasn’t really doing anything different than it had before. The only change
was an afterschool tutoring program for Title I students, which was a program
enabled by formula funding from the state and was not a district or school decision.
But even in situations when the superintendent asked the staff at ELEM 3 for their
opinions on new strategies or materials, the staff felt resentful and claimed that the
programs were really intended more for the other elementary building.
In the three years of my visits to the school, there was only one example of a
decision that followed a linear decision-making process: the selection of a new math
curriculum. Teachers had for years been complaining that their math textbooks
were old, poorly aligned to the state standards, and filled with “fluff” (Teacher,
ELEM 3). When the district received funds from the 2008 stimulus bill, the district
was able to search out new curriculum materials. The process was fairly linear and
top-down in nature – the superintendent solicited vendors to submit sample
textbooks, then she met with her two elementary principals to discuss, then she
called together a committee of teachers at the two elementary schools to discuss the
various options on the table, and then she made a decision based on their input.
Despite this fairly inclusive top-down strategy, teachers at ELEM 3 claimed that they
were very wary of the new math curriculum because they felt they had been left out
of the process, and they suspected the choice was really made because teachers at
the other elementary building had wanted it.
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In the two years while teachers waited for this new math curriculum,
however, they actively sought out new ways to align their instruction to the state
standards, albeit without any coordination or supervision at the school level.
Teachers reported that they took it upon themselves to find solutions to the
outdated curriculum. When asked what resources she used to help her implement
the state standards, one teacher said, “We get some stuff from the Internet. Not
much. I have other books that the previous teacher left. My father was a math
teacher for thirty-some years, and he gave me some stuff, too. I was pretty much
given a lot of things from previous years” (Teacher, ELEM 3).
Although one might think that the school’s self-described second-class citizen
status would cause them to rally around one another, this was not the case – in their
search for solutions in their own classrooms, teachers rarely leaned on one another
as resources. Low levels of social capital in the school prevented teachers from
sharing ideas and helping one another. As a result, efforts at aligning curriculum to
the standards (before the new math curriculum was adopted) were fractured. The
4th grade’s strategy for alignment, for example, was to replace its Pennsylvania
History class with more geometry preparation before the PSSAs. The 5th grade was
trying to ramp up its use of the PSSA coach booklets, while the 6th grade opted to
replace recess periods with more test preparation. In all cases, the elementary
principal seemed to have simply signed off on whatever teachers wanted to try,
resulting in an uncoordinated bottom-up approach to decision-making.
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In general, the story of ELEM 3 is very few decisions were made according to
a true “process.” The lack of capacity, specifically the lack of social and human
capital, undermined efforts to make decisions for improvement in a thoughtful,
deliberate, and inclusive manner.
ELEM 4
Whereas ELEM 3 lacked staff capacity and suffered from a negative school
culture, ELEM 4 enjoyed a surplus of support staff and prioritized efforts to
constantly improve social capital. ELEM 4 is located in a well-to-do area with a
highly motivated parent community. The building principal was a woman whose
leadership style was not unlike that of a military officer – she was driven, decisive,
focused, and blunt. She was also very well liked in her school and, by the third year
of interviews, she had been promoted to an administrative position in the district
office. Despite the regimented personal leadership style of the principal, however,
the district did not follow any specific set of guidelines for decision-making in
general or search procedures in particular. Instead, the district operated on a
general philosophy that information for decision-making could come from
anywhere – from sources internal or external to the district, from research journals
or word-of-mouth recommendations, and from the school custodian up to the
superintendent. While some might view this as a fragmented approach to decisionmaking, perhaps a more appropriate term would be “organic,” because
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administrators were constantly encouraging personnel to collaborate and
brainstorm about new potential programs.
As a result, the district was highly attuned to the social needs of employees,
and spent a great deal of effort on increasing social interaction among employees in
different buildings. The Assistant Superintendent for Elementary Education said
that her primary goal for the academic year was to conduct meetings with building
leaders, rotating the venue each week so that personnel could see what other
peoples’ “worlds were like.” The goals of these meetings were to share best
practices, as well as communicate emerging issues or instructional challenges.
Mostly, however, the goal was to get people to feel that they were part of a
functional team.
The district actively called upon principals, teachers, specialists, and
paraprofessionals to participate in the decision-making process – they were asked
to present data, generate new ideas for improvement, and even vote on new
potential programs and strategies. The assistant superintendent for curriculum and
instruction said that he liked to call general meetings and be very upfront about his
own preferences for new programs or strategies; but he admits that he openly
encourages employees to disagree with him, as long as they can express their
reasoning in a coherent and convincing way. When we spoke to the building
principal and her staff, they were extremely proud of their abilities, and felt that
they were trusted and valued members of the district’s decision-making team. As
the principal explained, “I think journals and all those are great, but the process of
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finding a program, working through the program, and then implementing it is a
person-to-person thing. The team is more important to me than the theoretical
jargon. It’s great to start from and to take from, but the practicality of doing it in the
building is the everyday business” (Principal, ELEM 4).
The district and the school relied mostly on internal achievement data to
inform decision-making. At the building principal’s request, the school started a
Response to Intervention (RTI) initiative that focused on progress monitoring and
automatic targeted remediation for minority students, regardless of their academic
performance. Although this latter focus was controversial within the school, the
principal explained that she implemented it because “research shows that
eventually those scores will struggle” (Principal, ELEM 4). The school’s RTI
program eventually became a model district-wide, which once again shows how
ideas in the district often are generated at the school level and then filter up to the
district level.
Although the district appeared to be highly functioning, district
administrators were quick to caution that the lack of formal decision-making
frameworks (aside from the RTI model itself) had some downsides. The first was
that the district was highly susceptible to political influences, namely from a
contentious school board and a demanding parent community. The school board put
pressure on the district to copy successful techniques by asking which other
districts were using certain curriculum materials before sanctioning their purchase
for ELEM 4. An example was the district’s search for a new bullying program. Two
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of the middle schools had in place a particular anti-bullying program, which was
also used in a neighboring district. Other programs were considered, but the school
board pushed hard for that one because there was “evidence of success.” As far as
parents are concerned, teachers were quick to say that any new program must pass
muster with parents if it is to be fully implemented. For example, the school
attempted to implement a standards-based report card one year, but that decision
was eventually scrapped when parents rejected the new report cards.
Another potential downside to the district’s search procedures is that it was
highly dependent on the individual leadership styles of the school and district
administrators. While one administrator might prioritize teacher input, another
might value principal-led brainstorming initiatives, and yet another might be
personally going to conferences in the area to find new programs. While these
differing tactics did not produce any specific problems during the three years of
interviews, three separate district administrators said that they would like to see
more cohesion in their search and decision-making approaches in the future. Said
one administrator: “We have sixteen principals, and of those sixteen principals, you
probably have ten, eleven, twelve different philosophies, and that’s hard when
you’re trying to do things consistently as a district. That’s hard. I mean, not in terms
of what people want, but philosophy-wise. People are all over the place with that,
and that drives some of us nuts” (District Administrator, ELEM 4).
Regardless of whether one calls the district’s approach to search and
decision-making “fragmented” or “organic,” the process was still fairly linear in
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nature. The district invested a fair amount of effort into diagnosing the problems
(specifically by using a “Response to Intervention” program), then actively searched
for solutions to fit those identified problems, and then made the decision itself,
which administrators at the district level said was the most difficult part of the
process, given the political climate district-wide.

HS 1
From afar, HS 1 could easily be mistaken for a small liberal-arts college
campus or an elite private school. The athletic fields are immaculate, and the high
school is enormous, brand new, and laid out in a U-shape with different sections of
the building proclaiming their unique focus (“Academics” or “Athletics” or “Arts”).
Inside, the building looks a bit more like a traditional public high school with
students rushing to class and hall monitors trying to control the chaos, but the
impression remained that this is a wealthy district and a well-maintained building.
Most of the decisions for improvement at HS 1 came from within the school
walls, and many originated at the teacher level. This may have be due to the fact
that the school is simply so big (the school has over 3,000 students), but it also
belied the district’s general philosophy around decision-making that bottom-up is
best. Said a district administrator, “I’ve been with the district for 35 years and I can
tell that during my time in the district that has always been the philosophy. To have
those people that are going to be ultimately using the resources and will be the
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people who can make those resources successful with students, that they’re a part of
the selection of those resources.” To support this approach, the high school leaned
heavily on department chairs through a Professional Learning Communities (PLC)
structure. Department chairs would meet regularly with teachers to brainstorm
around new instructional strategies and determine gaps in curriculum and/or
instruction. When an individual teacher or a PLC identified a need, they took it to
the department chair, who then took it to the principal, who then networked with
district administrators and the school board to turn the idea into reality.
This collaborative approach to decision-making presented both benefits and
challenges for the district. In terms of the benefits, teachers felt as though they were
included in the process and reported high levels of buy-in once a new resource or
strategy was selected. And because the district employed several decision-making
frameworks, such as the PLCs and curriculum committees, each decision was
thoroughly vetted before the ultimate strategy was selected. An example of a
teacher-led idea was the “math study lab” at the high school, which essentially used
benchmark tests to identify students for voluntary small-group remediation in the
school library during study hall periods. The idea came from a teacher who was
working on her Masters Degree and decided to implement the lab as part of her
thesis for her degree. She took the idea to her department chair, who worked with
her to iron out the details of the intervention, and she then spent her summer
coming up with the data markers to identify the right students for this lab. By the
second year of our visits to the high school, the program had expanded and the
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principal had become intimately involved in the scheduling aspect of the study lab,
working to make it a mandatory requirement for identified struggling students. By
the third year of interviews, district administrators said that the idea was so
successful that they had begun to use it at the middle school level, and that several
neighboring districts were interested in using the model in their own schools as
well.
A challenge, however, of this departmentalized approach was that there were
so many decisions coming up through the pipeline at one time that they could
become disjointed from one another. In other words, what may have seemed like
the next great idea could soon become a passing fad. Although the district generally
liked to pilot new programs before they were fully implemented, this piecemeal
approach drained financial resources, as licenses were purchased and then
abandoned in the search for the perfect set of resources. An example here is the HS
1’s search for a program to identify students for remediation. The school had
purchased one benchmarking program, but it didn’t have all the tools they needed,
so they purchased another one that better fit their needs. But a few years later, they
realized that teachers weren’t using that new resource fully and so they set about
finding yet another program that would work. They finally settled on a product that
was already being used in the middle school, but even that program did not seem
like it would last for long. Said one teacher:
“It is hard to find a good tool for that, where you can just go from one grade
and just dump it into the next and track it from year to year. We don't even
think [the program we have now] is the answer to that but it is the best that
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we have right now. We can convert their data into an Excel file and we can
manage it. We are still looking for a good longitudinal way to track them
from one grade to the next and to turn that data around….We are still
searching, if I come up with something in the next three months I will throw
it out to the group again and say hey let's look at this,” (Teacher, HS 1)
As one might expect, the district’s collaborative approach to decision-making
relied heavily on networking and word-of-mouth recommendations of new
resources. Most of this “human resources” work occurred within the school, but
teachers and administrators also reported that they actively worked with principals
in neighboring districts and the state technical assistance agencies. They did not
rely heavily on technical resources such as research journals, conferences, or
professional associations. A district administrator summed up their general
strategy for search:

“I think we want to make sure that we look at everything that’s available. We
want to take the time to evaluate those resources very carefully. And that
involves a number of steps, from vendors or publishers coming in to present
materials, the teachers having time to look at those materials in depth – that
takes a considerable amount of time. Certainly it’s easy for us using data and
using feedback from teachers to identify the issues that we want to resolve.
But then when we look at resources, that process is the most time
consuming.” (District Administrator, HS 1)
The district did not have many constraints on its search process, which
allowed them to network extensively, spending the time and the resources they
needed to find what worked best for them. Although interviewees mentioned that
the budget was starting to get tighter, they still admitted that they generally had
sufficient staff and money to choose whatever resources they thought would best fit
their students’ needs. It is highly probable, therefore, that the district’s search
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strategy was workable in large part because the district itself was wealthy and had a
strong team of administrators that were committed to spending the time and effort
to enable a truly collaborative search and decision-making process.
HS 2
In contrast to the college campus appearance of HS1, HS 2 is a traditional
looking small rural high school located in a similarly small district in the “slate belt”
of Pennsylvania. Its students came mainly from white, middle-class families, and the
percentage of its students on the Free and Reduced Price Lunch program hovered
around 19%. On the research team’s first visit in 2009, the school had just been
placed on the states “warning” list for failing to make Adequate Yearly Progress
(AYP) in several areas. By 2010, the school had failed again to meet state targets
and was in School Improvement I, which meant that the Pennsylvania State
Department of Education (PDE) exercised its right to send in a team of professionals
called “Distinguished Educators” to help the school to improve. In the final visit
with district administrators in 2011, the school had made some progress, and was
back on the “warning” list, but still failing for its special education students in
reading.
The district relied heavily on the school principal and his two assistant
principals to make decisions, generally asking for teacher input only after schoollevel administrators had already chosen a new program or strategy for
improvement. While some members of the school staff reported that they didn’t
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care if they were involved in the decision-making process, others reported that their
exclusion from the process led to feelings of resentment of school and district
administrators. When asked about his involvement in the decision-making process,
a special education teacher said:
“A lot of times, we feel like decisions are made without any of our input, and
then we’re told, you have to do this. And it’s frustrating on our end…. And
that seems to be the pattern that’s been going on a lot this year, where new
things are coming down the pike, and it’s like, okay, you guys have to
implement it. This is what we want to do. Here, make it happen. And we don’t
really meet as a faculty or as a department first to try to come up with ideas
of how to implement it or get our input on things.” (Teacher, HS 2)
Similarly, a Distinguished Educator at the high school said, “There’s, I think, a
lack of trust that the central office doesn’t trust that the administrators are going to
make the right decision. Therefore, the central office will make it for them. They do
have faculty input, the administration here at the high school, but it’s predominantly
the good old boys club that makes the decision” (Distinguished Educator, HS 2).
The problems identified by the school and district staff were threefold:
First, nearly all respondents reported that there had been an immense amount of
district and school administrator turnover, which resulted in low staff morale and a
mistrust of new initiatives. The high school principal, for example, was the third
individual to serve in his position in only a two-year period. The second issue
perhaps stemmed from the first, which was that there was a general lack of
communication among staff, which made it difficult for administrators to stress to
teachers and students alike the importance of the state standardized tests. Finally,
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respondents reported that the school was not adequately meeting the challenges of
serving an increasingly impoverished student body.
In response to these identified issues, interview respondents identified 15
separate decisions that they had made for improvement, ranging from minor or
superficial strategies (such as incentivizing student performance on the
standardized tests with small rewards like free prom tickets) to major strategies
(such as the total realignment of the curriculum to the state standards). Although
the specific search strategies varied depending on the decision in question, in
general, searches for new programs or strategies were limited to familiar channels,
such as networking with neighboring districts or contacting potential vendors.
Although most of the networking activity occurred at the district level, there was
one trusted individual at the high school – with the title of Instructional Coach – who
district administrators trusted to network with friends in neighboring districts
about new potential programs. When asked about why she prefers these types of
personal contacts instead of more technical research, the district superintendent
said, “Because you can get feedback. You really can. You can get feedback. You can
look in somebody’s eyes and tell if they’re selling you a line of bull. I can tell a guy
who’s trying to sell a product” (Superintendent, HS 2).
The search process, though constrained by geography and familiarity, was
fairly linear in nature. District administrators usually surveyed some of the school
data, did a few Internet searches, and then contacted potential vendors to have them
come into the district and pitch their products. Once the options were on the table,
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the district administrators weighed their options, and called in the school principals
to take a look. The principals sometimes would network with a trusted group of
school staff, but sometimes would not, depending on the decision at hand. Then the
decision would be adopted at the district level and handed down to the teachers to
implement. The only exceptions to this pattern were decisions that were made by
the Distinguished Educators, who answered to the state and not to the district or to
the school.
When I asked the district administrators to reflect on the district’s search
and decision-making process, the Assistant Superintendent said that, while the
district was usually open-minded when it came to new potential programs, she
believed the district could do a better job at including more people in the decisionmaking process, particularly during the “brainstorming” part of the process. The
superintendent agreed with this statement, but cited – as did many others – that the
lack of stability in the administrator position had undermined the district’s ability to
make decisions in an ideal manner. She and other interview respondents
mentioned that they hoped the level of trust and communication within the district
would improve over time, thus facilitating greater collaboration and joint decisionmaking. By the next year, however, the high school principal left the district, and the
school was faced with yet another absence in the administrative team.
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HS 3
Although the surrounding countryside makes HS 3 look somewhat similar to
HS 2, its relative proximity to an urban area qualifies HS 3 as a suburban school. It is
housed in a modern building and beautiful surrounding campus. When we first
went to visit the high school, the school had recently witnessed an enormous
turnover of the administrative staff at both the school and district levels: the
principal, assistant principals, superintendent, and assistant superintendent were
all new. This massive turnover coincided with the school’s low scores on the PSSAs,
but in fact the interviews with staff revealed that the administrative changes were
long overdue and actually produced positive change in the school and district over
the three years of our visits.
Perhaps the most influential change was the arrival of the new principal, who
was the son of a much-loved principal from many years back. This principal made it
his business to revitalize certain programs, analyze the data coming from the PSSAs
and other sources, and fill curriculum gaps. The staff responded well to his
enthusiasm, shedding some of the complacency about test scores that had
previously hampered the school’s ability to improve.
The principal, along with his administrative team, instituted a collaborative
strategy for decision-making. In essence, he would call together his trusted advisors
(consisting of his assistant principals and the two reading specialists in the school)
to come up with new ideas for curriculum interventions and other new
improvement strategies. Then, they would run their ideas by the rest of the school
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staff, including classroom teachers, special education teachers, and others. Then,
once there appeared to be support and consensus around a particular program, they
would present their ideas to the district office staff, who would approve the
decision, and together they would make a presentation to the school board for
financial approval. In this way, ideas for improvement almost always started with
the principal and his team at the school level.
An excellent example of this decision-making strategy in action was the
school’s selection of the Read 180 intervention program. After reviewing the data
gleaned from benchmark tests, the two new reading specialists in the school
decided that there were gaps in the reading curriculum that required a new
intervention program. They had both used Read 180 in previous positions in
different districts, and highly recommended that HS 3 use it as well. The principal
was worried about the cost of the licenses for the program, however, so he asked
them to present him with three or four options for a new intervention program.

“Of course we are pushy about it so we were like, we need this now, and
because of those subgroups not making it they were like, ok, if you say it is
the best, it’s the best. We even had somebody challenge us and say this is the
Mercedes of all reading programs, why can’t you find something less
expensive? I said, we can pay all this money and we would still have all this
stuff to do and it still wouldn’t meet every single kid at their level and it
would not have all the things we know needs to happen for kids to catch up
or close the gap. I said these people at Scholastic have done their
homework; everything is embedded in, from small group to independent
reading and the software. So why wouldn’t you get everything if you are
going to pay something, do it all” (Reading Specialist, HS 3)
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The principal reported that they completely convinced him of the need for
Read 180, however. He subsequently set up appointments with the vendor to visit
neighboring districts that were using this program, and then took all of this
information to the district office to make his pitch. From the district’s perspective,
administrators were interested in two things: First, how much would the new
program cost; and second, did it fit with their overall strategy of following Bill
Dagget’s (2005) “rigor-relevance” framework. When the superintendent found that
Read 180 met these two criteria, he reported that he was happy to take the
recommendation to the school board. Once the board approved the purchase of
some licenses, the principal piloted the program for a year, and then went back the
next year to make the case for expanded use of the program with the purchase of
additional licenses. The board approved his request because they believed that the
program had demonstrated positive results, as reflected in rising PSSA and Lexile
scores.
The overall decision-making process at HS 3 can be described as “nearly
linear.” The district, specifically the superintendent and assistant superintendent,
were very focused on data analysis to help identify the problems that needed to be
fixed in order for student achievement to improve. Then, they tasked the school
with searching for solutions to identified problems. Then came the decision point,
followed by implementation. The only hitch in this linear process was that the
search itself, though highly structured (i.e. involving piloting, multiple options on
the table, human and technical sources to inform the process, etc.) served mainly to
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justify decisions that administrators had already made in their heads. With the
Read 180 decision, for example, the reading specialists were already set on using
that program before they made their presentation to the principal. Said the
principal, “I trust them implicitly, but I knew already that they were Read 180
fanatics” (Principal, HS 3). Later, when the school was tasked with coming up with a
similar intervention program for math, the process unfolded in much the same way.
The principal, whose background is in math instruction, came across an
intervention program at a conference in Washington, DC, and liked it. When he
arrived back home, he thought he’d like to buy this new program, but researched a
few others just to brainstorm or play Devil’s Advocate.
In general, the school – and the district in general – seemed to be making big
leaps in terms of new programming and strategies for improvement over the three
years that we visited. In Year 1, the school was mainly trying to look at data and
figure out where the gaps existed – accordingly, their major efforts were to institute
benchmark exams, revitalize existing programs in the school, and pilot the Read 180
program. In Year 2, they expanded Read 180, re-sequenced the science curriculum,
and searched for a new intervention program for math. And by Year 3, the district
was working to create greater alignment between the efforts at the high school and
middle school levels so that improvement strategies might build off of one another
and enhance academic achievement district-wide.
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HS 4
Similar to HS 3, HS 4 experienced a high percentage of staff turnover over the
three-year study period. In the first year, the high school principal and the district
superintendent – both of whom had served for over a decade respectively in their
positions – were about to retire. Furthermore, the teachers had been out of contract
for over a year, which had created tension between the school staff and the district
administrators. In short, it was a district on the brink of transition. The outgoing
high school principal described the decision-making process as a completely topdown approach, primarily because he did not trust teachers to be proactive enough
to come up with ideas on their own. For their part, teachers said that they were left
out of the decision-making process, and would have liked to be more involved.
By the second year of our visits, it was evident that the contract negotiations
and the administrative turnover had significantly depleted social capital within the
district. Although the contract dispute was finally resolved in Year 2, teachers
mistrusted the motives of administrators, and this mistrust was only amplified by
the fact that the district was unable to hire a new superintendent to replace the
outgoing individual. The new high school principal faced similar challenges.
Although he had previously served as the assistant principal at the school, he felt
uncomfortable in his new leadership role and admitted that he let teachers dictate
most of the new school policies. A district administrator described his decisionmaking approach as haphazard and too rushed:
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“[He] doesn't know what to do with all this unleashed ability. I think he is
extremely bright; I think he is willing to make a decision but unfortunately he
is a little premature in his decision making because he hasn't thought
through all the pieces. It always sounds good and he always goes in that
direction and I will go, ‘did you think about this and if you did this with Sheila
and the ESL and pull her here, what does that mean for the kids who have it
next year?’ He doesn’t' think through that next step, he is not the big picture
thinker.” (District Administrator, HS 4)
By the third year of our visits, the district had finally hired a permanent
replacement superintendent, a man who stated that his primary goal was to restore
some semblance of mutual respect and trust among administrators and staff alike.
He described his district staff as, “a bright group of people.” But, he cautioned, “they
don’t play well together” (Superintendent, HS 4). At the high school level, the
principal remained in his position and was gradually getting to the point where he
felt he could assume a true leadership role and guide the decision-making process
accordingly.
To support the decision-making process, district and high school
administrators alike tried to institute a more collaborative process, using focus
groups, surveys, and committee structures as mechanisms for gathering teacher and
staff input. Teachers reported that they liked this new level of involvement, but it
also led to some problems. For example, a district administrator described the new
high school principal as a “whipped puppy” when it came to new staff proposals
because he would always agree to whatever they asked (Teacher, HS 4).
In terms of the broader decision-making approach, the district’s processes
were scattered and generally followed the Garbage Can Model of decision-making.
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Although there were some examples of linear decision-making (for example, the
decision to implement Professional Learning Communities district-wide), many
other decisions were brought to light in a haphazard manner, with solutions
preceding identified problems, narrow or non-existent search processes, and
hurried decision-making time frames. An example of such an initiative was the
institution of more Advanced Placement classes, which the high school principal
spearheaded primarily because his teachers were telling him that the gifted
students in the school were under-challenged. Although he says he also briefly
considered the International Baccalaureate (IB) program, he and his assistant
principal decided against doing so, and instead invested money in online portals to
access a range of AP courses. Once school was back in session, he instituted a
committee for teachers on the new AP classes, but in truth the decision had already
been made. In short, the decision-making process amounted to throwing a bunch of
problems (inadequately challenged gifted students, small district size to support
classes for gifted students), a bunch of solutions (IB courses, AP courses), a
truncated timeframe (the summer months before school began in the fall), limited
collaborative input, and mixed it all around. When the trash was taken out in
September, online AP courses were the garbage concoction du jour.
It is possible to attribute this chaotic process to the simple fact that the
district was in the midst of a major administrative transition – perhaps if I had
visited the high school for a fourth year, I would have seen a confident principal who
was able to better harness the potential of teacher committees to make truly
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collaborative bottom-up decisions with district support. Without that insight,
however, I can only guess at the trajectory of the decision-making processes in the
district.
In terms of the search process in particular, the specificity and thoroughness
of the search varied from decision to decision. In some cases, the search was
thorough, with several formal options on the table and utilization of both technical
and informal word-of-mouth recommendations from like-minded schools and
districts. In other cases, however, the search process was truncated or non-existent,
as time, budget, and human capital constraints limited decision-makers’ ability to
reach out for a range of possible solutions. The inconsistency of search at HS 4
meant there could not truly be a unified “search process” for the district, although
generally speaking, the district curriculum coordinator and the high school principal
leaned on technical resources, whereas the superintendent and the high school
assistant principal leaned on word-of-mouth recommendations.

75

CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS ON DECISION-MAKING PHASES

The decision-making environment in education is often characterized as a
four-step process. First, the decision-maker (or group of decision-makers)
identifies the problem at hand, finding the area of deficiency that is in need of a
solution. Next, the decision-maker searches for a solution, identifying a range of
potential solutions to the problem. Next, the decision-maker selects a solution, and
finally implements the decision. If we accept the assumptions of Rational Choice
Theory, we assume that these steps occur in a strictly linear fashion: problem
identification; search; decision; and implementation (Bass, 1983; Simon, 1955). If
we accept the assumptions of the Garbage Can Model of decision-making, however,
steps in this process might be ignored, occur out of order, and the resulting decision
would be far from optimal (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972).
I address the degree to which decision-making in education is rational or
chaotic in the next chapter. Here, however, I provide a description of the first three
steps – problem identification, search, and decisions – in the schools in my sample. I
pay particular attention to the search phase, because this is an area that has not yet
been adequately studied in the public education setting. I omit the implementation
phase because the converse is true; a wealth of literature exists on how schools
implement selected programs for improvement (e.g. Cohen, Moffit & Golden, 2007;
Honig, 2006; Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002; Spillane, 2000).

76

Problem Identification
One of the key assumptions of performance-based accountability systems is
that providing information about student performance will start schools on the path
to improvement. No Child Left Behind (NCLB) disaggregates student performance
on the state standardized tests along various subgroups – including race,
socioeconomic status, English proficiency, special education status – and it is
assumed that this level of detail will help schools to solve their most glaring
problems, some of which may have been hiding in plain view from school and
district administrators. The larger IES study on which this dissertation is based
designed the sample with the specific goal of teasing out and testing this
assumption. Six of the eight schools in my sample failed to make Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) on the state test (the PSSAs) following the 2007-2008 school year,
with one school failing in each of the disaggregated subgroups. In this way, the state
had officially notified the majority of the schools in the sample that they were
underperforming and should take action to improve.
In an article from the larger IES study, Beaver and Weinbaum (In Press)
found that schools used state assessment data for three purposes. First, they used
state data as launching pad to collect or analyze their own data, for example by
instituting new benchmark exams or purchasing new data management tools.
Second, they used state data to guide and prioritize their school-wide improvement
efforts, for example by aligning their curriculum to the standards or investing in
professional development for teachers across all grade levels. Finally, they used
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state data to focus on specific student needs, for example by instituting new
individualized remediation or differentiated instruction strategies. That said, the
authors also found that school personnel did not usually treat the state assessment
data as groundbreaking information. Most school-level personnel reported that
they were already well aware of the many problems with specific subgroups in their
school, and that the test data merely highlighted what they already knew. School
personnel also believed that the test did not yield useful information because it
provided a static measure of student performance as opposed to a dynamic view of
student performance over time. This finding is in line with the literature, which
suggests that school and district personnel’s perceptions of data use have
implications for school improvement efforts (Coburn & Talbert, 2006).
My findings suggest that schools dutifully use state data as a key indicator of
the “problem” in their schools, but treat this information as merely a starting point
for them to delve deeper into the problems that they face. In this dissertation study,
I cast a wider net, asking school and district personnel to talk broadly about the
various problems they face, how they identified those problems, and what they are
doing to fix them. Although many respondents mentioned the role of performancebased accountability systems in identifying problems, they also spoke about the
importance of relying on two types of school-level indicators – internal data and
observations.
Internal data for problem identification includes the active collection,
management, and dissemination of student-level data for decision-making purposes.
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During the first year of data collection for this study, five of the eight schools in my
sample had put in place interim assessments or “benchmark exams” to monitor
student progress on key academic indicators throughout the year. By the third year
of the study, all eight schools had some sort of benchmarking tool in place schoolwide. Schools and districts used their internal data to identify gaps in the
curriculum (i.e. poor alignment to the standards), identify individual students or
groups of students for remediation, and provide teachers with targeted professional
development opportunities. Some schools in the sample had become powerful
producers and consumers of internal data. ELEM 2, for example, regularly ran a
“War Room” in which a set of mid-level school managers met to discuss the data and
identify any remaining areas of weakness in their programs or strategies. And a
school-level administrator in ELEM 4 explained:

“Needs are really determined first and foremost through data... So everything
that we do is built around that, and everything we do is sort of built with the
end in mind and backwards map and backwards plan all that, to say the very
first step is what are our needs? What does the data tell us are our needs?
And then what is it that we want to achieve? What are those goals, those
smart goals, that are very measureable, time-bound, not qualitative. We want
to make it as black-and-white as possible, where we know at that point in
time whether we hit that goal or we didn’t hit that goal, and that typically is
tied to whatever achievement results we want to ultimately achieve, shortterm and long-term.” (Administrator, ELEM 4)
Other schools, however, struggled to make sense of the data. When HS 3 first
instituted 4Sight benchmark exams they didn’t know if they could trust the data,
because they saw a wide discrepancy between the scores on this test and the PSSA
exams, even though the two exams were supposedly aligned. Other schools
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reported that they collected massive amounts data but then were unsure what to do
with all the information they had collected. One principal explained that his school
started using a benchmark exam but was reluctant to collect more data. “It would be
nice to have the information,” he said, “but we’re not utilizing all the data we have
today to its fullest. Why bring in any more not to be used as it possibly could be?”
(Principal, ELEM 3).
In an effort to make sense of internal data, some schools purchased
expensive data warehousing products that promised to help decision-makers
identify trends and identify problem areas for their schools. In some cases, these
products sometimes helped decision-makers to identify problem areas. HS 2 was
one such example. They instituted a data-warehousing tool that helped them to look
critically at areas of need in their school. Explained one district administrator:

“We were assessing students, but we weren’t doing anything with that data.
So we had above average, we had our below basic, but that information was
just sitting, kind of, in somebody’s desk or whatever. We didn’t do anything
with it, so we started to take that out, take a greater look at it, find some
targeted interventions for those different students" (District Administrator,
HS 2)
In ELEM 4, administrators had purchased a data management tool but teachers
were having trouble finding the time to use it as administrators intended. Said one
teacher, “I’m trying to use AimsWeb. I don’t know if you’re familiar with that. But the
amount of time it takes for the volume of kids I have right now is difficult to be able
to get the data in. I’ll do the assessments and then can’t get it in, or I’ll skip a week,
and then I’m off a week, and so to get all of that in is a challenge” (Teacher, ELEM 4).
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The school eventually remedied this problem by instituting “data discourse teams”
that analyzed and interpreted the data in a team setting to help come to a common
understanding about the meaning of the data.
Despite some of the setbacks associated with internal data collection and
analysis, schools widely reported that they trusted these sources of data far more
than they did the state generated PSSA data. The consensus among all respondents
in all the schools in the sample was that internal data, while time consuming to
collect and interpret, helped schools pinpoint the problems they faced and put them
on a path to finding appropriate solutions.
The final way that schools and district identified problems was also perhaps
the simplest way: they simply made observations about the various issues that they
saw in their school from day to day. Perhaps the most obvious observations of
school problems were the ones that respondents felt were outside of their control,
namely changing student and community demographics. In fact, this was the most
oft-mentioned problem facing schools in my sample – school personnel said that the
2008 recession had led to greater numbers of students growing up in homes under
economic stress, which led to problems in the classroom as well. To be sure, the
tone of these comments varied widely. While some respondents spoke with great
reverence for the difficulties their students faced on a daily basis, others were quick
to blame parents for becoming complacent about their children’s academic
achievement. In one particularly flippant comment, a teacher from ELEM 1
explained her school’s main issue as follows:
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“We have poverty. We have parents who have such limited ability they can't
possibly help those students. We have parents who feed their children on
the idea if you don't succeed you can get some kind of compensation, like
social security. Our parents want their kids labeled as “learning disabled” so
they could get checks in the mail. It's a way of life – this is an inter city school
and it's a way of life to not do well or it's not important to do well, somebody
will come along and give you what you don't have and I don't think kids are
motivated.” (Teacher, ELEM 1)
In addition to student demographics, respondents were also keen observers
of social capital issues within the district, recognizing a lack of communication or
low levels of collaboration among teachers and administrators. Respondents
sometimes described social capital problems as issues endemic to the school
environment and likely would not be changed in the near future. For example,
teachers in ELEM 3 said they felt their school was treated as a pariah in the school
district, and that the superintendent funneled more money to the other elementary
school where the students came from families that were wealthier and more
involved in the education system. This situation, they said, was not likely to change.
On the other hand, HS 4 and HS 3 both recognized that there was a lack of trust
between teachers and administrators in the school and, by Year 3, both schools had
started to foster greater levels of collaboration to fix this problem. The difference in
these two approaches is that, in the first case, teachers identified with the social
capital problem but were passive about it; whereas in second instance with the high
schools, the schools identified the problem and took an active role in fixing it.
In general, many respondents reported that they believed that problem
identification was the easiest of the four decision-making steps. This is perhaps due
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in part to the fact that respondents relied heavily on observation as a problem
identification tool. An building administrator in ELEM 3 described the problem
identification phase as “pretty easy” because they simply observe whether they have
the right materials or whether they need new ones. And a building administrator in
ELEM 1 said, “You’d have to be pretty stupid not to know there are problems,
wouldn’t you?” When pressed about how he might use internal data to help inform
the problem identification phase of his decision-making process, he responded, “See,
I think a lot of things are transparent” (Building Administrator, ELEM 1). In other
schools, administrators used all three of the tools at their disposal – state data,
internal data, and observations – to identify problems. A district administrator at
ELEM 2 said that she puts a lot of time into combining these sources of information
into identifying the problems her schools face, explaining, “I think you have to
clearly identify the problem before you can do anything else. And whatever time it
takes to identify that problem, you need to put into it. Sometimes the problems are
very clear, and sometimes they are masked and if you go with the first vision you
are totally on the wrong track” (District Administrator, ELEM 2).
Overall, schools identified on average seven problems in their school that
needed fixing. In Figure 4.1, I display the problems that schools identified, along
with their frequency of mention. I do not include “Failure to Make AYP” as a
problem, although this was the case in six of the eight schools due to the nature of
the sample.
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Figure 4.1
Problems Identified in Sample Schools and Districts
Problem Frequency
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Source: Field notes and memos
As shown above, social capital problems, which included a lack of communication
among personnel or a culture of mistrust in the district, affected all eight schools in
the sample. Another problem mentioned in all eight schools was that students
stu
and
teachers alike did not take the state standardized test seriously, leading to a feeling
of complacency about student performance on this outcome measure across the
district. Economic hardship among students was a commonly mentioned problem,
as were high degrees of staff turnover and the misalignment of curriculum materials
to state school goals or state standards. Finally, discipline issues (including
attendance, classroom behavior, gangs, and dropouts) ranked high among the
problems in schools.
84

Search
Although schools are supposedly transparent, public institutions, it is
surprising how little we know about how they search for ways to raise student
achievement levels. We assume, for example, that school actors have a method for
searching for potential solutions. Although there may be some schools with clearly
defined processes around search, other schools alter their processes based on the
decision at hand, and still others lack processes all together. It is tempting to simply
assert, therefore, that making generalizations about search is an exercise in futility
because such processes vary from school to school. The data from this study show,
however, that a descriptive analysis of school and district search strategies is a
worthwhile endeavor. In this chapter, I describe how schools search for new
programs and strategies for improvement. Included in these descriptive analyses
are examinations of the factors that schools consider during the search phase of the
decision-making process, the locus of control for search in districts and schools, and
the sources of information (either familiar or technical) that school actors use to
support their decision-making process.
The descriptive analyses paint a picture of how schools approach the search
phase of the decision-making process, especially when they have been called upon
by the state to improve student achievement (as measured on the state
standardized tests). To fully examine these various aspects of the search process, I
employed case-ordered descriptive matrices, which are specialized qualitative
databases designed to allow cross cutting themes to emerge from the data in a
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controlled way (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The first step was to code the interview
data with codes that were aligned to both my research questions and emergent
findings. Table 4.1 contains the list of codes that align to each research question
pertaining to search, as well as the definitions that I created for each code.
Table 4.1
Search Code and Research Question Alignment
RQ2: How do schools and school districts search for solutions to perceived or formally identified
needs for improvement?
(a): What factors do schools consider when searching for potential alternatives?
Code

Definition

FACTOR

Description of the factors that went into the consideration of a
particular decision. May include data.
(b): Who are the decision-makers? To what extent is search tightly controlled and to what extent
is it dispersed among many actors? How do districts guide the search process for schools?
Code
Definition
SEARCH: WHO

Who conducts the search process at the school or district levels.

SEARCH: INCLU
SEARCH: EXCLU

Search process is guided by a large and diverse team of individuals in
the school or district
Search process is exclusive to a small group of decision-makers

SEARCH: DISTRICT

Search process originates at district, or is mandated by the district

SEARCH: SCHOOL

Search process originates at the school level

LEAD: STYLE

Description of leadership style and relationships with staff

(c): What sources do schools and districts use (human, technical, or other) when searching for
potential alternatives and making decisions? What is the perceived validity and applicability of
information coming from these sources?
Code
Definition
SEARCH: TECHN

SEARCH: HUMAN

SEARCH: VALID

Description of technical sources used to gather information about
available alternatives. May include using professional associations,
conferences, research literature, and vendors.
Description of the individuals or groups who help to inform/guide the
search and decision-making process. May include copying a strategy
from another school or district or the IU.
Description of the degree to which people trust the information they
receive during the search process.
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Next, I created output reports for each group of questions, containing the list
of quotations that pertained to each set of codes. After reviewing each quotation, I
input the information into an Excel spreadsheet containing columns of analysis
variables and metavariables that formed the basis of the case-ordered descriptive
matrices. Once the information was in the case-ordered descriptive matrices and
aggregated to the district level, I looked across cases at all aspects of the search
process. In total, I created three sets of matrices, one for each of the components of
Research Question #2. I detail my findings in each of the three areas below.

Factors Schools and Districts Consider During Search. When decision-makers
initiate a search for a new strategy, it is assumed that they have in mind certain
factors that will guide their search process. Although this is not always the case – a
school administrator could, for example, explain her school’s search for a new
curriculum supplement by simply saying, “we needed something that would raise
student scores on the state test” without going into detail about the reasoning
behind her search for a new strategy – the majority of schools in my sample were
able to provide insight into the factors they considered during the search process.
Examining these factors helps to shed light on decision-makers’ motivations and
reasoning as they look to adopt new materials or approaches in their schools.
To analyze the factors at play in my sample, I reviewed the “factor” codes in
the interview data and input them into the case-ordered descriptive matrix with the
following variables: a) a description of the issue or problem at hand; b) the factor
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that the school or district considered during its search for solutions to this problem;
c) a marker as to whether this factor was generated internally or externally; and d)
the stage(s) of the decision-making process that the identified factor primarily
impacted. Analysis from the case-ordered descriptive matrices yielded three
separate factors that schools consider during search: a) alignment to state and
federal accountability policies; b) the right “fit” with identified student needs; and c)
the accessibility of the new programs and strategies. Below, I describe the three
main factors in detail.
Accountability
Alignment to performance-based accountability policies was by far the
common factor that respondents identified as informing their search process. This
is perhaps due to the nature of the sample – six of the eight schools were labeled in
“warning” for failure to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) under No Child Left
Behind following the 2007-2008 school year, and had been specifically called upon
by the state to adopt strategies aimed at improving student scores on the state test.
The skew toward accountability is also due to the nature of the interview protocol,
which asked specific questions about the impact of the state test on school efforts
for improvement. Accountability policies were nonetheless an important driver of
school and district search strategies, even in the two schools that made AYP
consistently throughout the three years of the study.
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There were two ways that schools used accountability measures to guide
their searches. The first, and most prevalent, was to find programs and strategies
that were aligned to either the state standardized test or the state standards (or
both). The Pennsylvania Department of Education encourages alignment by
publishing “anchors” and “eligible content,” which create direct links between the
standards and the tested content. Decision-makers reported that they only looked
for new products if vendors could claim that their products were aligned to the state
standards. Said one high school teacher, “For the math we just had a curriculum
rewrite this summer. We sat down and made sure there were no holes from top to
bottom at the high school, that kids have access to every possible thing they need to
know for the PSSAs" (Teacher, HS 3). In fact, all eight schools in the sample
mentioned that they actively used the standards to realign, re-sequence, or re-pace
their instruction or curriculum to match the state standards or the state assessment.
Two elementary schools in the sample, ELEM 2 and ELEM 4, adopted a standardsbased report card district-wide. By the third year of interviews (in 2011), schools
were also starting to talk about a new sort of standards alignment, namely that of
alignment to the Common Core State Standards. Pennsylvania adopted the Common
Core standards in July 2010, and district administrators were already anticipating
the many changes they might need to make to their existing materials to meet the
standards’ rigorous career and college readiness goals.
The second factor related to accountability was that schools used data
gleaned from their PSSA results to target programs and strategies to identified areas
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of need. For example, if a school found that it did not make Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) in a particular grade for a particular subgroup of students, decisionmakers in that school would often report that they concentrated their efforts on
raising the scores of those students. Although schools reported that they
concentrated their efforts on specific groups, their focus was not as laser-like as
they might think. In the larger CPRE study of school improvement (on which this
dissertation is based), researchers found that, regardless of their accountability
status, schools adopted many varied approaches for improvement in response to
accountability measures (Weinbaum, Weiss & Beaver, 2012). The schools in this
subsample of mostly “warning” schools echoed those actions, choosing a whole host
of strategies that they believed might raise student achievement and get their
schools off the warning list.
That said, school and district decision-makers reported that they searched
for and evaluated new programs and strategies that would provide them with the
greatest gains in student achievement (subgroup deficiency focused or not). When
asked what factors the district considered when searching for new strategies, one
district administrator put it succinctly, saying, “Well, the first thing is student
achievement. What’s it going to do for my students? Is it going to help my students?"
(Administrator, ELEM 1). This administrator was specifically talking about
achievement on the PSSAs. And when asked how much AYP and the PSSA scores
figure in to how her school finds and selects new programs, one high school teacher
said, “Oh it’s everything we do” (Teacher, HS 1).
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Fit
A search process could be said to be about “fit” if school leaders mentioned
that they actively searched for programs and strategies that would align to their
school’s identified needs. First, nearly all the schools used internal data such as
benchmark tests or teacher reports to find programs to fill identified areas of
student need. In many cases, schools might use the data generated from the state
standardized test as a “starting point” and then use benchmark tests as a way to drill
down and get a full picture of individual students’ needs over time. One high school
(HS 3) used benchmark testing to get more information on the subgroup of students
that had caused the school to miss its AYP benchmarks, which was the economically
disadvantaged subgroup. In other schools, school leaders explained that they
believed benchmark exams were a far more reliable indicator of student needs than
the state tests. Another high school (HS 2) was using 4Sight exams (probably the
most popular benchmark assessment in the state) along with other classroom-level
indicators to identify students for remedial classes. The principal explained:

"Based off your 4Sight scores, we will use those scores to determine where
you’re going to be scheduled for your classes. So if you’re doing well, then
that’s an indicator. It’s one indicator. We’ll use teacher input, we’ll use your
scores from the previous classes, and we’ll use these scores. So it’s a threeheaded monster that’s going to be used to determine where you’re going to
be and what is best for you." (Principal, HS 2)
Student-level data helped the school search for the right remediation
strategies for each individual student. Schools varied in their approaches to datadriven decision-making, however. Some schools, like HS 2 above, implemented
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benchmark testing as a sort of pulse check to get a sense of how students were
performing throughout the school and target remediation. Other schools,
meanwhile, conducted thorough data analyses of their benchmark data and used
that information to search for the right fit with potential curriculum programs,
supplemental materials, and instructional strategies. ELEM 2 was perhaps the best
example of the power of a data-driven approach to guide school search processes.
In this school, there was a data team – consisting of the school’s principal, math and
reading specialists, guidance counselor, and a specific “response-to-intervention”
coordinator – that met in a “war room” to discuss the data on a regular basis. The
team would look at data from one of four different benchmark or universal
screeners they were using in the different grades and look for gaps in curriculum. In
one instance, the data showed that first graders were not receiving adequate
instructional coverage in phonics and the school’s reading specialist worked with
the district reading supervisor to find a new curriculum supplement that would fill
that specific need. The result of this strategy was a patchwork quilt of programs
that together formed a curriculum for students – and school leaders were constantly
examining the quilt for holes and sewing new patches throughout the school year.
These data-driven techniques are about finding the right fit for individual
students or groups of students, and therefore can be labeled as “demand-driven”
search strategies. There is another type of evidence-based approach to finding
programs and strategies, however, which is based on supply rather than on demand.
School and district leaders spoke often of searching for programs that were either
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“research-based” or “proven effective.” In essence, they were looking for evidence
that programs had a track record of success, as validated either through external
scientific research or other evidence of success. I will go into much greater detail
about the technical and word-of-mouth searches later in this chapter, but for now I
will simply assert that “evidence-based” programs were an important factor for
schools as they searched for improvement strategies.
Aside from data-driven need assessments, decision-makers also assessed
“fit” in more personal and emotional ways. This approach is consistent with
Abelman and Elmore’s (1999) assertion that school personnel make decisions based
on their “internal accountability,” including their beliefs about student learning and
student achievement, their values, and goals for their school. Decision-makers are
often eager to explain their personal search criteria for new programs and
strategies, especially if they come from a deep-seated belief that their search criteria
will lead to better results for their students. For example, the assistant principal in
the school below (ELEM 1) talked about how it was important to change the
instructional approach for the district’s high school students:

"I think we need to create better thinkers, so the thing we’re focusing on now
at the high school is a higher influence in more meaningful and complex
reading and writing. So that’s been our new initiative, that we are slowly but
surely going away from the more mundane PSSA tasks and strategies to more
higher level thinking skills with complexity and thought and reflection than
ever before." (Assistant Principal, ELEM 1)
Similarly, when I asked an elementary school principal why she wanted to focus on
character education, she responded:
93

“It is something I think is so critical in an elementary building. I have always
believed that it is half of it; if you can get the kid to buy in that this is our
school and [our school] is the best. You know, respect. You walk down the
hallway that some says Good morning Dr. [Principal], and you get a response.
I think that builds into the performance in the classroom, without a doubt."
(Principal, ELEM 4)
In several cases, administrators took it upon themselves to redesign the way that
their schools or districts approached the search process on the whole, for example
by instituting frameworks around search or cyclical curriculum review processes.
But personal beliefs drove decision-making on a smaller scale as well, with several
teachers working on their own to identify student needs in their classrooms and
design interventions to meet them. In one school (ELEM 3), a fourth grade teacher
realized that her students did not receive adequate instruction in basic grammar
concepts, and so she took it upon herself to find online lesson plans on the Internet
that would meet that need.
Ease and Accessibility
This category of factors is the quintessential case of “looking under the
lamppost.” School and district decision-makers reported that they often searched
for materials in familiar places – checking with colleagues, relying on previous
programmatic use in their district or neighboring districts, or simply copying others.
I spend considerable time in the next chapter exploring how using ease and
accessibility as a factor during search can affect the entire decision-making process,
leading to decisions that are limited by both geography and familiarity. Suffice it to
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say for now that schools and districts often lack the time and resources to do robust
searches for new programs and strategies, and therefore limit their searches to
what they know.
Choosing an “easy” search process could take three forms. First, schools
could simply scale up an existing program that was being offered to a subset of
students in the district to a larger set of students. This was the case in HS 1, where
district administrators needed to find a remediation program for the high school.
Instead of searching for a wide range of options available on the market, they
decided to scale up the remediation program that the middle school was using. Said
one district administrator:

“It was something that was being used in the district for remediation, so
many of our teachers at the high school were already familiar with that
program. And it was a method for remediation. What we decided to do was
to use that program to create the remediation, the benchmark assessment,
and the alternative assessment to have students show proficiency in reading
and math because it was something we were already familiar with and we
had that capability.” (District Administrator, HS 1)
In this sense, scaling up existing programs has the advantage of a proven track
record of success, as well as familiarity with intricacies of the program (which help
for smooth implementation). In this case, it was certainly possible that the program
might not have been a good fit for high school students, or that expanding its use to
remediation, benchmarking, and alternative assessment might flop, but the district
felt most comfortable truncating search in favor of a familiar program. It is
important to note that districts that pursued this approach spoke not only of
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“familiarity” but also of “alignment” – they believed that using familiar programs
was an effective way to align programming throughout the district, creating a
coherent approach to instruction and remediation.
A second approach was to look to other districts and copy their programs
and strategies. School and district decision-makers are looped in to various
professional and personal networks that provide access to information from
neighboring districts. In most cases, these relationships are open and friendly, with
information flowing in both directions and decision-makers observing other schools
as they implemented potential programs and strategies. Said one teacher, "I learned
of Study Island from friends. Their children were working on it, and they live in
other districts, and I’m saying, well, we don’t have it, and we don’t pay for it, and this
is what we use. They were advocates, because they showed me. I said that makes
sense. That makes a lot of sense” (Teacher, ELEM 3). In some cases, teachers
brought in programs that they had used themselves when they worked in other
districts. For example, an assistant principal at one high school described how he
selected a new reading program for his school. Both of his reading specialists had
used a program called “Read 180” in their previous positions – one of the specialists
had worked in Georgia before coming to Pennsylvania – and thought it would be a
good fit for their high school. So the principal asked them to pitch it to him (along
with a few other options) and finally selected the program that the reading
specialists knew the best. In a few isolated cases (e.g. ELEM 3), the information flow
was not quite so free and open. In these cases, decision-makers felt pressured to
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copy neighboring districts out of a fear that they would be out-scored on the state
standardized tests; in other words, they were driven by competition rather than by
a desire to share effective practices.
Finally, a third approach that falls into the “ease” category is when school an
district decision-makers pursued a hands-off approach in which they simply waited
for vendors to come to them with new programs and strategies. Vendors approach
schools often with offers to pilot their products, partake in professional
development opportunities, and take advantage of special deals and limited-time
offers. For some schools, vendor pitches are simply another part of a complex and
involved search process, whereas for others, it is the search process. Said the
curriculum coordinator in a relatively large urban district, “The vendors basically
find you. You really don’t have to search them out too much, because they’re for
profit. So they find you pretty easily. There’s a lot of good stuff out there. The thing
is, you’ve got to sift through it and find what’s right for your district. And make sure
that you’re not duplicating, and it’s meeting your needs” (District Administrator,
ELEM 1). As this administrator admits, he lets vendors determine the field of
available alternatives and then selects from among them.

Locus of Control. Organizational theorist Karl Weick (1976) famously asserted that
decision-making in schools resembled an “unconventional soccer match” in which
there were several goals, the field was round and sloped, the rules were fluid; but
the game was strangely played as if it made sense. Cohen et al. (1972) have
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similarly described schools as “organized anarchies,” in which teachers have
widespread freedom to generate ideas from the ground up, or bypass administrative
control all together. Their depictions of the school context run in direct contrast to
the Weberian depiction of strong bureaucratic structures that feature top-down
control and limited teacher responsibilities (Weber, 1947).
Which depiction more accurately fits the context of search procedures in
public education today? The answer is that search in schools and districts is far
more orderly than Weick and his colleagues might believe, but also more flexible
and collaborative than Weber might predict. Although some districts in my sample
exerted tighter control over decision-making than others, the overall variation
among districts was actually quite small – the vast majority of districts employed a
“middle-out” strategy for decision-making. A middle-out strategy is an alternative
to “top-down” or “bottom-up” decision-making approaches in which middle
management – in this case, school administrators, department heads, reading or
math specialists, etc. – play an important role in searching for improvement
solutions (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; Nonaka, 1994). Although theorists might
employ differing terminology – Nonaka (1998), for example calls it “middle-updown management” – the principle is the same. The top-level managers provide the
vision and some structure around decision-making, for example by setting deadlines
and budget limits. Mid-level managers then perform all the critical tasks of
researching and finding potential options, getting consensus, and pitching their
preferred solution to the top-level management. To be successful, these mid-level
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managers must be charismatic, organized, and detail-oriented. Says Nonaka (1998),
“They work as a bridge between the visionary ideals of the top and the often chaotic
reality on the frontline of business. By creating middle-level business and product
concepts, middle managers mediate between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be.’ They
even remake reality according to the company's vision” (p. 32).
Discussions of middle-out decision-making in the education setting are
situated within the literature on Distributed Leadership, which is a study of the
locus of control in school decision-making. Distributed leadership studies take as a
given that leadership can originate from multiple sources, creating a “leader plus”
aspect to decision-making and, by extension, search (Spillane & Healey, 2010).
Distributed leadership, however, is not a study of management approaches in
schools, but rather a conceptual frame for researchers to use when studying school
settings. The theory does not allow for descriptive findings of effective practices for
varying levels of distribution in leadership. I do not take a distributed leadership
approach in this study, which allows me to make distinctions between top-down,
bottom-up and middle-out approaches, including potential benefits from the
middle-out approach. Specifically, I find that middle-out approaches foster districtwide collaboration, increase the flow of information, improve teacher buy-in to
potential new programs for improvement, and free up district administrators to
concentrate on broad-scale efforts for improvement.
Before discussing districts’ middle-out approaches to decision-making, I
briefly explain how I used case-ordered descriptive matrices to come upon these
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findings. I pulled the data from the codes that pertained to the locus of decisionmaking control (see Figure 2) and input the quotations into an Excel spreadsheet
along the following lines: a) Who conducts the search; b) the degree of dispersion in
the search process (unilateral versus collaborative search); c) the origin of search
(top-down versus bottom-up); and d) the supportive mechanisms that enable
search (committees, frameworks, etc.). In attempting to classify each quotation as
either bottom-up or top-down, I realized that this dichotomy did not fit the data, as
many schools relied on mid-level administrators to conduct searches. As a result, I
employed the “middle-out” variable, and soon found that a majority of entries fit
into this category of response. Of the 167 total catalogued responses, 39 were
bottom-up approaches and 47 were top-down, but 81 of the responses were labeled
as middle-out. Although nearly half of the cases in my sample fit into the “middleout” search category, not every decision that a school makes is universally a middleout decision. The average school makes many different decisions at the same time,
and some might be bottom-up, middle-out, or top-down depending on the
perspective of the interviewee, the limitations on the search context (e.g. time
crunches or political considerations), or the scope of the decision itself. I
categorized overall district approaches based on aggregated depictions of the locus
of control district-wide.
When employed in a thoughtful, deliberate manner, middle-out approaches
led to generally greater levels of collaboration and reported levels of satisfaction
among staff at all levels. Middle-out decision-making did not exist in a vacuum,
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however – districts employing this approach had in place supportive structures and
guidelines for decision-making that were specifically aimed at supporting the search
efforts of mid-level managers. These support mechanisms included
departmentalization, committees, and “pre-implementation” (i.e. piloting)
strategies. Perhaps not surprisingly, high schools were more easily able to institute
middle-out decision-making because their larger size already lent these schools to a
departmentalized structure. In one high school (HS 1), a department head explained
her role in the search process:

“Things work both ways, this is one of the reasons I like working here. You
have communication in both directions. If someone within the department
comes to me with something and there is enough interest within the
department and we think it is beneficial to the school, I take it to the
curriculum supervisors, I go up to the assistant principals, the principals,
whoever need to hear it and we will run it through and if they are on board
then we will flush that out. But it also comes the other way, usually each year
there is something that comes down from the superintendent's level, saying
OK, we are going to focus on this. Principals, how are you going to do this in
your building, the principals will go to department heads, how are you going
to do it in your department. It does work both ways and I have been very
happy with that.” (Department Head, HS 1)
Her explanation fits perfectly with the middle-out approach. She is the hub for
search activity in her school, culling together the ideas generated by teachers, and
also making sure that the ideas generated in the school are aligned to the vision
created at the district level. In this particular case, the principals and the
department heads are both the mid-level managers that make the middle-out
approach effective.
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The approach worked in elementary schools as well, but was most effective
when there was a district-wide embrace of collaborative decision-making in which
the majority of search responsibility had been ceded to the school level. An
administrator in one district (ELEM 4) explained that he viewed the district’s role as
one of the “convener” of school-level administrators so that they could come
together to make collaborative decisions:

“We set up a big whiteboard. We brainstorm everything. We synthesize them
into categories. Okay, so this is what we think. Okay. We’re going to get a
committee of the principals, the reading specialist, special ed representative.
We’re going to come into the room…Agree with them, disagree with them,
and let’s come up with different issues. Put them all on the board. What are
the political issues? What are the educational issues? What are the
implementation issues? What are the program issues? And then that gives
you a structure to work through coming up with a really good solution.”
(District Administrator, ELEM 4)
This quotation provides a good example of how the district can play the visionary
role, while allowing school administrators the freedom to explore potential
solutions for their school context, as well as strategies that are crosscutting for all
the schools within the district.
Of course, not all middle-out decisions are made in a thoughtful, collaborative
manner. For that matter, a middle-out approach to decision-making is not
necessarily a better approach than a top-down or bottom-up approach. In most
cases, a middle-out approach was associated with greater levels of collaboration (as
measured by the variable of “unilateral vs. collaborative” in the case-ordered
descriptive matrix) and higher reported levels of teacher buy-in to new projects.
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However, this was not universally the case. In some instances, a strong-minded
principal would commandeer the search process at the school level, underutilize
teacher input, and conflict with district approach. This was the case in HS 2, where
the principal decided to implement a new program that combined math with
physical education. Although the teachers were not opposed to the new program,
they were not consulted during the search process either. And although the district
administrators gave the principal license to pursue this new strategy, it did not align
well with the district’s goal of focusing on test score improvement, which eventually
lead the superintendent to grow increasingly dissatisfied with the principal’s
performance. By the third year of interviews, the superintendent indicated that this
principal would most likely not stay in the district much longer.
Although the majority of schools in my sample searched in a “middle-out”
fashion, there were two schools that pursued a mostly “top-down” approach (HS 4
and ELEM 1) and one school that pursued a mostly “bottom-up” approach (ELEM 3).
I discuss these outlier cases briefly. I label HS 4 and ELEM 1 as pursuing a top-down
search strategy because they met the following conditions: First, the district had
sufficient capacity to conduct searches; second, the district had a strong vision for
the programs that it wanted to find; and third, the district fundamentally distrusted
school-level personnel to search for improvement solutions on their own. The
district for HS 4 had a staff of at least five administrators and was in the midst of a
tense renegotiation of the teacher contract. As a result, the district offices dictated
policy without asking for principal or teacher input. ELEM 1, which was a larger
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urban district, selected a scripted reading program because they did not trust
teachers to raise student achievement scores on their own. Said the principal:

"It is not like I have much say on what curriculum we have. It is pretty much,
‘This is what we have and you need to work it.’…I had a teacher last week, I
said, ‘You are adapting, why are you adapting? You are a second year
teacher, you used to teach preschool, don't adapt. You need to follow it. If you
need to adapt you need to come talk with me or [the Assistant Principal]
first.’ So teachers don't have a lot of leeway in that. Well, that's okay. If it's
data based, again, how can you argue with it?" (Principal, ELEM 1)
In this school, the superintendent wanted all the elementary buildings to work on
the same content at the same time, and so he would not authorize teachers or
principals to adapt the curriculum to fit their needs.
ELEM 3 pursued a bottom-up search strategy. While the romanticized ideal
of bottom-up decision-making is one of teachers coming together to determine the
direction for new programs, this was not the case in this school. Here, teachers
worked in a fractured manner and reported that, even though they appreciated that
the principal usually took their suggestions without question, they felt isolated and
even abandoned by the district staff. The district curriculum director position
remained vacant during the three years of interviews, which meant that the district
had very little capacity and the superintendent couldn’t set a cohesive vision around
search. As a result, teachers were forced to take it upon themselves to align their
curriculum to the state standards, pace their curriculum to align to the state tests,
and find appropriate resources for their classrooms. As the example of ELEM 3
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demonstrates, truly bottom-up decision-making with little structure imposed from
above can create a chaotic decision-making environment.
My findings suggest that there are some programmatic and structural
arrangements that support a middle-out orientation. School structures that support
teacher collaboration include altering the schedule to allow for common teacher
preparation time or creating a structure around teacher meetings, for example by
establishing Professional Learning Communities or topical committees. Of the eight
schools in the sample, two had PLCs in place and a third (HS 4) was considering
instituting them in the future, and five of the schools had some sort of committee
structure in place. Carving out time and space for teachers to collaborate supports
middle-out management because it allows mid-level managers at the school level to
hear from classroom teachers about the issues that matter most to them.
A second structural arrangement is to create a tier of middle managers
where one might not have existed before, or at the very least elevate the role of
middle managers to include search functions. Schools employing middle-out
approaches often had a cadre of personnel specifically tasked with searching for
improvement solutions. In ELEM 4, it was the reading and math specialists. In
ELEM 2, it was the elementary school principal. In HS 3, it was the two reading
specialists working in concert with the principal. Whatever the combination, it is
important that this person (or team of people) has a clear directive to conduct
search activities, as well as pathways in both directions to gather input (from
below) and present their proposed solutions to the decision-makers (to the top).
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Finally, districts employing a middle-out approach often invited teachers to
“pre-implement” potential improvement solutions. Pre-implementing is a form of
piloting a potential new program. Administrators or mid-level managers give a
select set of teachers access to a potential new program in their classroom for a few
months or even a whole school year. The teachers then provide detailed feedback
on the program to a committee at the school or district level, which helps the
decision-makers make the decision about whether or not to fully implement the
program in the future. One school in the sample, ELEM 2, expertly employed a preimplementation strategy, and teachers reported that they felt engaged in the search
process, and were more likely to help their colleagues implement new programs
with fidelity if they had been a part of the program’s selection.

Sources of Information. When decision-makers search for solutions to identified
problems, they typically draw upon two sources of information. The first source is
trusted individuals who can provide feedback on programs that they have used the
past or are using currently in their own efforts for improvement. This may include
individuals within the school, such as teachers, administrators, or even one’s
personal experience from working in a previous school or district. It could also
include external sources, for example one’s professional network of colleagues in
neighboring districts or friends and family who work in the education sphere.
Evidence from business and marketing research suggests that word-ofmouth recommendations from trusted sources are powerful determinants of
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decision outcomes. Berger and Schwartz (2011) find that even “idle chatter” can
push a particular product to the top of the list of potential alternatives, and that
popular products can quickly come to dominate the market. This may explain why
certain products came up again and again in this study’s findings. In particular, the
computer-based remediation program Study Island and the 4Sight benchmark
testing program seemed omnipresent, even though these programs were not
officially endorsed by an official agency or organization. Research also shows that
school leaders play an important role in setting the trends in education programs
and strategies. Findings from Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Valente (2010) suggest
that people in leadership roles and who have strong social networks facilitate the
diffusion or “social contagion” of new products, causing favored products to catch
on quickly. My findings echo these marketing research findings. For example, the
search process in HS 3 was driven by two reading specialists who were outspoken
in their support of a particular reading program called Read 180. Both of these
specialists had used the program in their previous jobs in different districts.
Although the principal asked them to come up with two other options before he
made a decision, he said that he was heavily swayed by the strong support that they
both expressed for their favored program, and he ultimately selected the Read 180
program for the entire high school.
My findings highlight several benefits of word-of-mouth recommendations as
a source of information during the search process. First, meeting with sources
internal to the school district exposes decision-makers to a wide range of
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experiences and instructional styles, and it also provides glimpses of potential
factors to consider during search. (For example, decision-makers might need to
look for programs that have a strong professional development component if many
of the teachers in the school are new.) Second, working with trusted colleagues in
neighboring districts allows decision-makers to observe programs in action and ask
questions about potential pitfalls or strategies to effectively implement the
programs. Third, and perhaps most importantly, school and district personnel
report that they trust the information gleaned from personal sources more than
they do information from third parties. Although this was not universally true in my
sample – certainly some individuals reported the opposite – a majority of the
interviewees in the sample said that they leaned on their colleagues for support
because they believe that the information they receive would be trustworthy,
applicable to their work, and easy to understand.
Trusting colleagues and friends is also the biggest downside to word-ofmouth recommendations as a source of information. Enthusiastic support for
certain programs does not mean that these programs are necessarily well suited to
the particular context and needs of the schools who are searching for solutions.
Decision-makers can easily become drawn into a program if it has a track record of
success in a neighboring district, and may subsequently ignore information
suggesting a suboptimal fit for their school context. This is evidence of what
cognitive psychologists call a “confirmation bias” (Nickerson, 1998) and education
researchers – particularly sense-making theorists – have documented that
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confirmation bias can play a strong role in how schools make decisions and
implement new programs for improvement (Spillane et al., 2002; Firestone, 1989).
There were several instances of schools that had fallen victim to the confirmation
bias in my sample, only discovering that particular programs were a poor fit after
they had made purchasing decisions for their schools. ELEM 3 was one such school.
They were struggling to find a new math program because their curriculum was
outdated and poorly aligned to the state standards. They chose not to ask internally
for teachers’ opinions about a new curriculum, but instead follow the lead of
another Pennsylvania district that was considered to be a successful district.
Explains the elementary school principal:

"We looked at other schools that have performed very, very well, and the one
example I have is [our neighboring district] – the district is the size of this
building, I think. But they’re one of the top in U.S. News and World Report.
They’re one of the top in the state. They have an innovative superintendent
that does great things. So we copy what others have as success.” (Principal,
ELEM 3)
Only in the third year of interviews did the principal admit that he wished the
district had invested more time in finding a program that was a good fit with the
needs of that particular elementary building, where social capital was low and
teacher turnover was high. The math program they selected, he admitted, was
facing resistance from the teachers who didn’t like the new approach to math
instruction. But he wrote off teachers’ complaints saying, “Not everything is perfect.
I mean there are drawbacks to everything. Every program that’s out there, there’s
no perfect fit” (Principal, ELEM 3).
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A related drawback to word-of-mouth recommendations is that copying the
practices of outside districts makes it difficult for a school or district to be a true
innovator. Explains one district administrator in ELEM 2:

“With the word-of-mouth, what I’ve found is that a lot of people spend time
on ‘what is,’ instead of the vision of ‘what should be’…For me, I’d rather read
Harvard Newsletter and find out what is the direction and where everything
is headed so that I could make the decision. So I do a lot of reading that way.
Because I don’t want this district to be ‘what is’; I want it to be prepared so
that other districts are looking to us. For the word-of-mouth, it depends on
who you talk to, and you want to talk to the right people.” (District
Administrator, ELEM 2)
As this administrator suggests, technical sources of information avoid the
potential problem of copying practices that might be a poor fit for the school or
simply outdated. Technical searches include a broad range of activities, including
looking at websites, reading evaluations or other research, going to professional
conferences or workshops, and listening to presentations from vendors. If decisionmakers consult high quality research from trusted sources – for example the U.S.
Department of Education’s WhatWorks Clearinghouse or well-respected
professional association publications – they minimize confirmation bias and expose
themselves to unbiased accounts of effective practices. Importantly, research may
help decision-makers determine the specific conditions under which programs and
strategies can be expected to have an impact in their schools. Technical searches
have similar pitfalls to human searches, however, because the search process is
compromised if the quality of the source is subpar. And unfortunately there are
many so-called technical resources that are misleading. For example, many
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interviewees proudly touted that their programs were “research-based,” when in
fact the research in question was conducted by the vendor itself and was of low
quality (for example, employing a small sample size, using anecdotal evidence, using
ill-defined outcome measures, etc.). In other cases, school personnel admitted that
they did online searches for new strategies, which opened up a host of options, but
with few checks on the quality of materials.
Another popular source of technical information was the Intermediate Units
(IUs), which are agencies that operate under the auspices of the Pennsylvania
Department of Education (PDE). The IUs provide training and technical assistance
to teachers and administrators on topics ranging from alignment to new state
accountability measures to the adoption of new instructional strategies in the
classroom. While some interviewees reported that they highly valued the IU
trainings, others noted that the trainings were outdated and not very helpful. The
principal at HS 2 said, “those workshops have been very frustrating because it
seems every time you go to another one, they’ve changed their mind on something.”
And a district administrator at ELEM 2 said, “With the IU, they don’t lead; they are
kind of following so with them right now they’ll offer things like on Common Core as
it’s happening. So if you just wait for the IU you are always behind.”
My findings suggest that human sources of information and technical sources
of information are not mutually exclusive strategies during search – several schools
in the sample thoughtfully combined the two strategies in a way that maximized the
strengths and minimized the weaknesses of each approach. The three districts that
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employed a combination strategy were ELEM 2, ELEM 4, and HS 1. By the third year
of interviews, I could also include HS 3 as an organization pursuing a successful
combination strategy for search, as this high school spent a lot of time and effort
refining its search strategy. Even within this subset, however, districts searched in
different ways. Interviewees in ELEM 2 first used technical information to identify a
range of potential solutions and then looped in their colleagues – both internal and
external to the district – to help them further narrow the field of alternatives. As the
district curriculum coordinator for math explained, “My research and best practices
drive the dialogues that I have with the people that I work with, and that’s where
the collaborative piece comes in.” By contrast, HS 1 and ELEM 4 began their
searches by asking trusted individuals to provide recommendations based on their
needs and personal experience with specific strategies, and then validated those
suggestions with technical sources of information. Finally, HS 3 changed the order
of events depending on the decision at hand. In one case, it searched for a new
reading program by leaning first on the personal experiences of its reading
specialists (as detailed above), but flipped the process when searching for math
materials. The order of operations appeared to be inconsequential; interviewees in
all four districts reported that, regardless of how the human and technical search
process unfolded, the programs and strategies that they ultimately selected were
high quality, research-based, and likely to work well with their school context.
A few common threads emerged from the data about how districts supported
their combination search strategies. The first is that districts used their
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Intermediate Unit (IU) both as a resource for technical training and as a valuable
networking tool. One administrator in HS 1 explained that the district’s search for a
new reading program began with a workshop at the IU, but continued long after the
workshop was over when he spoke with colleagues in neighboring districts through
an IU-run administrator list-serve. Other interviewees mentioned that they had
close personal relationships with particular IU employees so that they could bounce
ideas off them in addition to attending specific trainings, for example on new statemandated testing policies related to the Common Core State Standards or the endof-year Keystone Exams. Another valuable resource for these “combination
districts” was conferences. Conferences enabled decision-makers to network, learn
from best practices, get exposure to current research, and gain access to a wide
range of vendors. One strategy was to send a group of people, including
administrators and teachers, to a particular conference and then ask the group to
share their experiences to the whole school or district upon their return. Finally,
combination districts all had some mechanism to gather information from teachers
before they moved to the decision phase. For ELEM 4 and HS 1, the mechanism was
Professional Learning Communities. For ELEM 2 it was asking teachers to “preimplement” potential new programs. And for HS 3, it was establishing common
teacher planning time and making clear that the principal valued input from
teachers throughout the search process. In all four districts, the feeling was the
same, however – teachers were valuable sources of information, the lines of
communication were open, and the process as a whole was transparent.
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Decision Point
Presumably once decision-makers have identified relevant problems and
have conducted thorough searches for potential solutions, they then make a
decision. The literature on bounded rationality suggests that, because decisionmakers are flawed and are constrained by their environments, they will satisfice or
use other heuristics to make the decision process easier (Guth, Levati & Ploner,
2010; Forester, 1984; Simon, 1972). This, of course, assumes that the decisionmaker (or makers) has been tasked to select just one solution from a set of potential
options. But evidence from the larger IES study suggests that, instead of using
mental shortcuts to help them make their decisions, school actors select a whole
number of solutions and hope that at least one of them will help to raise student
achievement scores (Weinbaum et al., 2012).
The findings from this research also run contrary to the commonly held
belief that high performing schools and low performing schools will select
fundamentally different types of improvement strategies. Using data from the 2009
survey of all Pennsylvania principals, we found that low-performing schools were
more likely to focus on test preparation strategies, but in general all schools,
regardless of performance, selected many varied strategies for improvement
(Weinbaum et al., 2012). On average, survey respondents reported devoting
moderate or major effort to 15 unique strategies (of the 46 options listed on the
survey) to improve student performance on the state standardized tests. In essence,
schools operating in the context of performance-based accountability are
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desperately throwing improvement strategies at the wall and hoping that something
will stick.
Just what types of strategies are schools selecting? In the larger IES study,
we established nine separate categories of improvement efforts where schools
devoted their efforts (Weinbaum et al., 2012):

1. New instructional approaches
2. New student and staff schedules
3. New or aligned curriculum
4. State test (PSSA) preparation
5. Remediation for struggling students
6. Data analysis to guide improvement
7. Outside expertise
8. Rewards and sanctions for performance
9. Efforts to address non-academic issues

Based on the survey data, the most popular categories among schools statewide
were adopting new curriculum materials (#3), conducting test preparation activities
(#4), providing remediation for struggling students (#5), and conducting data
analysis (#6). The least popular strategies were changing student or staff schedules
(#2), bringing in outside support (#7), and establishing reward or sanctions for
student performance (#8).
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The qualitative interview data from the eight schools in my sample echo
these findings. The most oft-mentioned decision for improvement was the purchase
of new curriculum materials or the realignment of existing materials to
performance-based accountability measures – I recorded 52 mentions of
investments in curriculum across the eight schools. Making changes to schools’
instructional approaches was another popular trend. These decisions included
investing in professional development, moving to a co-teaching model, and
promoting differentiated instruction and other instructional techniques aimed at
school improvement. The third most popular category was test preparation
activities, which included purchasing programs and strategies that used a “drill and
kill” approach to prepare for the state test, as well as lower-cost solutions like
practicing question types or content. Finally, school personnel reported that they
invested in new data collection and analysis tools, for example by instituting new
benchmark exams or investing in data warehousing tools.
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Figure 4.2
Decisions for Improvement by Area of Emphasis
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In their study of decision
decision-making
making in high schools under conditions of
accountability pressure, Gross, Kirst, Holland and Luschei (2005) found that, when
problems were ambiguous and search processes were rushed, schools were more
likely to select “periphera
“peripheral”
l” solutions. As they defined it, peripheral solutions were
improvement efforts that were not very close to the instructional core of learning,
(see also: Elmore, 1996). Test preparation, for example, would qualify as a
peripheral solution because it do
does
es not constitute a fundamental shift in the way
that teachers and students interact with the curriculum. In my sample, I found that
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schools were selecting many varied strategies for improvement, including
peripheral strategies like test preparation, as well as strategies more toward the
instructional core like the adoption of new curriculum materials and new
approaches to instruction.
In addition to the descriptive information about the strategies schools select
for improvement, I analyzed the data to provide insight on how schools made their
selections. I found it difficult to identify trends in the decision point phase, however,
because approaches were highly dependent upon the specific context of each
decision. This wide variation in approaches existed both among cases as well as
within cases. In any one district, respondents might report that in one instance they
took a vote to select a new program, and in another instance the principal or district
administrator selected the program unilaterally. The only trend that emerged was
one that follows common sense: decision-makers took more time to make a
selection if the options on the table were high-cost improvement efforts (e.g. new
curriculum materials or technology tools) than they did for smaller scale and lowercost options.
Summary
My descriptions above of the problem identification, search, and decision
point phases of the overarching decision-making process are like pieces in a
complicated puzzle. What is striking is that, in many ways, the schools in my sample
selected a similar set of strategies for improvement. Most notably, the majority of
118

schools in my sample used benchmark exams to identify problems, employed a
middle-out approach to search, and select many varied improvement solutions in an
attempt to improve student achievement scores on the state test. Given these
similarities, it is perhaps surprising that these same schools’ overall approach to
decision-making was at times dramatically different from one another.
As the literature on the right-hand side of the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum
suggests, the boundedness of the education environment plays an important role in
shaping the nature of the decision-making process. In the next chapter, I put the
puzzle pieces together, describing how schools make sense of their environments,
how they turn the discrete phases of decision-making into a decision-making
“process,” and how constraints impact their approaches to improvement.
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CHAPTER 5: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER

Defining the Decision-Making “Process”
In the previous chapter, I described how schools approach the discrete stages
of the decision-making process – problem identification, search, and the decision
point. In this chapter, I analyze how schools and districts put those pieces together
into an overall process around decision-making. At the outset, I define a decisionmaking “process” as a district’s strategic approach to improvement that is echoed
across multiple different decisions district-wide over a period of at least a year. In
other words, one teacher’s personal method for selecting materials for her
classroom would not constitute a district’s decision-making process unless her
approach represented a common approach in the district as a whole. In this way, I
base my categorizations of decision-making processes on self-reported practices
corroborated by multiple actors across the district. Additionally, I base my
characterizations of decision-making processes on a conglomeration of many
decisions that occurred over the three years of interviews, because most schools
had slight variations in their processes from decision to decision and from year to
year.
To conduct my analyses in this chapter, I first return to the theoretical
framework that I presented in Chapter One. In my Conceptual Map (see Figure 5.1),
I depict the school/district as the primary agent in charge of making decisions for
improvement under performance-based accountability measures, and this entity
120

operates under internal and external constraints, leading to decisions that fall at
some point along the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum. As I explained in the opening
chapter for this dissertation, the Spectrum is a tool that situates a broad range of
decision-making literature from various disciplines on a spectrum that ranges from
depictions of schools as rational decision-making organizations to depictions of
schools as utterly chaotic decision-makers.

Figure 5.1
Conceptual Map
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I define schools’ placement on the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum along two
literature-based dimensions. The first is linearity, which is the degree to which
schools’ decision-making processes follow the “rational” sequence of problem
identification, search, and decision point (Simon, 1955). A school that follows the
decision-making steps in that order has been judged in previous empirical research
to be more chaotic than one that completes the steps out of order (Farley-Ripple,
2008). The second factor in determining schools’ placement along the Spectrum is
an assessment of the degree to which a school has a “systemic process” around
decision-making. I define a “systemic process” as one in which decision-makers
were able to articulate a cohesive, consistent approach to school improvement in
the school or district, for example by identifying common approaches for the
discrete steps in the decision-making process, alignment of decision-making
strategies to the stated school goals or mission statement, and thoughtful
consideration of sources of information (both internal and external, human and
technical). For example, a school in which decision-makers identified many
disjointed approaches to decision-making that were poorly aligned to the school’s
stated mission would be to the right of center on the Spectrum.
I used evidence from the individual case studies to analyze the schools in my
sample on each of the two criteria – linearity and “systemic process” – making sure
to weight these two criteria equally. Then, I created case-ordered descriptive
matrices to look at trends across districts, paying particular attention to the order in
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which districts approached the decision-making phases, as well as alignment
between school goals and reported decision-making approaches.
This exercise yielded two main findings about school and district decisionmaking processes. First, schools and districts approached the decision-making
process in a mostly linear fashion, beginning with the problem identification phase,
followed by a search for solutions, and then a selection from among available
options. Second, six of the eight schools in my sample met the standard of having a
“systemic process” around decision-making in place. These two findings combined
suggest that schools and district may not be nearly as chaotic as the literature on
educational decision-making suggests (e.g. Farley-Ripple, 2008; Gross, Kirst,
Holland and Luschei, 2005; Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). With that said, my third
finding is that the decision-making environment in schools and districts is bound by
a great number of contextual and environmental constraints. These constraints can
compromise the quality of each phase of the decision-making process, but seem to
have an especially detrimental effect on the search phase. Below, I describe each
finding in detail, as well as the method of analysis that I used to come to these
findings, and then I provide an analysis of the overall effect on decision-making
processes for schools.
Linearity in Decision-Making
The garbage can model of decision-making characterizes decision-making in
education as a chaotic endeavor in which solutions often “seek” problems and
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search is omitted all together (Cohen et al., 1972). In her empirical study of
decision-making in one large district, Farley-Ripple (2008) found that a school
district distorted the decision-making process on several occasions, for example by
putting decisions before problems. And in their empirical study of high schools in
the context of high-stakes accountability, Gross et al. (2005) characterized the
decision-making process as chaotic. They write, “…the dependence on ad hoc,
individual, and uncoordinated decision situations suggests that schools in large part
have not generated a truly organizational response to their state accountability
systems” (p. 50).
Evidence from this study, however, runs in contrast to the studies above. I
found that six of the eight schools in my sample made decisions in a linear or fairly
linear manner. HS 4 was the most chaotic district in the sample and acted in a
chaotic manner not unlike the scenario that Gross et al. (2005) describe above, in
which there was no common pattern of decision-making behavior, linear or
otherwise. But school and district leaders in the remaining six schools were able to
articulate how they made decisions by following a linear procedure. First, they
described how they identified problems within their schools, as well as the obstacles
they faced in doing so. In some cases, these problems were obvious – for example,
students were complacent about the state test or the curriculum was outdated – but
in other cases schools used elaborate data collection methods to identify issues. In
all cases, however, everyone from the teachers on up to the superintendent was well
aware that the school had barriers to effective school improvement efforts. Second,
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although search efforts were often truncated, rarely did school leaders omit this
step entirely. A truncated search might have involved a quick online search for
potential solutions, a phone call to a trusted colleague or friend polling them on the
products they had used in the past, or it might have involved asking a number of
vendors to come in and explain their products. The majority of schools conducted
searches that were incomplete, which is to say that they did not carefully consider a
broad range of options, nor did they spend time comparing and contrasting their
available options. These searches, though incomplete, did occur in a linear fashion
in that they were an intermediate step between problem identification and the
decision point. Finally, schools and districts made a decision that they believed best
met the needs of the school and its students, taking into account factors like
alignment to accountability policies, cost, and other considerations.
Although I do not have the ability to determine whether schools selected the
“best” decisions from the available alternatives, achievement data from the schools
over the three-year period of the study show that, of the six schools that initially
failed to make AYP following the 2007-2008 school year, all but one school (HS 2)
was able to get out of its “warning” status over the course of the study. This
suggests that at least some of the decisions that schools made for improvement
were the right ones.
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“Systemic Process” around Decision-Making
Rational decision-making isn’t just about the degree to which decisionmakers approach problems in a linear manner, however; it is also about the degree
to which decision-makers had a “true process” around decision-making. Again, I
define a “systemic process” as one in which decision-makers approach problems
thoughtfully and align their process to their stated school goals and mission. I
gleaned the majority of this information from the Year 2 interview protocol, which
contained specific questions about schools’ mission and goals for improvement (see
Appendix B). In response to these questions, some respondents parroted the
school’s official written mission statement, while others spoke freely about their
instructional philosophies and goals for their students. I found that the schools in
my sample were, for the most part, able to articulate a cohesive decision-making
philosophy. Of the eight schools in the sample, six schools met the standard of
having a “systemic process,” meaning that they articulated a school or district-wide
approach to identifying problems, finding potential programs, and/or making
decisions for improvement. The content of their philosophies and missions was less
important than the simple fact that they had one, especially if this philosophy
extended to others throughout the school and pervaded the school or district’s
decision-making strategy.
In ELEM 2, for example, respondents uniformly expressed their commitment
to using district frameworks to search for new programs and then pilot them in the
classroom before full implementation of new strategies. In ELEM 4, school leaders
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talked about the importance of involving teachers across subject areas and grade
levels during the decision-making process. In HS 1, district administrators and
school leaders talked about the increasing dependence on formative assessments to
guide their decision-making process. By contrast, respondents in ELEM 3 each
seemed to have different personal goals for their students, which in part explained
why teachers pursued individual, disjointed strategies without forming a
collaborative approach to improvement. And in HS 4, district administrators said
outright that the enormous amount of staff turnover had left the district without a
cohesive process for making decisions, as each new staff member came in with his
or her own vision for improvement, and at times those visions were in direct
conflict with one another.
Interestingly, the two schools that did not possess a “systemic process” were
the same schools that did not approach decisions in a linear manner, as explained in
the previous section. Although more research with a larger sample is necessary to
determine the degree to which linearity and “systemic process” are correlated, my
research suggests a strong positive relationship.
In Figure 5.2, I depict the rough placement of each school along the
Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum that I first outlined in Chapter One, using both
linearity and “true process” indicators with equal weighting. The figure depicts six
schools (ELEM 1, ELEM 2, ELEM 4, HS 1, HS 2, and HS 3) as operating in
environments that are bounded, but not so bounded that their decisions become
chaotic or nonsensical. The remaining schools are further toward the “chaos” end of
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the spectrum. ELEM 3 is farther to the “chaos” end because this district lacked a
cohesive approach to decision-making, which presented itself in a haphazard topdown decision-making approach on some issues, although most of the time the
district left teachers to come up with their own strategies for improvement, which
were rarely scaled to the school or district level. Furthermore, ELEM 3 frequently
omitted the search component of the decision-making process and made decisions
without careful consideration of relevant problems. HS 4, meanwhile, is farther
along to the right of the spectrum because the levels of social capital in this district
were dismally low and the school was in the midst of a major administrative
upheaval. As a result, there was no cohesive decision-making process in place
during the three years of my visits, and decisions preceded problems and searches
in many instances.
Figure 5.2
School Placement on Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum
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Despite the evidence from these two schools, the overarching story from the
sample is that the schools were not nearly as chaotic as the literature might suggest.
Although the schools were not purely rational organizations, they generally
approached problems in a linear manner and utilized all steps of the decisionmaking process. They also included a variety of actors and approached decisions in
a middle-out fashion, meaning that the locus of decision-making generally
originated at the school level with the principal or other school administrators
and/or specialists and then radiated outward to include teachers in the classroom
as well as administrators in the district offices. The most vulnerable phase in the
decision-making process was search– this was the phase that decision-makers were
most likely to truncate, postpone, or skip when facing pressure from performancebased accountability systems to improve. Additionally, most schools had a
“systemic process” around decision-making on the whole. Even with a linear
approach and a cohesive philosophy around search, however, schools and districts
still operate under conditions of uncertainty and boundedness in their decisionmaking environments (see Figure 5.2). To understand the forces that caused
schools to deviate from the more rational approach to decision-making requires a
more in-depth examination of the various factors that bound decision-making in
schools, especially since some schools in my sample operated in environments that
were dramatically constrained by politics, internal school culture, and other factors.
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Constraints on Decision-Making
A key assumption inherent in accountability theory is that all schools,
regardless of their contexts and environments, have the necessary tools at their
fingertips to enact changes to improve student achievement. Evidence suggests
however, that context matters more than policymakers would like to think. Politics,
financial constraints, personal beliefs, human capital, and social dynamics can all
constrain the decision-making process in real and meaningful ways, which in turn
can lead to drastically different approaches to school improvement. To ignore
school and district context is to severely undermine the pressure put upon schools
to meet the rigorous standards that accountability systems set. By the same token,
however, simply asserting that “context matters” is an equally egregious
oversimplification of the reality of schooling.
The literature identifies numerous forces, both internal and external to the
school district, which can constrain the decision-making environment (Coburn &
Talbert, 2006; Gross et al., 2005; Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002; Abelman &
Elmore, 1999; Hannaway & Kimball, 1998). Internal constraints generally arise
from the intricate ways in which students, staff, and administrators interact and set
goals for achievement. They include human capital constraints, school norms and
culture, personal experiences and beliefs about student achievement, district size,
and time. External bounds, on the other hand, are those pressures that outside
sources place on schools. They include policy mandates, politics, budget, and
community pressures. The boundary between internal and external bounds is not
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always clearly delineated, but does provide a useful guideline to distinguish
between the various types of constraints that might affect educational decisionmakers. The literature also identifies specific constraints on search, including
familiarity (Coburn, 2007; Honig, 2003; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), search
misalignment (Gross et al., 2005), and accessibility (Gilovich, 1991; Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990).
Consistent with my analysis strategy in previous chapters, I used a caseordered descriptive matrix to examine the various constraints on the decisionmaking process. In addition to the case-ordered descriptive matrices, I conducted a
selective document analysis of the Pennsylvania accountability framework
document called “Getting Results” that each school was required to fill out if they
failed to meet the accountability standards set forth by the state. (I asked schools to
provide me with their Getting Results documents and three of the eight schools in
my sample allowed me access to these documents.) I found that respondents
identified many different factors that constrained decision-making in their schools.
The most severe constraints on search were policy mandates from performancebased accountability systems, tight budgets, pressure from the community and the
school board, time constraints, staff turnover, a negative school culture, and
outdated technology. Generally speaking, the first three constraints in this list fall
into the category of “external” constraints and the next four constraints fall into the
“internal” category, which signals a relatively even split between the two. Below, I
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provide details on the constraints, including their impact on each individual phase
of the decision-making process.

Table 5.1
Decision-Making Constraints Area of Emphasis
External Constraints
Constraint
Policy
Mandates

Tight Budgets

Community
Pressure

Problem ID
Narrowly defines
problems in terms of
performance on state tests

Search
“Scientifically-based”
requirement limits field of
options

Decision Point
Truncates timing
and hurries
decisions

N/A

Prioritizes alignment to
standards/ assessments
Limits field of options

Delays decisions

Redefines problems
through political lens

Limits ability to gather
information
Limits field of options
based on cost/politics

Greater
transparency
Delays decisions

Internal Constraints
Constraint
Time
Staff
Turnover
School
Culture

Outdated
Technology

Problem ID
Overlooks underlying
problems
Muddles problem ID
Excludes critical
viewpoints

Search
Limits exposure to new
ideas
Leads to inconsistent
approaches to search
Limits searches by
familiarity

Muddles problem ID

Leads to fractured
approaches

Makes data less accessible

Limits technical searches

Decision Point
Leads to unilateral
decisions
Delays decisions
Exclusionary
Creates
disagreement over
common
improvement goals
Leads to avoidance
of technology-based
strategies

Before I detail the specific constraints on the schools and districts in my
sample, however, it is important to state at the outset that not all constraints are
inherently negative forces on decision-making. After all, schools are public entities
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that serve a vulnerable, underage population (Ingersoll, 2003; Lortie, 1975) and
some bounds on decision-making behavior are designed to protect the academic
and social wellbeing of students. School boards, for example, were created with the
specific intention of keeping district administrators’ decision-making ability in
check. Although they do not necessarily operate in the best interest of the school
district at all times, they could play a positive role if they were to force schools and
districts to choose new programs and strategies in a careful and deliberate manner.
To be sure, constraints can negatively impact decision-making as well. For example,
a distrustful working environment is likely to hamper efforts to come to decisions in
a collaborative manner, which can narrow the field of options, make consensus
building difficult, and impede implementation. And sometimes the line between the
positive or negative impact of a constraint is blurry. For example, administrative
turnover might disrupt the decision-making process and cause a lack of continuity,
but it might also bring with it the opportunity for fresh ideas and renewed
commitment to improving academic achievement. In the analyses below, I mention
both the positive and negative effects of decision-making constraints, and I also
point out instances where the effect might be ambiguous or context-specific.

Policy Mandates. Performance-based accountability measures affected all stages of
the decision-making process. This is perhaps due to the nature of the sample, as six
of the eight schools in my sample were labeled as “in need of improvement” after
the 2007-2008 school year, which meant that these schools felt the pressure to
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improve their students’ scores on the state standardized tests. In term of problem
identification, my case study schools reported that they had received a report from
the state prior to Year 1 of the study indicating their school’s accountability status
for the following year, disaggregated by student subgroup. For the vast majority of
schools, these results did not come a surprise – teachers across all cases said that
they knew which students were in danger of missing the “proficiency” mark on the
state tests. Still, the schools were well aware that the state had publicly announced
the “problems” in the school, and that it was now their responsibility to address
these problems, however narrowly defined they might be.
In Pennsylvania the state requires that schools in “warning” status also fill
out a document called “Getting Results” that details their perceptions of school-wide
problems and their strategies for improvement. Specifically, school leaders must
identify a “school improvement team,” review and analyze state test data, identify
the root causes of performance deficiencies, and detail their plans for improvement.
Although the state does not dictate which strategies schools must choose to improve
their scores, the Getting Results document serves as a problem identification
framework for schools. Whenever possible, I analyzed schools’ Getting Results
frameworks to see how they described the problems in their schools. In the three
schools that allowed me access to their documents (ELEM 1, ELEM 2, and HS 3), I
found that the frameworks forced schools to be honest about their shortcomings
and look closely at the data from the state assessments to determine which pockets
of students needed extra attention. In the three years of interviews, I also asked
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how the document affected their approach to school improvement for the sample as
a whole. Most schools asserted that the Getting Results framework did not
fundamentally alter their approach to improvement, but that it did push them to
look more closely at school-level data and examine the needs of student subgroups
that might previously have been overlooked. A special education administrator in
ELEM 2 explained how the framework highlighted the specific needs of special
education students:

“With the change in curriculum materials…they really look at the special ed
component and how will this affect our special ed students. And I don’t
know. Before the curriculum changed it was like ‘oh gee this looks good, let’s
try it.’ And I don’t know that anyone ever thought about the special ed
population, and now it’s definitely considered.” (District Administrator,
ELEM 2)
In this way, the effect of accountability measures on problem identification might be
both positive and negative. On the positive side, the comments of the administrator
above highlight how accountability policies and frameworks can push schools to
concentrate on previously overlooked students. On the negative side, however,
defining problems through the lens of students’ scores on state standardized tests
might cause schools to ignore other pressing issues that cannot be expressed
through student test scores, for example school culture, critical thinking skills, or
graduation rates.
Policy mandates also affected the search phase of the decision-making
process. The No Left Behind Act law mandates that all programs and strategies in
schools be based on “scientifically-based research” (NCLB, 2001). Although many
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have critiqued the scientifically-based research requirement as vague and poorly
defined (e.g. Eisenhart & Towne, 2003), the provision does, at least hypothetically,
limit the programs that schools can select to those that have been tested and found
to have positive effects on school performance. The schools in the sample
mentioned that they felt constrained to look for programs that fell into this
“scientifically-based” category, although perhaps not as much as one would have
expected. This may be due to the fact that the provision had been in place for a
sufficient period of time that vendors were able to conduct research – or at least
claim that they conducted research – that helped their products appear to meet the
minimum standards.
Districts also reported that they received enormous pressure to align their
curriculum to the state academic standards. Pennsylvania helps districts align their
curriculum by publishing the standards, providing webinars and trainings on
alignment, providing a list of tested content or “anchors,” and offering technical
assistance from regional providers or “Intermediate Units.” Schools in this study
reported that pressure from the state caused them to seek out vendors that could
claim their products were well aligned. Said one district administrator:

"I think at the time that we began to create the Study Lab and the resources,
there were limited resources available. There were companies that were just
coming about with the notion that we were looking for something that would
be aligned with the Pennsylvania Academic Standards. In fact, at the time
that we selected Princeton Review, even they were not aligned at that point.
But they were indicating that they were going to be aligned within the next
year or two and in fact they were. And they were a company that we felt very
comfortable with.” (Administrator, HS1)
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By the third year of the study, interviewees were also mentioning a new type of
alignment, namely that of alignment to the Common Core Standards, which is a set
of college and career readiness standards that nearly all states have agreed to
support (NGA & CCSSO, 2010). Study participants reported that “Common Core”
became a buzzword as they searched for new programs, and any vendor touting a
new program would proudly proclaim alignment as a major selling point for their
materials.
The pressure generated from the “scientifically-based” requirement and the
standards-alignment movement also operated in a subtler manner. Some programs
have gained popularity within performance-based accountability systems because
they have been found to be effective at raising student achievement due to their
inclusion in the U.S. Department of Education’s What Works Clearinghouse. When
schools or districts were searching for new programs, they reported that they felt
pressured to choose these rigorously tested programs over other programs that
might align more closely with their specific needs. For example, respondents in one
high school (HS 4) reported that they were unhappy with their existing curriculum
but felt unable to change it because those programs were so highly regarded by
proponents of performance-based accountability systems.
Finally, accountability measures truncated the time allotted for the decision
point phase of the process. Because the testing period in Pennsylvania is in the
early spring, most schools must put in place any new improvement programs in the
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fall if they realistically hope to see any meaningful results. Since schools don’t
typically receive their scores back until early summer, the time they have to make
decisions is limited to the summertime. One teacher at a struggling elementary
school (ELEM 3) mentioned that her school wanted to align their test preparation
program to the state standards but that those efforts were frustrated when the
truncated decision-making period for decisions caused them to rush the process,
which ultimately cut teachers out of the decision point phase of the process and led
to an unpopular curriculum choice. Another district (ELEM 2) was faced with the
same problem and solved it by paying its teachers overtime during the summer
months to work on aligning the curriculum to the standards and plan professional
development activities before the start of the school year.

Tight budgets. I began my school interviews in the spring of 2009, soon after the
beginning of a nationwide recession. By the end of third round of interviews in the
summer of 2011, all eight districts in the study reported that they had been affected
by the recession, although some districts felt the budget crunch more acutely than
others. One administrator in a well-off district (ELEM 4) put the issue of budget
woes into perspective, saying that the recession forced them to slash their
curriculum budget by about eight hundred thousand dollars in a single year, which
was about half their total budget. And the principal of a suburban high school said,
"Things have changed a little bit with the change in the economy. Although they still
want to have the best intentions for our kids, the economy plays a role. You can't
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keep going back to your taxpayers and raising taxes when people are losing jobs and
salaries have been frozen in a lot of different areas and so forth" (Principal, HS 3).
School and district leaders did not identify specific ways in which tight
budgets affected their efforts at problem identification, but they explained in great
detail how they limited their search processes by narrowing the field of options to
less expensive programs and strategies. In some cases, this meant that decisionmakers would not even consider programs that cost too much or required
additional full-time employees to administer. Several administrators in one high
school (HS 4) reported that they had recently purchased curriculum materials for
Advanced Placement courses but were weighing sending the books back to the
publisher because they could not justify the ongoing cost of the technology licenses
that came along with the books. In other cases, schools would only partially
implement programs, for example by purchasing a few licenses and piloting them in
one classroom while they lobbied the school board for funding to extend licenses to
a broader student population.
Tight budgets also limited decision-makers’ ability to gather information
about potential new programs and strategies. Personnel in a majority of the schools
in the sample mentioned that budget woes caused them to curtail or even eliminate
sources of information for their searches, including travel budgets, subscriptions to
journals, and memberships to professional associations. Several schools said that
they also had to cut staff positions, which meant that there were fewer people to
conduct searches and everyone’s time was more crunched. In one elementary
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school (ELEM 4), the district cut several reading and math specialist positions,
which forced classroom teachers to conduct their own searches for new strategies
during their rare free periods. When it came to travel budgets, several school
administrators mentioned that one of the first things to get cut was travel to
conferences, which meant that they had less freedom to explore new and innovative
solutions for their schools. One high school principal who was young, energetic, and
eager to search for new programs for his school explained that he had stopped going
to conferences himself, “Because I feel bad, for one thing, going to a lot of
conferences. Especially since I've told my teaching staff that they're not allowed
because of the budget. The superintendent saying you need to cut- we had to cut our
conference and travel budget by, oh, it was like eighty percent. So I didn't have
much” (Principal, HS 3). In this way, the findings show that tight budgets limited
technical searches (i.e. searches that lean on third-party information, such as
research, professional development materials, journal articles, and professional
organization pieces), and therefore caused decision-makers to lean more heavily on
human resources (i.e. word-of-mouth recommendations, examples from
neighboring districts) during their search processes.
Although interviewees viewed budget woes as a negative constraint on
search, the impact on the decision point was both negative and positive. On the
negative side, insufficient funds could postpone or indefinitely delay decisions.
When asked what sort of new programs her school had adopted that year, a teacher
responded matter-of-factly, saying, “Yeah, we haven’t gotten anything new. I don’t
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think anything new is being bought because we don’t have any money, so that’s
pretty much what we have” (Administrator, HS 2). In its “Getting Results”
document, however, this high school had listed numerous ways in which it planned
to improve student scores on the state tests, including purchasing new materials.
This high school teacher was not alone in believing that the budget had delayed
important decisions for improvement. One elementary school principal (ELEM 3)
said that he desperately wanted to buy new computer-based remediation materials
for his students, but financial problems in the district had forced him to spend the
money in the district’s general fund to cover the basic salaries of teachers. And a
district administrator (HS 4) in charge of curriculum and instructional programming
described how the budget cuts had caused her to completely revisit how she
purchases new materials. Buying programs ad hoc, she said, “eats up my entire
budget. So it's going to have to become more cyclical. I didn't really want to do that. I
really wanted everybody to bring everything they needed this year, and we'd try to
work out with them- hey, if I get you this half, can you wait for this half? That's
gonna hugely differ, so that will be a fall-out from the Governor's budget”
(Administrator, HS 4).
On the positive side, however, interviewees acknowledged that budgetary
constraints often forced their schools and districts to make decisions in a more
transparent, collaborative, and deliberate manner. Said one high school principal:

"Realistically in the last couple of years you have to be really careful about
every dollar that you spend. I think we've gotten better at some of our
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decision-making because of that. We've gotten more thorough. Because God
forbid we make a mistake and spend a couple hundred thousand dollars and
find out that we just wasted all that money." (Principal, HS 1)
Although the data does not support a determination as to the extent to which one
decision was “better” than another, almost all of the subjects in this study believed
that a slower, more deliberate process was better than a hasty process. And some
teachers who were very vocal about their disdain for budget constraints in general
reluctantly expressed their gratitude when the budget caused the process to become
more collaborative, because it meant that administrators were more likely to seek
their opinions on new programs and strategies. Interview respondents also
reported that the community – particularly school board members – liked the
decision-making process to be slow, methodical, and collaborative because they felt
they had greater control over how their dollars were spent.

Community pressure. My findings suggest that the community – that is, taxpayers,
parents, and the school board – all played an important political role and affected all
stages of the decision-making process. Forces in the community often attempted to
interpret schools’ accountability status based on their personal politics and
preconceived notions of how the schools in their community should operate.
School boards were perhaps the most instructive example of how the
community injected politics into the problem identification phase of the decisionmaking process. The school board was so divisive and politically polarized in two
schools in my sample that it made the purchase of any new materials an uphill
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battle. The school boards in these districts reflected the larger national political
polarization, with half of the board opposing any new spending in public education,
and the other half supporting robustly funded education reform. Ironically, these
schools were the only ones in my sample that were not on the state’s watch list for
improvement, which suggests that school board politics represent a pressure for
schools that is wholly separate from accountability pressure. Four schools in the
sample had school boards that were powerful, but had a collaborative and friendly
relationship with the schools. The remaining two schools in my sample reported
that the school board rubber-stamped all their requests.
School boards constrained the problem identification phase by bringing their
own biases, experience, and opinions to the table. In many cases, school boards
contributed their own interpretations of the problem to the decision-making
process, and these identified issues were sometimes in conflict with the problems
identified by performance-based accountability systems. This was the case with HS
2, where the school board interpreted the high school’s “warning status” as a sign
that students were less engaged and showed less school pride, even though the
superintendent was adamant that the problem was academic in nature. School
boards exerted their control over the search process primarily by controlling the
purse strings in the district. Politically polarized communities, such as the
community for ELEM 4, found it difficult to approve new capital purchases because
the school board was wary of using taxpayer money on large educational
investments. School and district leaders reported that they tried to anticipate the
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school board’s stinginess by avoiding consideration of programs that might draw
undue attention from the board.
Aside from school boards, vendors also constrained search processes in my
sample schools and districts. Although some schools reported that their decisions
were completely unaffected by vendors pushing their products, other schools
admitted that they did not conduct a thorough search because vendors actively
sought them out. Small, understaffed districts like ELEM 3 seemed to be the most
susceptible to vendor pitches
Political pressures in the community also affected the decision point phase of
the decision-making process. School boards, for example, could delay or even derail
the decision process if they disagreed on funding allocations for new programs and
strategies. Note the differences below in the way that these two administrators in
different districts talk about how they work with the school board to select new
programs. The first district had a friendly relationship with a school board and
worked collaboratively with the board to select new programs and strategies. The
second operated in a highly political environment with a very contentious school
board.
District A: "We meet with the board once a year in a workshop that lasts
probably most of the day. And we go over what we consider to be our goals,
and then we take input from the board members about things that they feel
are important. So the administrative team, which consists of the central
office and the principals, will sit and have that discussion about what our
goals should be with the board. When we're done with that, we take two
days at the end of June to assess how we did last year on what our goals were
and then take those same goals and say well how far do we expect to get next
year. And then we use the input from the board to say whether this is the
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direction that the community and the board feels that we're going." (District
Administrator, ELEM 2)

District B: “They're very unrealistic. It's a split board. They either love you or
they hate you, depending upon the week. They are doing it for political
reasons and don't understand….that it's really about the kids. We're in a
contract year. Some of the board members, they want to see blood. They're
missing it. They're missing the big picture of what their purpose is.” (District
Administrator, ELEM 4)

In the first district, the educators guided the decision point phase and involved the
board as community collaborators, using them to refine their district’s goals at key
points along the way. In this case, the school board was a positive force because it
helped the district to clearly articulate its goals to the community. In the second
district, however, the adversarial relationship with the school board caused district
decision-makers to cede control over the decision point when their ideas for
improvement became mired in school board politics.
It is important to discuss the various forces within the community that did
not affect decision-making to a great degree. First, I found that teachers unions did
not seem to constrain any of the decision-making phases in a major way. With the
exception of two districts that underwent contentious contract negotiations at some
point during the three-year study, interview respondents said that unions did not
exert undue pressure on their decision-making processes. This may be because the
districts had good working relationships with their teacher unions, or it may be that
administrators were so used to operating within the bounds of the contract that
they did not even view it as constraint. For example, interviewees nearly
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universally mentioned that they wished they had more time to conduct professional
development around new programs and strategies. While they did not mention
teacher contracts as a limiting factor, it is certainly the case that contracts placed
limits on the hours in the school day, which in turn made it difficult to schedule
these activities.
Second, I did not find that parents and community groups greatly
constrained any of the decision-making phases. Some school-level personnel
mentioned that their community newspaper had printed the results of their schools’
scores on the state standardized test, which increased their anxiety about the tests
in general. However, only in a few isolated cases did respondents mention that
parents constrained their search or decision-making process.
Finally, I did not find that vendors or district personnel exerted undue
influence during decision-making, for example by arranging under-the-table deals
for exclusive contracts with certain vendors or forgoing a collaborative process to
make way for products advocated by family members or friends. Although it is
possible that interviewees censored their comments during the interviews – after
all, the data is entirely based on self-report – interviewees generally felt comfortable
being candid during the interviews because they did speak about several other
sensitive topics. This is not to say that impropriety did not indeed occur in these
eight districts, but there is not evidence in this study to support that it was a
pervasive constraint on decision-making.

146

Time constraints. Talk to any teacher, principal, or district administrator and the
one thing they can almost certainly agree upon is that there are never enough hours
in the day. Teachers wish that they had more time to search for the right materials
to fit their class’ needs, collaborate with their peers, and participate in professional
development. Specialists wish that they could meet with teachers, observe more
classrooms, and find the right programs and strategies for pockets of struggling
students. Principals wish that they did not get mired down in issues of building
maintenance so that they could dedicate more time to instructional improvement.
And district administrators wish they could spend more time researching the right
programs for their schools.
These time constraints are, in many cases, symptoms of a larger problem.
When budgets are tight, staff are usually spread thin, which makes it difficult for
people to fully examine the barriers to improvement in their schools or conduct
thorough searches for new improvement programs and strategies. Accordingly, the
pressure to look for shortcuts during the problem identification and search phases
of the decision-making process is strong (Feldman & Tung, 2001). In terms of the
problem identification phase, harried decision-makers in my sample did not have
sufficient time to delve into the data and investigate underlying causes for
underperformance. Teachers in many schools admitted that they had taken only a
cursory look at student achievement data and did not talk to students’ previous
teachers before the start of the school year. Instead, they relied on administrators
to tell them where to concentrate their efforts, assuming that the administrators
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themselves had conducted a thorough needs assessment, which was not always the
case. When asked whether his school would be using new sources of data to help
identify areas for improvement, one assistant principal at a struggling elementary
school (ELEM 3) said: “It would be nice to have the information, but we’re not
utilizing all the data we have today to its fullest. Why bring in any more if it’s not to
be used as it possibly could be?” (Building Administrator, ELEM 3).
Tight schedules also prompted decision-makers to cut their search processes
short. Decision-makers reported that they were more likely to take only a cursory
look at research-based materials and other technical sources of information such as
journals, clearinghouses, and articles from professional associations. They were
also less likely to take the time to visit conferences and other outside learning
opportunities. Similarly, decision-makers pressed for time were more likely to
make only courtesy inquiries to friends and colleagues about the programs they
were using in their schools, forgoing any process to find out if the programs were a
good fit for their student populations and identified needs. Even administrators in
districts with well-developed decision-making frameworks reported that time
constraints affected their search processes. When asked how she would spend her
time if gifted some additional hours in the day, one district administrator in ELEM 4
responded, “Certainly more time to read. Certainly more time to network. I don't
like sitting here. I wish I had more time to do that, to answer the emails, to really
write a really good response to something that [my colleague] is putting together for
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Keystones, but I'll throw that together. It'll be okay" (District Administrator, ELEM
4).
Limited time frames also had a severe effect on the decision point phase of
the larger decision-making process. These schools and districts often rammed their
decisions through with very little input from their peers. In extreme cases, decisionmakers acted unilaterally and without much evidence to back up their decisions. In
these instances, interviewees mentioned that teacher buy-in to the decisions was
very low, and that fidelity of implementation suffered as a result. One salient
example came from HS 3, which selected a problem-based learning curriculum
program for math without much input from teachers. When asked why they had
selected the program in the first place, administrators said that they knew they
needed a new math program because their materials were outdated, but didn’t have
much time to find a new one. They knew they were looking for “alignment” –
although they had trouble defining exactly what they were looking to align the
curriculum to – so they simply followed the path of a neighboring district that had
selected a problem-based learning approach for its high school. They made the
decision to switch to the new materials over the summer and implemented them in
the fall, when the high school principal was out on leave. The teachers, as it turned
out, hated the new approach and the accompanying materials. By Year 2, the
principal (who had returned from leave) was already looking to give teachers more
flexibility in their instructional approach.
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Although there is insufficient information to determine the degree to which
time constraints made decisions substantively worse than decisions that were made
carefully and deliberately with a longer time frame, the qualitative evidence
suggests that a thorough search and a structured decision-making process takes
time – and that well-funded, robustly staff districts are more likely to have that time
to spend. Said one district administrator in a high-performing, well-funded district:

“We have a committee that we put together that includes district
administrators, school administrators, teachers, parents, and community
members. Well, that takes time, and it should take time. You want it to take
time, and you put all the resources out there, and that's typically three-tofour meetings – an hour to an hour and a half each” (District Administrator,
ELEM 4).
This was a common opinion voiced by those schools that had robust decisionmaking processes in place, namely that search takes time and should not be rushed.

Staff Turnover. Another major decision-making constraint was staff turnover.
Staff turnover affected all stages of the decision-making process. In terms of the
problem identification phase, new personnel often come in the door with different
philosophies and ways to conceptualize the problems that a school faces. One high
school (HS 2) reported that it had gone through three principals in as many years,
which made it nearly impossible to get anything done because each principal had a
different understanding of the gaps in achievement in the student body. An
administrator in a different district (HS 4) said that the worst part about
administrative turnover was that employees’ differing goals and strategies for
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improvement meant that the decision-making process started from scratch every
time. Said one administrator, "[Our superintendent] left and with that came nine
different approaches on what it is we are all about" (Administrator, HS 4).
Administrative turnover impacted the search phase as well. Administrators
were usually the people who established procedures and processes around search –
for example by creating curriculum review cycles or setting guidelines for
collaborative decision-making – and when they left, their search methods often left
with them. In one district (ELEM 2), the turnover of administrative staff left the
district without a cohesive process around search. Even though the incoming
assistant superintendent had intended to create a real process around search, he
found that there was simply too much to do and too little time to do it. As he
described it, “Unfortunately we were literally in the ‘building the airplane as we
were flying it’ mode. And in fact I often remarked that we not only building it, we
were reconstructing it, redesigning it, and then putting it back together while we
were in flight” (Administrator, ELEM 2). This administrator reported that he had to
create all new procedures around search, and a colleague of his said that she was
forced to borrow a curriculum review guideline from her previous employer (a
neighboring district) because there simply wasn’t enough time to create her own.
Staff turnover affected the decision point phase of the decision-making
process as well, especially when incoming administrators had differing leadership
styles. A teacher in HS 4 spoke about how her school coped when the
superintendent and the high school principal left in the same year:
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“And that was half of our team gone, new people in. Some of those new
people were never in an administrative job or did so very, very early on in
their careers. So we were left mentoring each other. And that works
sometimes, and sometimes it can really be biting, and what I what happened
is, it's kind of a loss of trust and credibility among the team, and it's borne out
of frustration with that whole mentoring each other kind of piece, and trying
your luck at different types of leadership styles” (Teacher, HS 4).
New leadership styles, new improvement goals, and new personalities can all push
off decisions or even prevent them from occurring. Just as the high school above
(HS 4) became accustomed to its new principal’s leadership style, the
superintendent, who was only in the first year of his new job, announced that he
would be leaving, which led the school to push off its selection of a new test
preparation program for the high school.

District Culture. Staff turnover also highlighted the importance of school and
district culture during the search and decision-making process. Findings from my
sample showed that a school culture characterized by distrust or competition
limited the degree to which school leaders made decisions in a thoughtful,
collaborative, and goal-oriented manner. I found two factors that led to a negative
school or district culture and constrained decision-making: a lack of trust between
teachers and administrators; and a poorly articulated or conflicting philosophy
around improvement. Both of these cultural constraints affected all phases of the
decision-making process.
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The most frequently cited culture problem was a lack of trust between
teachers and administrators. Of the eight schools in the sample, only three
consistently reported that they had a positive, collaborative decision-making
environment. The other five schools reported a great degree of mistrust between
the different levels of hierarchy in the district. The principal of a struggling
elementary school (ELEM 3), for example, said that he had tried to involve the
teachers in the decision-making process regarding the selection of new curriculum
materials but now excluded them because collaboration was too difficult to manage.
And a high school teacher in a district where contract negotiations had created a
strained relationship between teachers and administrators said:

“As much as I believe the administration thinks it was all about the contract,
there were many things that happened that made staff feel unimportant and
not valued and as much as we know we give our heart and soul in classes and
teach the kids and show them how much we love teaching as much as they
love or not love learning. There were some of us that got the impression that
we didn't do anything because we didn't have a contract. It made some very
hard, negative feelings that I don't think are going to be quick to go away.”
(Teacher, HS 4)
This teacher’s comments highlight the importance of creating a culture of trust and
collaboration, and point to the effects of distrust on all phases of the decisionmaking process. In terms of problem identification, when teachers were excluded,
they did not speak up about the barriers to school improvement that they see. In
Year 1 of this study, teachers in HS 2 reported that they were not consulted after the
school received its “warning status” determination, even though they would have
liked to be a part of the decision-making team. In terms of search, when teachers
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felt as though their opinions were not valued, they were less likely to search for new
materials or explore instructional strategies that could be implemented on a large
scale, choosing instead to implement targeted strategies for their classrooms alone,
or forgo new programs or strategies all together. In several cases, this caused
teachers to become resistant to change over time, which in turn encouraged
administrators to limit the number of options on the table to ones that they think
that teachers will more readily accept. In practice, this meant that the options ere
not as innovative as they could be – they merely tweaked the existing system. ELEM
3 fit this description, as teachers reported they would search for strategies that fit
their classrooms or perhaps their grade levels, but never did they take any big ideas
to school or district level to bring their ideas to scale. Finally, in terms of the
decision point, teachers were more likely to take a backseat to school improvement
efforts, instead letting administrators lead the charge for improvement. Teachers in
HS 4, for example, had been systematically cut out of the decision point phase for so
many years that they reported they never asked to participate anymore.
Another constraint on decision-making was a set of poorly articulated or
conflicting goals for improvement. The Year 2 interview protocol (see Appendix B)
contained three specific questions about school personnel’s perceptions of their
school’s mission and goals. In their responses, interviewees usually recited the
school’s mission statement or articulated a broad set of school goals for
improvement. Interviewees in several schools, however, had trouble articulating
their school’s mission or presented conflicting visions for the school or district. In
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two low-performing elementary schools (ELEM 1 and ELEM 3), nearly everyone we
interviewed said that the school didn’t really have a guiding mission or set of goals
for improvement. Their goals were more short-term, for example to get new staff to
participate in professional development activities after school. In ELEM 3,
respondents said that the school was looked down upon in the district and one
teacher actually said that the school had no identity other than being the “redheaded stepchild” in the district. And although respondents in ELEM 2 reported
that that their principal worked hard to instill a sense of ownership and
entrepreneurship in all school staff, the principal himself expressed deep frustration
that the district superintendent did not respect these leadership goals. The district
was trying to make his school into a “Stepford school,” he said, which belied
conflicting goals around decision-making in the district.
The problem of conflicting philosophies affected all stages of the decisionmaking process. It confused the problem identification phase because it allowed
people to identify different or even conflicting problems. It stymied search because
it failed to provide the impetus for change, essentially leaving it up to individuals to
set personal goals for themselves and their students. Finally, poorly articulated
philosophies made it difficult for decision-makers to come together in a
collaborative manner at the decision point because they had difficulty agreeing on a
common set of goals for improvement.
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Technology. Whether it was a data management tool for tracking student-level
data, a curriculum supplement, or a computer-based remediation program, the
schools in my sample were investing large amounts of money in new 21st Century
learning tools. With these tools, however, came various stumbling blocks for
schools. First, technology required that someone in the district as available to set up
the technology and troubleshoot problems with connectivity, access, and other
technical problems. Second, investments in innovative technology-based software
only worked if the school or district had already made the necessary investments in
hardware. A new computer-adaptive remediation program was useless if the school
didn’t have enough computers. Finally, teachers and administrators must be trained
on how to use the technology hardware and software, which necessitated an
investment in professional development.
At first glance, technology might seem like a constraint that only affects the
implementation phase of the decision-making process. After all, teachers may lose
instructional time and become frustrated when technology tools don’t run smoothly
in the classroom, but the tools themselves have already been selected. On the
contrary, I found that technology problems plagued all phases of the decisionmaking process. In terms of the problem identification phase, outdated or poorly
implemented technology meant that administrators and teachers did not have the
appropriate data management tools to track student data, such as benchmark test
scores, achievement levels in previous grades, and areas of opportunity. Said one
high school teacher:
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"We have tons of data but it is not easily accessible, it is still a matter of going
to three different things and look up three different scores and supposedly
they have a program that we are going to get next year called Tetra Data, that
is going to give you all the kids’ numbers. We are still a little ways away from
that but that will save us a lot of time and get people more interested in the
data.” (Teacher, HS 3)
As this teacher points out, without the proper tools, it may be difficult for school
leaders to spot potential achievement gaps or design improvement plans for at-risk
students.
In terms of search, many search processes themselves were technology
based, for example when teachers used online lesson planning websites or when
administrators conducted technical searches for new improvement strategies or
programs. If technology did not run smoothly, decision-makers redirected their
searches away from technical searches and toward human searches (i.e. word-ofmouth recommendations). In some cases, this meant that searches became
constrained by familiarity and, if the decision-maker’s network were local,
geography. Another potential outcome was that searches became drawn out,
delayed, or eliminated all together. Decision-makers in nearly half of the schools in
the sample mentioned that they would have loved to use technology to help them
manage data and target individual student needs, but they lacked the time or
support to find appropriate programs. This problem affected teachers as they
searched for strategies for their classroom, but it also impacted administrators and
other school-level personnel who were unable to spend as much time as they would
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like finding the right ways to support their teachers. Said one high school teacher
leader:

"I don’t think I’ve made as many changes as I hoped to. I think when I went
through the classes and I thought about a lot of the group efforts and
business and contacting business and getting them involved in my classroom,
I think I had good intentions. I wrote some proposals that made sense and I
don’t feel like I have really followed through, whether it’s because of the time
factor or whatever." (Teacher, HS 1)
This teacher’s struggles demonstrate that searches for technology-based programs
and strategies were inherently more complicated than traditional searches for new
improvement strategies. Because technology required a capital investment in
hardware, decision-makers needed to search both for the programs themselves and
for grants to fund the purchase of the programs. This teacher leader was looking to
local businesses for support but had trouble finding the time to do that sort of
networking.
Finally, the decision point became complicated when teachers anticipated
difficulties implementing technology-based programs and strategies in their
classrooms. In particular, decision-makers became skittish if they thought that
technology problems would detract from successful implementation of new
programs. This was the case for three schools in my sample. In the most striking
example, a high school (HS 1) delayed the rollout of its new math curriculum by a
whole year, deciding instead to invest in teacher training around new technology
tools. The principal’s reasoning was that the school could only unveil one major
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initiative at a time, and that an investment in technology tools would have to push
other decisions to the side.
Spotlight on Search
The cross-cutting effects of decision-making constraints presented above
highlight the fact that schools feel enormous amounts of internal and external
pressure to change their decision-making processes. In some cases, this pressure
helps them to focus and refine their approach, and in some cases pressure has the
opposite effect, essentially confounding and muddling the decision-making process.
In Table 5.2, I show how each of the constraints identified by the schools in my
sample affected every nearly stage of the decision-making process, including
problem identification, search, and decision-making. Reading this table may leave
one with the misleading impression, however, that each stage of the decisionmaking process was equally vulnerable to internal and external bounds, when in
fact the search process was by far the most vulnerable phase of the three.
To determine the differential effects of decision-making constraints on each
of the individual phases of decision-making, I went back to the detailed profiles that
I had created for each school in my sample, which in turn were based on a careful
read of the interview data pertaining to each school. In these profiles, I detailed the
collective effect of constraints on problem identification, search, and the decision
point. After reviewing each of the profiles, I defined the whether these constraints
had a “minor” or a “major” influence on each of the decision-making phases. A
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minor influence was where, on the whole, constraints were specific to an isolated
incident and did not affect the school or district’s larger approach to decisionmaking, whereas a major influence was one that affected a broad set of stakeholders
and permanently changed the way the approach to decision-making.
Table 5.2 details the results of this analysis. For each school I list the major
constraints that respondents identified within their school or district, omitting only
the “policy mandates” category, since this was a precondition for all but two schools
in the sample. I then list whether the constraints had either a major or minor
influence on the individual decision-making stages.
Table 5.2
School-Level Analysis of Differential Constraint Impact
School

Major Constraints

Problem
ID

Search

Decision
Point

ELEM 1
ELEM 2
ELEM 3
ELEM 4
HS 1
HS 2
HS 3
HS 4

Time, Technology, Human Capital
Community, Time
Human Capital, Budget, Community, Time
Community, Budget, Time
Time, Technology
Human Capital, Budget, Community, Time
Human Capital, Budget
Human Capital, Community, Budget

Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Minor
Major
Major
Major

Major
Minor
Major
Major
Major
Major
Major
Major

Minor
Major
Major
Minor
Minor
Minor
Major
Major

In Table 5.2, I show that the bounds on the decision-making environment
were a major influence on the search phase for seven of the eight schools in the
sample. Contrast this with the problem identification phase (five of the eight) and
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decision point phase (four of the eight), and search emerges as the phase that is
most vulnerable to internal and external decision-making constraints.
This finding is not directly in contrast with the literature, as several authors
(e.g. Farley-Ripple, 2008; Coburn, 2006; Gross et al., 2005; Honig, 2003) point out
that searches can quickly become chaotic or even omitted when the decisionmaking environment becomes constrained. My research is the first, however, to
specifically highlight the vulnerability of search as directly compared with the
problem identification and decision point phases of the overarching decisionmaking process. Especially given the great number of resources dedicated to
studying evidence use and data-driven decision-making, this work suggests that
researchers pay more attention in the future to search.
Summary
Based on the descriptions above, I characterize schools as linear decisionmakers that operate under moderate-to-severe constraints. Many of my findings in
this chapter are in line with the literature. My findings confirm that schools acutely
feel the pressure from performance-based accountability systems (e.g. Stecher et al.,
2008; Hamilton, Berends & Stecher, 2005; Linn, 2005), and are affected by other
external constraints as well, including community politics and budgetary limitations
(Hess, 1999; Kingdon, 1995). They are also affected by internal constraints like
school culture (Abelman & Elmore, 1999), leadership (Coburn & Talbert, 2006;
Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002; Hess, 1999); and time (Gross et al., 2005).
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My findings also depart from the literature on search and decision-making in
several ways. Although the literature identifies access to information as a major
search constraint (Gilovich, 1991; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nelson et al., 1987), I
found little evidence that school and district decision-makers lacked access to
materials that would inform their decision-making processes. Even those schools
and districts that reported they were under extreme pressure from accountability
systems to improve student performance said that they had access to all the
information they needed – it was simply a question of finding the time and money to
make good use of that information. The literature also identifies district size as a
constraint on the decision-making process (Hannaway & Kimball, 1998), as districts
that are too large have overly rigid processes and districts that are too small lack
capacity. Although none of the schools in the sample were from extremely large
urban districts, I found that the larger districts in my sample did not overly
structure their decision-making process. My research does confirm the findings on
the other end of the scale, however, as I found that small districts lacked sufficient
human capital to make decisions in a structured, thoughtful manner.
Finally, my research highlights the especially vulnerable nature of the search
process in schools and districts. Although Table 5.1 displays how internal and
external constraints generally press upon all phases of the decision-making process,
the detailed findings reflect the fact that decision-makers often compromise,
truncate, or eliminate the search phase before they compromise the problem
identification or decision point phases. Additionally, as I detail in the previous
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section, I found that the compounding effects of decision-making constraints
affected search more than the other two phases. Although the decision-making
literature does highlight the vulnerable nature of the search process (see, for
example Coburn, 2006; Honig, 2003), my work is the first to systematically analyze
constraints that pertain to each of the decision-making phases, which highlights the
differential affect that constraints have on search as opposed to problem
identification and the decision point.
In the next chapter, I provide a set of decision-making typologies that
describe the different decision-making approaches that I observed in my sample
over the three-year study period. These typologies provide additional insight into
why schools are differentially affected by the bounds inherent in their internal and
external environments. More importantly, however, they form a framework for
researchers to categorize the range of decision-making approaches, taking into
account districts’ unique context, including their culture, mission, and contextual
constraints.
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CHAPTER 6: A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING

The Need for a Framework
In Chapters Four and Five, I found that complexity, ambiguity, organizational
structure, and internal philosophies all shaped the decision-making process in the
schools and districts in my sample. Since context matters for decision-making, it
stands that there should be a way to categorize schools’ differential responses to
environmental pressures, including that of performance-based accountability. In
this chapter, I present a framework for understanding the types of approaches that
schools have toward decision-making. Specifically, I identify four typologies of
decision-making behavior.
A framework categorizing decision-making behavior is a valuable
contribution because it links contextual factors to school and district approaches to
decision-making. Although some authors offer frameworks to describe the decisionmaking environment in schools and districts, their work is narrower in scope than
my own. Coburn and Talbert (2006), for example, look through the lens of
performance-based accountability at the different ways that district leaders think
about the validity of evidence use in schools, ultimately offering four categories of
conceptions of evidence use. Their framework helps to shed light on how, even
within just one district, people can have fundamentally different assumptions about
the value, validity and purpose of evidence. But their work is limited to the problem
identification phase of the decision-making process, and therefore touches on only a
164

narrow portion of my conceptual framework, which attempts to operationalize the
decision-making process as a whole.
Another framework from the literature is Abelman and Elmore’s (1999)
work on internal accountability. This framework posits that three interrelated
concepts shape a school’s response to performance-based accountability systems:
individual conceptions of responsibility; shared norms and expectations; and formal
or informal conceptions to accountability, both internal and external. Again, this
framework provides valuable guidance on a limited portion of my theoretical
framework, namely the role that internal constraints play in bounding the decisionmaking environment in the context of performance-based accountability.
There are two efforts to establish frameworks that look at the decisionmaking process as a whole. The first is Gross, Kirst, Holland & Luschei’s (2005)
framework, in which the authors study how decision-making constraints operate in
the context of performance-based accountability. Their framework helped greatly
to inform the work of the overarching IES-funded study, because it detailed the
different buckets of strategies that schools might select when they face potential
sanctions for failing to meet achievement targets. These buckets included remedial
strategies, curriculum strategies, instructional practice, and organizational changes.
In the Gross et al. (2005) framework, the authors define what “peripheral,”
“moderate,” and “core” strategies look like in each of the buckets. The framework,
however, has two limitations – one major and one minor – that impacted my ability
to apply directly it to my theoretical framework. The major limitation is that is it
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more concerned with the outcome of the decision-making process – that is, the
actual decision – than it is with the process or approach that the school took to
arrive at that decision. The authors concluded that the schools in their sample were
chaotic organizations, conforming to Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can
model of decision-making and did not explore the various contextual conditions that
might lead to variation from school to school. The second point is a minor one –
their sample contained only high schools, which arguably are not as regularly
responsive to the pressures of performance-based accountability systems because
they contain only one tested grade.
The framework that is most directly applicable to my work comes from
Farley-Ripple (2008), who studied the decision-making processes in one district in
Delaware. She divided the decision-making process into components that were
aligned with my theoretical framework, including organizational characteristics, the
characteristics of decision-makers themselves, the characteristics of the evidence
that decision-makers employ, and the characteristics of the decisions themselves.
While her findings in each of these areas greatly informed my work (including my
theoretical framework), her study did not take the extra step of distinguishing
between different approaches to the decision-making process, which is a function of
the fact that the scope of her research was of multiple decisions within just one
district.
The literature lacks an empirically based framework that describes the
differential approaches that schools and districts might take when they are called
166

upon by state and federal performance-based accountability systems to
demonstrate student achievement gains. In previous chapters, I have demonstrated
that many different internal and external forces shape the decision-making
environment in schools and districts, leading them to use certain types of evidence,
lean on certain sources for support, and involve a variety of different stakeholders
while developing strategies for improvement. I attempt to fill this gap in the
literature by offering a framework that uses my findings from the comparative case
study to establish four typologies of decision-making behavior.

Conceptualizing Decision-Making Approaches
Before I present the framework, I present the assumptions behind it. First, I
take as a given that there is no one best approach to decision-making. I assume that
all decision-makers in public education strive to make decisions that are optimal for
their schools, by which I mean that the results of their decisions are aligned to their
stated objectives. In the context of performance-based accountability systems, one
objective is likely the improvement of student scores on the state standardized test,
but I do not assume that this is the only goal toward which school leaders aspire.
Thus there are no “optimal” decision-making approaches, but rather multiple
decision-making methods by which schools may, if they avoid potential pitfalls,
achieve their goals.
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Additionally, I assume that schools are dynamic, not static, organizations.
When a school’s mission, philosophy and leadership changes, so too can the school’s
decision-making approach. As I depict in the framework, HS 3 spans two categories
over the three-year study period and HS 4 spans three categories over the same
time period. Categorizing schools as one typology or another does not brand the
school with that classification. The final year of data collection for this dissertation
was in the spring of 2011, and it is highly possible that these schools have changed
their decision-making approaches since that time. I define the four approaches to
encompass a full range of responses, with the expectation that a school making a
change in its decision-making approach will still fit into one of these basic
categories.
In my original review of the literature in Chapter One, I identified four
potential dimensions across which schools decision-making approaches might vary
(see Table 6.1). The first was the degree to which schools and district looked within
the school walls for information versus exploring externally validated sources of
information (Coburn & Talbert, 2006; Spillane et al., 2002; Abelman & Elmore,
1999). The second hypothesized relationship was whether a school or district
prioritized human sources of information over technical information (Honig &
Coburn, 2007; Kerr et al., 2006; Marsh, Pane & Hamilton, 2005; Rosenkopf &
Almeida, 2003; Supovitz & Klein, 2003; ECS, 2002). The third relationship was
whether a school pursued a top-down approach to decision-making or a bottom-up
approach (Bidwell, 2001; Weick, 1976; Weber, 1947). Finally, the fourth
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hypothesized relationship was whether a school or district made decisions in a
linear manner or whether their process was more chaotic (Cohen, March & Olsen,
1972; Simon, 1955).

Table 6.1
Literature-Based Dimensions that Influence Schools’ Decision-Making Approach

Internal

<-----------------------------------------------------------------------> External

Human

<-----------------------------------------------------------------------> Technical

Top-Down <-----------------------------------------------------------------------> Bottom-Up
Linear

<-----------------------------------------------------------------------> Non-Linear

My findings in Chapter Four, however, suggest that schools are by-and-large
linear decision-makers that pursue middle-out strategies to decision-making.
Without sufficient variation in the sample along these dimensions, I was able to
exclude them as factors when creating the framework.
To develop the framework, I read through each of the individual case study
notes and write-ups, and I revisited the case-ordered descriptive matrices for
information on the internal/external and human/technical dimensions of decisionmaking behavior. I then categorized each school along a continuum for each of the
two dimensions, where the x-axis was internal/external and the y-axis was
human/technical. Visually depicting where each school lay helped me to create the
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four typologies because it showed where groupings occurred. Once I had placed the
schools along these two spectrums, I began to group them in ways that would
provide meaningful characterizations of each typology. I developed as many as
eight different groupings of behavior and then consolidated and re-consolidated
consolidated the
groups until I had four categories that encompassed the full range of decisiondecision
making behavior in my sample. Finally, I assigned a name to each of the discrete
categories.
Figure 6.1
Two Dimensions of Decision
Decision-Making
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Figure 6.1 represents the final consolidated version with the four typologies
that comprise the framework. In the figure, the clouds represent the variation that
can exist among schools within a particular typology. In several cases, it proved
difficult to place a school in the same group over the three years of the study due to
drastic changes within the school or district (for example, a cultural shift that came
with a new set of administrators). In these cases, I split the school up by year,
noting which typology fit for each specific year of the study. Below, I present the
formal framework (Table 6.2) and explain, using specific examples from the cases,
the common strengths, common pitfalls, and supportive structures of each of the
typologies.
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Table 6.2
Decision-Making Approach Typologies
Name

Description

Common Strengths

Potential Pitfalls

Supportive
Structures
RTI, curriculum
review cycles,
data analysis
teams, piloting

Sample
Examples
ELEM 2,
HS 3 (Y2, Y3)
HS 4 (Y3)

EvidenceBased DM

Schools highly value technical
information. Schools favor
internal data to inform problem
identification and external
technical data to inform search.

• Robust problem ID through
internal data analysis
• Scientific evidence of success
• Robust search
• Schools as innovators

•
•
•
•
•

Organic
DM

Schools look from within to
identify problems and search for
solutions, examining both
human and technical sources of
information.

• Robust problem ID
• Collaborative, inclusive
• Leverages expertise and
experience at all levels
• Robust search

• “Over-testing”
• Ignores local trends
• Strong voices may overpower
DM process
• Search limited by geography
and familiarity

RTI, PLCs,
committees,
piloting

ELEM 4
HS 1
HS 4 (Y2)

Instinctual
DM

Schools make decisions based on
gut reactions to problems, ideas
for improvement. Primary
sources include past experience,
beliefs, and information from
trusted colleagues and friends.

• Leverages expertise and
experience of key decisionmakers
• Enables quick decision-making
• Accounts for school/district
context

• Highly dependent upon
leadership orientation, district
capacity
• Exclusionary
• Confirmatory bias in search

Improvement
teams,
committees

ELEM 3,
HS 3 (Y1)
HS 4 (Y1)

Externally
Validated
DM

Schools lean on external sources
of information above internal
sources. Schools use both
human and technical sources of
validated information, but
generally place greater trust in
professional networks and
neighboring districts’ success
stories.

• Enables quick decision-making
• Accounts for school/district
context
• Strong community support
• Ability to learn from others’
experiences in implementation

• Poor use of internal technical,
human data
• Districts more likely to be
followers of trends, rather than
trend-setters
• Confirmatory bias in search
• Blindness to school context

Local networks,
professional
associations

ELEM 1,
HS 2
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“Over-testing”
Over-diagnosis of the problem
Ignores local trends
Blindness to school context
Exclusionary

Evidence-Based Decision-Making. I found that schools using an evidence-based
approach to decision-making highly valued technical information over human
information, although they got their sources of information from both internal and
external sources. These schools invested a large amount of time, energy, and
resources into the problem identification phase of decision-making by adopting new
methods of collecting school-level data. Evidence-based schools usually had in place
at least one benchmark testing implement, and this robust investment in identifying
problems set a solid foundation for the search and decision-point phases. ELEM 2,
for example, created a “War Room” for collecting and analyzing data from internal
sources such as benchmark exams and student report cards, as well as external
sources of information such as the data gleaned from the state standardized tests.
HS 3 and HS 4 also invested in the rigorous implementation of benchmarking tools
during the duration of the study.
The experience in ELEM 2 also highlights a potential area of tension for
schools falling into the Evidence-Based Decision-Making typology, namely that
district stakeholders (for example, teachers and parents) might complain that the
culture of testing became overbearing for students and take time away from
classroom instruction. Additionally, a problem that all three schools in this category
experienced was that school leaders were likely to over-diagnose the problem,
which in turn led to an over-prescription of solutions, as school leaders saw every
data point as a need for a full-blown school-wide solution. In ELEM 2, a district
administrator admitted that part of the district’s challenge was to put in check its
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instinct to find specific solutions to each identified problem, regardless of how
miniscule that problem might be. “We need to get a little bit better at looking at
what becomes the litmus test for what we take in as the new thing we take in from
down the pike,” he said (District Administrator, ELEM 2).
One way that school leaders in these three schools attempted to avoid the
“over-diagnosis” or “over-prescription” pitfall was to meet regularly to discuss the
data and analyze the various issues facing the school as a whole. For ELEM 2, this
took the form of the “War Room” and using the Response-to-Intervention (RTI)
framework as a supportive structure to reinforce discussions around internal data
analysis. In HS 3, the principal employed school improvement planning teams by
the second year of the study, and he used this structure to gain a variety of
perspectives across the school about the meanings and appropriate uses for student
data. And in the third year of the study, the principal in HS 4 instituted a committee
structure in which teachers met by grade level, by content area, and across the
school to identify problems using technical data from the benchmark exams.
For the search phase, the three schools in the Evidence-Based DecisionMaking typology depended on external technical information, such as professional
associations, nationally vetted technical information on intervention programs (for
example, the What Works Clearinghouse), and state-led technical assistance
seminars. For these schools, human sources of information still played a valuable
role in helping schools to select new programs and strategies, but the order of
operations put technical sources as decision-makers’ first source. School leaders
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said that they mainly used word-of-mouth recommendations as a tool to convince
school board and community members of the need for a new program or strategy.
The principal of HS 4, who took over in the second year of the study, reported that
he was constantly scouring the Internet for education publications that would clue
him into new potential improvement programs and strategies. Once he found a
program that sounded interesting to him, he would ask the teachers in the high
school for their opinion – but only in that order. A district administrator described
the principal’s search philosophy:

“[The principal] is the guy who will cite the most recent best practice,
research-based information until you are blue in the face. He attends
national conferences, he teaches for the collegiate level so he is always
forcing himself to learn. He completely believes that his job is to be well read
and glean from what it is that he believes best practice is based on and what
really works. He is a research-based guy.” (District Administrator, HS 4)
Although the other decision-makers in the school and district may not originally
have been as inclined to lean on technical sources of information, the principal
reoriented the school culture over the two years that I observed him, making the
district as a whole focus on technical sources of information to a much greater
degree than was the case before his tenure.
This approach highlights both strengths and weaknesses for evidence-based
decision-making schools. On the positive side, schools are more likely to invest in
programs that have been validated through rigorous testing, including randomized
control trial designs and other rigorous quasi-experimental testing. Additionally,
staying abreast of new advances in educational improvement provides schools with
175

an opportunity to be innovators in their field, unbound by the typical constraints of
geography and familiarity. On the negative side, however, schools might place too
much value on external research, looking for “what works” for a broad swath of
schools without careful evaluation of the specific markers that would make a
particular program a good fit for a school’s specific context and needs. An example
here is HS 3, where school leaders searched for and selected a new math curriculum
during the second year of the study. The program they selected was nationally
recognized and had a strong record of success in raising student test scores. It also,
however, represented an entirely new way of teaching math, and teachers nearly
uniformly reported that they hated the program. By the third year of the study,
school leaders said that they regretted their decision.
One way that ELEM 2 avoided this problem was to involve school and district
personnel during the search phase by instituting a robust “pre-implementation”
process for program selection. And by Year 3, HS 3 had learned from its mistakes,
forming an improvement planning team that gathered input from teachers and
administrators across different departments within the high school to inform search
and decision-making.
In summary, schools employing an evidence-based approach to decisionmaking generally made deliberate, informed decisions around improvement that
were based on technical evidence of success. These decisions took time and highly
skilled staff at both the school and district levels to execute well. HS 3 and HS 4
spent years trying to become evidence-based decision-making organizations,
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achieving this goal only at the end of the study period and thanks to leaders that
pushed this approach with strong conviction and authority. As the lessons from the
schools in this typology show, the successful implementation of an evidence-based
approach requires systematic use of data to inform processes, and that data must
become part of the fabric of the school or district, with stakeholders at all levels in
accordance that data informs their strategy around instructional improvement.

Organic Decision-Making. Schools following an organic decision-making process
typically gathered information from a variety of sources internal to the district and
processed that information in a way that involved multiple stakeholders. Although
school-level managers (the principal, assistant principal, specialists, etc.) managed
the flow of information, ideas for improvement were encouraged from anywhere
and anyone. Accordingly, teachers played an important role because they believed
that their observations and ideas might well turn into improvement solutions that
could be implemented school- or district-wide.
Although the name “organic” suggests that ideas might sift through to middle
managers in a haphazard fashion, there were several mechanisms that provided
structure around organic decision-making. Two of the three schools that fell into
the Organic Decision-Making typology employed Professional Learning
Communities (PLCs) as a way to gather feedback from teachers. PLCs are an
organizational strategy that allow teachers to meet in groups to discuss learning and
instructional techniques, challenges, and ideas. The structure of PLCs varied from
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district to district – in ELEM 4, teacher groups met by grade levels in afterschool
periods, and in HS 1 they met by area of instructional expertise during common
planning blocks. The common thread with these two schools was that teacher
expertise was a valued component of the decision-making process. Another way
that Organic Decision-Makers involved a broad constituency of actors was by
establishing committees to address specific needs in the school. ELEM 4, for
example, had a strong committee structure that was working on a number of areas,
including aligning the school’s report card to the state standards. A district
administrator summed up the school’s PLC and committee approach to search and
decision-making:

“It gets down to, is it useable? Is that usable? Does the teacher find value in
it? Does the teacher feel equipped? Do they feel prepared to be able to
implement this? So with all that in mind, with this really firm investment in
our teachers and our implementers, that’s why we want to go to this model of
professional learning communities, so we’re going through that process right
now, and when you talk about what works and doesn’t work, from a research
standpoint, I mean, we’re going through that now. We have all these
committees formed. We have administrators, teachers, school-based,
department-based, we have central office based people on these
committees.” (District Administrator, ELEM 2)
HS 4 also instituted a number of committees that were tasked with addressing a
broad range of issues, including student discipline, curriculum selection, and
student drug testing.
Finally, organic decision-makers often piloted new programs before fully
implementing them. A teacher in HS 1, for example, came up with the idea to
institute a “Study Lab” for struggling students in math. In the first year, the program
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was voluntary and only available to a select set of identified students. By Year 2, the
program was an official program in the school that was mandatory for a larger
group of identified struggling students. And by Year 3, the district had expanded the
Study Lab idea to the middle school.
These three supportive structures highlight the emphasis that organic
decision-makers placed on internally generated information. This information was
slightly skewed toward human sources, as shown in the schools' placement in
Figure 6.1, but decision-makers in these schools also considered technical sources of
internal information, specifically student-level performance data. In this way,
organic decision-makers had at their fingertips multiple sources of information on
student performance to create a plan for improvement.
With this approach came three potential pitfalls. The first was that schools
might fail to combine human and technical sources of internal information in a
thoughtful and cohesive manner. In the second year of interviews, HS 4 exemplified
this problem. The principal was new to the job and accepted teachers’ suggestions
for improvement without checking first to see if their suggestions were in line with
the problems identified from benchmark exams. Although the school may have
collected both human and technical data for improvement, the principal did not
have the leadership skills necessary to narrow the field of options to those that were
both supported by the data and by school-level personnel. As a result, the school
pursued many different strategies and quickly depleted the school’s budget.
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Another potential pitfall was that, by focusing almost entirely on internal
sources of information, schools did not always learn effectively from common
practices in the field. If a neighboring district had trouble implementing a new
improvement strategy, it would be useful for the decision-making district to have
this knowledge a priori to the decision point and include it as a factor in the
decision-making process. The principal of ELEM 4, for example, said she did not
take advantage of the state technical assistance agency (or “Intermediate Unit”) in
the local area because she preferred to meet with actors internal to the district. And
yet she admitted that the Intermediate Unit was doing trainings that were aligned to
a number of district initiatives.
Finally, a third pitfall was that Organic Decision-Makers were highly
influenced by the leadership characteristics of specific individuals at all levels across
the district, and just one strong voice could overpower discussions and harm a
district’s culture of collaboration. In HS 1, for example, the school depended a great
deal on its technology coordinator, who worked with teachers to integrate
technology into their instructional techniques. Said the high school principal:

“If he ever leaves, I’m going right after him. Because he is the guy that I lean
on. If I’ve got in-service time, I’ll say, ‘Here’s what we got, here’s my goal,
now run with it.’ He’ll run with it. He’ll set it up, he’ll bring the people in.
And that’s me delegating to him. It would take me twice as long to organize
it, and it probably wouldn’t be as good. He knows who the people are, he
knows what we need, and he’ll go out and set something like that up. Having
that kind of person with those skills has been essential for us.” (Principal, HS
1)
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The principal freely admits that the organic nature of decision-making in his school
was largely dependent upon the skills of one person, who personally gathered
information from teachers and facilitated the entire decision-making process. ELEM
4 attempted to avoid this pitfall by hiring and promoting personnel who strongly
believed in the participatory nature of the decision-making process. The principal
for ELEM 4 was widely respected throughout the district as an organic decisionmaker, and was eventually promoted to an administrative position in the district
office where her primary objective was to create stronger communications between
the various elementary buildings in the district. Her first initiative was to force
principals to visit the other elementary schools to learn from practices in the other
schools. In this way, the district invested in human capital as a way to sustain its
philosophy around organic decision-making.

Instinctual Decision-Making. Even in the age of high-stakes accountability when
school leaders are constantly bombarded with external accountability data to
inform their decisions for improvement, some schools still relied primarily on their
instincts as educators to make decisions. The schools and districts from my sample
that fall into this group of Instinctual Decision-Makers generally favored human
sources of information over technical ones, and internal sources (slightly) over
external ones. In some instances, these preferences represented an intentional
approach to school improvement; in others, it was the result of low levels of district
capacity.
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HS 4 (in Year 1) was an example of the former, as administrators at the
school and district level rested on the assumption that their experience in the field,
their familiarity with their district’s context, and their in-depth knowledge of
student needs would set the stage for informed decision-making around
improvement. Personnel in this school remarked that technical information such as
standardized test data only confirmed what they already knew to be true about
areas for growth and improvement. For this reason, the decision-making process in
HS 4 was highly dependent upon the personalities, experience, and beliefs of the
decision-makers themselves. The high school principal in HS 4, for example, had
been the principal for ten years and believed that his experience would guide the
high school to make the best decisions for its students, regardless of whether his
opinions were shared among teachers and other administrative staff.
Although some schools might consciously choose to employ an instinctual
approach to decision-making, for others this approach was the fallback when the
district lacked capacity to adequately collect and interpret technical information.
ELEM 3 was an example of such a school. The district was small and the
superintendent was overstretched in her duties – the curriculum director position
remained vacant for the three years of this study due to budgetary constraints. With
insufficient capacity to analyze research, attend conferences, and join professional
associations, ELEM 3 had great difficulty finding a new set of curriculum materials
for math. By Year 3, the superintendent felt that she had to select new materials
that were aligned to the standards, and she worked with the principal of the other
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elementary school (not ELEM 3) to select a new program. She was fully aware that
her process was exclusionary and based on her personal beliefs and experiences,
but she lamented that she just didn’t have the time or the money to fully explore the
research on other potential programs.
As the experiences of HS 4 and ELEM 3 highlight, the Instinctual DecisionMaking approach is only as reliable as the instincts of the leader or leaders making
the decisions, which the psychological research suggests is subject to myriad
cognitive flaws and misunderstandings (Grove & Meehl, 1996; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974; Simon, 1972). The predispositions, experiences, and beliefs of
decision-makers can lead to a confirmatory bias in decision-making (Lord, Ross &
Lepper, 1979), wherein school leaders only search for programs that meet their
preconceived notions of what will work in their schools. Findings from my sample
show that these preconceived notions could limit the field of options and render
searches superficial. For example, when school leaders at HS 3 (in Year 1) searched
for a new reading intervention program, the principal asked the reading specialists
to present him with three different options. Although the specialists did as they
were asked, they favored one option far above the others, and their searches were
perfunctory. In the end, the principal chose the favored program, and the search
itself – which involved reaching out to neighboring districts – only served to confirm
a decision that they had already made informally.
Additionally, even in schools with charismatic leaders, there was a tendency
for decision-making to become exclusionary. Although instinctual decision-makers
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often made decisions quickly, they did so at the expense of a thorough and inclusive
inquiry into the underlying reasons for achievement gaps and the vetting of
potential solutions. In the first year of the study, HS 3 and HS 4 both relied on
school leaders’ instincts to make decisions. While the principals in both schools
touted the new improvement solutions underway – a new math curriculum in HS 3
and a new remediation tool in HS 4 – teachers in both schools expressed
disappointment and frustration that they had been excluded from the decisionmaking process. By the end of the first year of the study, school-level administrators
in HS 3 had already recognized that they needed to take steps to include a larger
group of people in the decision-making process, because excluding teachers and
other personnel had created conflicting philosophies and beliefs around
improvement strategies, which in turn impacted buy-in to new decisions for
improvement. In response to this need, HS 3 decided to establish improvement
teams and committees that were tasked with solving specific problems.
My sample of Instinctual Decision-Making schools also shows that this
typology may also be a way station for schools and districts that are under new
leadership. While new school or district leaders find their footing and establish new
processes and procedures around problem identification, search, and decisionmaking, they may need to rely on their gut instincts and predispositions. Both HS 3
and HS 4 fit into this category. HS 3’s principal was new and he wanted to use
internal technical data to make decisions, but he didn’t yet have the appropriate
benchmarking tools in place. By Year 2, he had implemented a benchmarking exam
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and was avidly working to become a consumer of external research; in essence, he
had turned his school into an Evidence-Based Decision-Making organization. HS 4
was also experiencing a transition, as both the high school principal and the district
superintendent were set to leave at the end of the school year. Because he had been
in the school for so long, the principal had made decisions based off his instincts
about school needs, student deficiencies, and staff areas of professional
development. The new principal who took over in Year 2 changed the school’s
decision-making approach to an Organic Decision-Making approach (and, in Year 3,
an Evidence-Based Decision-Making approach). Instinctual Decision-Making does
not have to function in this way, however. Although there were no schools in my
sample that intentionally selected an instinctual approach as a permanent method
for decision-making, the Year 1 data from HS 4 suggests that this approach could be
a realistic and achievable goal for districts that have sufficient capacity both in
terms of resources and human capital, as well as consistent leadership.

Externally Validated Decision-Making. This final category describes schools that
valued information from external sources above internal sources. Schools leaders in
this typology were accustomed to reaching out to external partners, including
friends and colleagues in neighboring districts as well as national third-party
reviews of potential programs and strategies. Although these schools consumed
both human and technical information, they trusted human resources more than
technical ones – in other words, they saw research based programs as good, they
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valued them much higher if neighboring districts were already using these
programs with some success. These schools were copiers rather than innovators, as
they were rarely the first to adopt a new strategy that did not have a long track
record of success. In HS 2, for example, the principal reiterated over and over that
he valued improvement programs that were “research-based” because they would
then have a greater chance of success in his school. But he also reiterated how
important it was to his community that he validated these research-base decisions
with neighboring schools and districts. As is evidenced by this principal’s account of
his approach, decisions in Externally Validated Decision Making districts were
somewhat less contentious because community members, (i.e. parents and school
boards) generally liked to copy practices from neighboring successful schools.
The two schools in this typology also highlighted several potential pitfalls
with the Externally Validated approach. Although school leaders stood to learn a
great deal from human and technical reports of programmatic success, they tended
to ignore contextual factors specific to their school or district that may have
impacted program implementation success. For example, ELEM 1 adopted a
standardized, scripted curriculum for reading because the What Works
Clearinghouse reported that the program was effective at creating measurable gains
in student academic achievement. The school’s reading scores, however, remained
low and even slipped over time – by the second year of our visits, the school had
entered School Improvement I. Teachers in the school said that they hated the
program because it didn’t allow for instructional flexibility with their students.
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Although the program might have been externally validated as “successful,” it did
not align well with the culture of the school.
A related pitfall is that the schools in this typology tended to select solutions
that did not align well with identified problems. Again in ELEM 1, the district was
looking to adopt a new math program, even though it was in reading that the real
barriers to improvement existed. Although this school had instituted benchmark
exams to measure student growth, it was not effectively using this internallygenerated information to inform decisions for improvement.
ELEM 1 and HS 2 highlight the need for Externally Validated Decision Making
schools to invest in various supportive mechanisms that expand their reach into
technical and human networks. On the technical side, school leaders in these two
schools did not fully utilize technical information from professional associations and
technical assistance agencies, which could have provided timely information on the
latest research, access to education conferences, and other materials. District
administrators in HS 2, for example, said that they were working to change district
culture to become more actively involved in searching for a broader set of technical
sources of information, but in general they still tended to familiar sources of
information such as their informal networks with neighboring districts. The
principal of the high school in the same district where ELEM 1 was located was a
possible exception to this trend. He proactively looked at technical resources and
human resources, reporting that he weighed them equally. When evaluating any
new program or strategy, he asked probing questions about potential barriers to
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adoption, price, competing programs on the market, and ease of implementation.
Although this principal’s approach was not common to the district, his approach
points the way for Externally Validated Decision Makers to make efficient use of
external information.
Academic Value of the Framework
The framework that I present in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2 advances what we
know about how schools under pressure from performance-based accountability
systems approach the “what now?” question. Because I designed the framework to
fit for any school operating in this context (which, in 2013, was essentially any
public, non-charter school), researchers can apply the framework to their own
samples to see if it holds up to scrutiny. Broader use of the framework in the field
would allow researchers a lens through which to examine inter-school differences in
response to performance-based accountability pressures. While it may be intuitive
that schools act differently when the state identifies them as needing to improve,
this framework allows them to categorize their responses on two literature-based
dimensions and determine where they fall among four typologies. Additionally,
knowing where a school or district falls on the framework is helpful because it
provides insight into an organization’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as the
opportunities and challenges to decision-making.
A nuanced feature of the framework is that it does not treat the two
dimensions that comprise the framework – human and technical information;
internal and external information – as a polarized dichotomous response. In other
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words, it allows for the fact that, in a given decision, a school may very well consult
both internal and external information sources, as well as both human and technical
sources. The strength of the framework is that accounts for the fact that schools
generally rely more on one type of information than on the other, for example by
consulting one type of information before pursuing other options, which belies a
fundamental belief that one type of information is more valuable or trustworthy
than another. In the Year 3 interview protocol for this study (see Appendix C), I
asked respondents which types of information they used to make decisions – human
or technical. Every single respondent was able to identify sources in both categories
that they used to help them identify problems, search for solutions, and select
improvement options. But then I asked a follow-up question: which of these sources
did respondents trust the most? Again, respondents were able to clearly identify
which source of information was more trustworthy. I did not ask the same question
to distinguish between internal and external sources of information – instead I
discovered this dimension through analysis – but I suspect based on my review of
the data that a similar preference exists given the nature of respondents’ attitudes
toward internally and externally generated information.
Although the framework has potential to add value to the field, more
rigorous testing is necessary to strengthen its external validity and generalizability
to a broader set of schools. Doing so could simply involve researchers using the
framework as a qualitative component of studies of schools under pressure to
improve student achievement, or it could take the form or a larger, more cohesive
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approach to test the framework assumptions using quantitative methods. The latter
approach would likely involve surveying a large sample of school personnel about
their decision-making habits and determining the degree to which their responses
are consistent with the two-dimensions that form the backbone of the framework.
In addition to filling a gap in the literature on decision-making and providing
a tool for researchers, the framework can also function as a practical tool for district
and school leaders who are looking to understand more fully the strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that their schools face given their particular
decision-making approach. In the final chapter, I place the framework and the
broader discussion of decision-making into the larger policy context, which includes
the recent waivers to the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), the Common Core State
Standards (CCSS), and the Race to the Top (RTTT) initiative. I then bring my work
into focus by relating my findings back to the original theoretical framework,
addressing broadly the ways in which my research adds to the literature base on
decision-making in education. I then discuss implications of my work for
policymakers, practitioners, and vendors, including ways in which these
stakeholders can use the framework for practical purposes. Finally, I address what
the future might hold for schools, including ways in which technology might
drastically change how schools identify, search for, and select decisions for
improvement.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Contextualizing the Dissertation
As demonstrated in this dissertation study, performance-based
accountability systems lead schools to adopt a variety of different decision-making
approaches in an effort to find the right programs and strategies that “fix” identified
problems. The purpose of my study was to gain further clarity into the nature of
these approaches and analyze the various forces at play that might cause a school to
select one approach over another. Additionally, I provided descriptive accounts of
how schools under pressure from accountability systems made sense of their
environments, gathered information, and ultimately selected improvement
programs and strategies. To this end, I employed a comparative case study design
that included eight Pennsylvania schools (and their corresponding district offices)
from a variety of different circumstances, geographic regions, and student
demographics. What the schools had in common was this: a mandate from the state
to improve the scores of their students on the state test or face sanctions that would
ratchet up year after year. My findings highlight that all schools – even those that
were relatively high performers – felt pressure to improve and accordingly selected
many varied strategies for improvement. Additionally, schools operated under
conditions of uncertainty, which added complexity to their decision situations.
This complexity is certain to increase even more over the next few years as
schools are forced to contend with changes to existing accountability systems and
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new policies around school improvement. This study began in 2008 and data
collection concluded in 2011. In this small three-year window, there were a number
of important policy changes that affected the way that schools will approach school
improvement in the future. The first major shift in education policy occurred in
2009 when President Obama signed into law a stimulus bill that contained $4.35
billion to support a “Race to the Top” (RTTT) education fund. This fund incentivized
states to adopt rigorous standards, create state longitudinal data systems, and lift
existing caps on charter schools. Pennsylvania received a Phase 3 RTTT grant in
December 2011. The next major policy change was the Common Core State
Standards, which were designed by the Consortium of Chief State School Officers
(CCSSO) in collaboration with the National Governors Association (NGA) and were
made public in 2010. The Common Core standards encourage states to align their
standards and assessments to a set of rigorous college and career readiness
standards. Pennsylvania agreed to adopt the standards in 2010 and has been
working since that time to align the state assessment to the standards. Although the
Pennsylvania State Department of Education signaled in 2013 that it might be
backing off its commitment to the Common Core, the state also unveiled the
“Pennsylvania Core Standards” which, similar to the Common Core, are designed
around college and career readiness goals. When this study began, school leaders
had not yet heard of Common Core State Standards, but they were well aware of
them by the final year of data collection and reported that their schools were
scrambling to make sense of how these new standards would affect their
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curriculum, instruction, and professional development efforts. Finally, a third major
policy change occurred in 2011 when the Obama Administration announced it
would issue waivers for the proficiency requirements in No Child Left Behind if
states agreed to meet a set of requirements, such as linking teacher evaluations to
student test scores. Pennsylvania received its waiver in August 2013, and this will
change the way that the state incentivizes performance on the state standardized
tests, which in turn could have broad implications for school decisions and
improvement strategies.
That these three major education policy initiatives were released in the short
window for this study was coincidental. However, it belies the underlying fact that
public schools operate in an intense, complex, and dynamic accountability
environment. To thrive in this environment, schools themselves must adapt to new
external stressors. It is my hope that researchers, policymakers, and practitioners
will use this dissertation as a means to better understand the process by which
schools come to make decisions for improvement, including the various internal and
external forces that constrain schools as they strive to make improvements in the
context of ever-changing accountability mandates.
In this concluding chapter, I return to the literature to compare my findings
from this study to the body of research on decision-making, stating the limitations of
my dissertation study and discussing the implications of my study for academics. I
then discuss the broader implications of my research for policymakers and
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practitioners. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the future of decisionmaking research and practice.

Revisiting the Decision-Making Literature
Theorists and researchers generally agree that context can constrain the
decision-making environment in organizations and make it very difficult for
organizations to operate in a purely “rational” manner. They disagree, however, on
the degree to which these contextual constraints disrupt the decision-making
process. Bounded rationality theorists (i.e. Forester, 1984; March, 1994; Simon,
1972) describe the decision-making process as impacted, but not destroyed, by
internal and external constraints. On the other end of the Rationality-to-Chaos
Spectrum (see Chapter One), Cohen, March & Olsen (1972) describe organizations
as little more than “organized anarchies” (p. 1). One goal of my dissertation study
was to determine where schools and districts fit into this schematic. I found that
schools did indeed operate under powerful contextual constraints, but that these
constraints did not cause them to devolve completely into chaos. The degree to
which these schools tended toward chaos depended, not surprisingly, on the
intensity of the constraints in question. Schools operating under conditions of
greater ambiguity (for example, unclear or conflicting goals for improvement in a
politically charged environment) were likely to fit the conditions put forth by
organizational theorists such as Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Weick (1976) that
described schooling as “loosely coupled.” On the other hand, the majority of schools
194

in my sample fit into the slightly less-constrained environment described by
theorists of bounded rationality, suggesting that there remains a certain degree of
rationality in decision-making in public education, as expressed through schools’
relatively linear, methodical approaches to decision-making.
Although it might be tempting to determine how “rational” a school is in its
decision-making approach, there is danger in placing each school in a specific
location along the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum, as I do in Chapter Five (Figure
5.2). First, placement on the Spectrum might provide context for school decisionmaking practices, it tells one very little about how a particular school approaches
the decision-making process. Whereas the framework offered in Chapter Six is
intended to establish a set of decision-making typologies that apply to schools and
districts, the Spectrum is intended more as a guide to the literature. Additionally,
the different theories of action on the Spectrum have different assumptions about
the nature of organizations, making it difficult to directly compare one theory to
another. For example, bureaucratic theory is mainly concerned how the nature of
organizational structures impacts decisions, whereas sense-making theory looks at
decision-making as a collection of individuals operating in tandem to come to the
decision point. In this way, the theories on the Spectrum offer different lenses
through which researchers can analyze decision-making in schools and districts,
and are not a means of strict categorization.
Looking at the Spectrum in this way – as a guide rather than as a
categorization tool – also highlights two realities about the decision-making
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literature. The first is that much of the literature comes from disciplines other than
education. Although there is nothing wrong about borrowing from economics,
psychology and sociology to explain decision-making processes in public schools,
my research points to several ways that schools are a very different type of
organization from the ones described in the literature borrowed from other
disciplines. Specifically, schools are public organizations with an underage clientele,
a de-professionalized workforce, and a flat hierarchy that makes them worthy of
specialized attention in the decision-making literature. Some education researchers
have turned their attention to this area in the last ten years (e.g. Coburn, 2006;
Honig, 2003) but more concentrated attention would be a worthy investment.
Second, the literature depicted along the Rationality-to-Chaos Spectrum is outdated.
Much of the literature on decision-making comes from the 1970s, including Simon’s
analysis of bounded rationality (1972), Tversky and Kahneman’s examination
psychological heuristics (1974), Meyer and Rowan and Weick’s organizational
theory analysis (1977 and 1976, respectively), and Cohen, March & Olsen’s garbage
can theory (1972). Although these remain seminal works in the field, organizations
themselves have changed dramatically in forty years – they operate in an
increasingly global environment where technology creates both increased
opportunity as well as increased challenges for decision-making. The ways that
organizations identify problems, search for solutions, and make decisions for
improvement have changed due to these advances, and the literature must be
updated to reflect the current reality. Furthermore, the task of applying the
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literature to education is made more difficult by the fact that performance-based
accountability did not exist to nearly the same extent in that decade. Since the
advent of high-stakes accountability in education, schools operate in a
fundamentally ambiguous environment: they experience a large amount of topdown pressure for improvement at the same time they are called upon to act in a
linear, rational manner to improve their performance. Accordingly, more targeted
research in the high-stakes, performance-based accountability environment of
public education would help to advance the literature, as well as provide practical
guidance for schools struggling to meet rigorous accountability performance
targets.
Another key finding from my research is that, when constraints press upon
schools, the search process is the most adversely affected phase of the decisionmaking process, as schools often truncate or rush their search for improvement
remedies when they are short on time, money, or human capital. This finding
suggests that the decision-making literature, which generally examines the whole of
decision-making processes, would benefit from a closer look at search in particular.
Literature on search processes generally focuses on the various limitations on a
thorough search process – geography, familiarity, etc. – but a more detailed inquiry
into the mechanisms that can encourage a more thoughtful, deliberate process
would be worthwhile.
The gaps in the literature that I name above may be due to the fact that
education researchers have focused their attention and efforts lately on a narrow
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component of decision-making, namely the use of evidence to inform decisionmaking. This body of literature examines how school leaders make use of data,
including state data, school data, and student-level data to inform their decisions.
Their primary concerns are to determine the patterns of data use that accord with
the adoption of specific strategies for improvement (e.g. Kerr et al., 2006; Marsh,
Pane & Hamilton, 2005; Supovitz & Klein, 2003; ECS, 2002) and/or the various
barriers to effective data use (e.g. Kerr et al., 2006; Doyle, 2003; Massell, 2001;
Stringfield, Reynolds & Schaffer, 2001). While both of these questions are
interesting and align to my work on decision-making as well, my work takes the
issue further by broadening the scope to all types of decisions in schools – those
based on data and those that are not – and also by focusing on the specific
mechanisms that cause schools to adopt one type of decision-making process over
another. In this way, the two literatures overlap, but are not the same.
Another area ripe for further inquiry is the relationship between decisionmaking strategies and school achievement levels. Bounded rationality theorists
claim, for example, that bounded decision-making environments cause decisionmakers to select suboptimal outcomes (e.g. Howes & Lewis, 2009; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). In education, this would suggest that school leaders select less
effectual improvement solutions when they operate under conditions of contextual
constraints. This is a difficult relationship to measure, however, because there may
be confounding factors at play within the school, for example the school’s qualifying
subgroups, previous year’s performance, and other variables.
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It is a limitation of my dissertation that I do not fully explore this relationship
using quantitative methods, however. Future research should attempt to fill this
gap by seeking to answer the following questions.
First, what characterizes a “successful” decision? The most obvious outcome
measure would be meaningful effect size improvement in student achievement
scores in reading and math. The challenge here would be measuring improvement
in high schools, as secondary schools are only required to test one grade (as
opposed to elementary school that test students in grades three through eight).
Another tempting approach would be to measure schools’ ability to meet Adequate
Yearly Progress requirements. However, this approach is flawed because AYP
thresholds vary by state and schools may qualify for state forgiveness measures
such as Safe Harbor (i.e. making a sizeable jump in scores even if scores remain
below the threshold) or Confidence Intervals (i.e. using statistical techniques to
determine if the threshold bar is within the margin of error). Additionally,
researchers may consider using other outcome variables that are not explicitly
linked to performance-based accountability, such as student growth (as measured
on benchmark tests), student engagement, collaboration, or teacher satisfaction.
Second, what types of decisions lead to better outcomes for schools? The
main challenge here is that it is difficult to isolate one decision from the many
decisions that the average school makes in the hopes of improving student test
scores (Weinbaum, Weiss & Beaver, 2012). Assuming that researchers were
seeking to isolate the effects of one decision on school improvement, a randomized
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control trial would be appropriate, as this method can test the impact of the decision
in question versus the status quo. The problem here would be external validity, as
an “effective” decision in one school might prove ineffectual in another due to
differing contextual constraints. Finally, RCTs can only test effectiveness of the
decision itself – it cannot take into account the decision-making process.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a more worthwhile endeavor would
be to measure the validity of my decision-making framework by surveying a very
large sample of schools about their decision-making habits and analyzing the degree
to which their responses are consistent with the two-dimensions that form the
backbone of my framework. In either case, a quantitative study can build upon my
qualitative work, as I expose the potential mediating and/or moderating variables
that impact a school’s overall approach to decision-making.

Implications for the Broader Stakeholder Audience
Aside from filling gaps in existing research and suggesting areas for future
research, this dissertation study also offers some practical tools for policymakers,
practitioners, and vendors.
First, policymakers benefit from the descriptive accounts of decision-making
constraints. My research shows that schools aren’t just generically “under pressure”
to improve from performance-based accountability systems – they are being
squeezed from all sides, often with conflicting goals and strategies for improvement.
This immense pressure to perform under conditions of uncertainty may steer
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schools away from the tough decisions and toward the so-called “low hanging fruit”
such as gearing curriculum improvements toward tested subjects, investing in test
preparation, and focusing on students on the bubble of proficiency.
To incentivize more meaningful improvement goals, policymakers would be
wise to give local decision-makers the tools they need to overcome some of these
internal and external barriers. Although the reach of performance-based
accountability is purposefully limited – it is not the work of federal or state
governments to control school board politics, nor can they set the tone of a school’s
collaborative culture – to the extent possible, policymakers can provide financial
incentives for meaningful change and avoid unfunded mandates. Relieving schools
of acute financial stress makes them freer to select programs and strategies that fit
their improvement goals, which are based on identified student needs.
Even more importantly, policymakers can use the framework to target
technical assistance to schools in more meaningful ways. Given time and resource
constraints at the state level, it is often easier for policymakers to treat all schools
and districts as equals in terms of technical assistance. The Intermediate Units (IUs)
in Pennsylvania, for example, provide trainings on Common Core alignment and
other timely topics, but these trainings generally follow a one-size-fits-all approach.
My framework allows state policymakers to provide targeted trainings that take
into account schools and districts’ differential approaches to the decision-making
process. A school that fits into the “Externally-Validated Decision-Making” category,
for example, would learn best by observing other schools in the state and by
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attending presentations on research-based programming options. Meanwhile, a
school that follows “Intuitive Decision-Making” would derive more value from a
technical assistance approach that allowed school leaders to pilot new programs in
their schools and then formed focus groups to discuss broader implementation.
Although more research is needed to test this relationship, it is my hypothesis that
aligning technical assistance to a school or district’s decision-making approach will
improve training efficacy and ultimately lead schools to make wiser, more
deliberate decisions for improvement over time. A detailed list of considerations for
each of the decision-making typologies is below.

•

Evidence-Based Decision-Makers: These schools like to use data to make
their decisions. Accordingly, states can provide detailed, disaggregated data,
including specific tested areas that were troublesome for students at all
ability levels. The state can also help schools by providing research and
policy briefs that gather together information on the latest research trends
and findings that align to specific decisions the school is looking to make in
the future (for example a new curriculum program or computer-based
remediation program).

•

Organic Decision-Makers: These schools prefer to come to decisions
internally and may resist state guidance. States can add value during the
decision-making process by providing programs for schools to pilot
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internally, or helping schools interpret internal data from benchmark tests
and other data points. If school culture is poor, the state can make available
facilitators to encourage schools to collaborate and come to a consensus on
school improvement goals. In general, policymakers would do well to have
in-person meetings about improvement with a broad group of decisionmakers in the school.

•

Instinctual Decision-Makers: These schools typically make decisions based
on their internally held views and beliefs about student achievement gaps
and needs, and therefore may mistrust state interference in their decisionmaking process. The state can provide guidance by explaining external data
sources (such as student achievement scores or relevant research), but it can
also add value by linking school and district-level personnel to a larger
network in the local community, thus lessening the geography/familiarity
constraints on decision-making. Additionally, policymakers may want to
press school decision-makers to identify on paper what they see as the
problems the school faces, as well as the solutions they have in mind for
improvement, because doing so lets the schools fully understand how their
experiences, beliefs, and culture guide their decision-making process.

•

Externally-Validated Decision-Makers: The state has a large role to play with
this type of decision-maker, as these schools generally welcome state
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guidance. Accordingly, the state can offer a variety of services – explaining
research, interpreting data, facilitating improvement teams, etc. – but it can
also take its cues from the districts themselves and provide trainings on
specific topics of concern. The state can also help schools select programs
that are not only successful on the broad scale, but also have a good track
record in meeting the specific needs and context of their schools.

Although vendors are not the primary audience for this dissertation study, I
should note that my work does have implications for the vendors of instructional,
remedial, curricular, and data warehousing products. Knowledge of the differential
decision-making approaches of schools and districts may help vendors to target
their products to schools’ unique needs, especially since many products are modular
and customizable. In an ideal world, when school and district leaders become aware
of their district’s opportunities and challenges, they will be better equipped to talk
intelligently with vendors, and this in turn will lead vendors to better target their
products. It is my hope, however, that vendors will not abuse the framework. One
way that they could do this is to use the school profiles to align their “pitches” to
particular types of school decision-makers without making any effort to actually
check to see if the product reasonably meets the schools identified needs. Worse,
vendors could examine the weaknesses of a school’s profile and use those
weaknesses against them, for example by limiting exposure to competitive products
to exacerbate the problem of familiarity. Luckily, however, most vendors are not
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familiar enough with the internal machinery of school and district culture to
determine with great accuracy where schools fall on the framework – schools
themselves are best equipped for this task, and it is their choice whether to share
this information with vendors.
My framework also provides practical tools for practitioner, allowing school
and district decision-makers to identify which category best fits their schools’
context. Because a framework can identify potential pitfalls for each category,
school leaders can work to address potential problems before they manifest
themselves. If, for example, a particular approach is likely to engender feelings of
resentment from teachers, school leaders can head off this problem by meeting with
teachers, explaining their approach, and asking for structured feedback on
decisions. A framework also allows school leaders to think outside the box by
exposing them to other types of decision-making approaches. School leaders who
are looking to make a change in the way they make decisions for improvement
under the banner of performance-based accountability can use the framework to
guide their new approach. Finally, because the findings from the previous chapters
highlight the importance of search to the overall decision-making process, this
framework can guide district leaders to conduct more robust searches for new
improvement programs and strategies.
While efforts to make the decision-making process more inclusive and
collaborative (for example, through Professional Learning Communities or
Distributed Leadership initiatives) are becoming more popular, schools must
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ultimately choose the decision-making approach that best fits their needs. School
decision-makers should think of their approach to improvement as a “process” in
and of itself, which they can influence and improve upon.
My framework is not the only practical tool to assist policymakers and
practitioners in selecting programs and strategies for improvement. The
Pennsylvania “Getting Results” document was an attempt to create such a decisionmaking framework, but it fell short of providing meaningful guidance, and instead
represented simply more red tape. Instead of more paperwork, school actors need
real training in how to make decisions. Even if they do not employ my framework,
policymakers can use simple worksheets to help schools detail their plans for
improvement, including ways in which they will engage community stakeholders,
collaborate both within the school and the district, and use resources effectively.
Although constraints, such as the ones examined in this dissertation, are certainly
unavoidable on the whole, they are far more manageable when decision-makers are
aware of their existence well in advance of the decision point and are prompted to
strategize ways to overcome them.
Looking Ahead
My dissertation focused on a set of schools that I believe are fairly typical of
K-12 schools throughout the country. Although they might have had high-speed
Internet connections and a couple of computers in the classroom, they were not
“high tech” classrooms. No school that I visited had, for example, a 1:1 laptop-tostudent ratio or used a blended learning approach to instruction. Teachers typically
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received some training on incorporating innovative new ideas into their classrooms,
but these approaches did not represent a wholesale reorientation of the learning
process around 21st century technology tools. With that said, those technology tools
have the power to transform the decision-making environment in schools over the
next decade, which may render my research outdated. Although there are many
technology-based innovations that may shape decision-making in schools, I
highlight three trends that are particularly relevant to my study.
First, data warehousing tools are becoming extremely sophisticated tools for
school and district administrators during the problem identification and search
phases of the decision-making process. This technology makes it exponentially
easier for school leaders to identify student-specific problem areas very early on in
the school year. Data warehousing products are not new – most schools in my
sample employed some type of software program to keep track of students’ growth
over time as measured in interim assessments. What is new is that these tools are
increasingly linked to specific interventions that narrow the field of options during
the search phase.
The second trend, personalized learning, is linked to the first, as both are
concerned with using technology to pinpoint student-specific interventions.
Personalized learning goes farther than aligned data warehousing tools, however,
because it represents a coordinated effort to tailor instruction, curriculum, and
remediation to each student’s unique needs. Instead of the traditional one-size-fitsall classroom model in which students sit quietly while the teacher talks at the front
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of the class, personalized learning supports a model where students become the
center of the learning environment, using technology tools to work at their own
pace on projects specifically designed for them. Because personalized learning
presents a dramatically different perspective on the fundamental relationships
among students, teachers, and the curriculum, the adoption of a personalized
learning approach has definite implications for the decision-making process overall.
Instead of selecting a curriculum that will fit for all students, for example, schools
might decide that they prefer technology-based tools and supplemental materials
that fit a wide range of student abilities and instructional preferences. Remediation
might well take place inside the classroom as opposed to after school or in a
designated tutoring block. These types of changes mean that decision-makers must
open their field of options to new and innovative solutions, and that researching
potential options may not be as easy as calling colleagues in neighboring districts to
ask what types of tools they are using. Personalized learning pushes decisionmakers beyond the bounds of familiarity and geography, encouraging them to
pursue different avenues for ideas, including blogs, wikis, social media, and other
technology-based tools for learning. In this way, the search becomes both more
nuanced and more open, as teachers and administrators use their most trusted
source of information – trusted friends and colleagues – in new ways. Teachers and
administrators can expand the base of their human searches by using technology
tools to scan the products that others in their extended social network are using,
and they can expand their technical searches as well when people in their social
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network post studies of effectiveness, product reviews, and other technical
information. The power of technology tools in general and social networking tools
in particular also means that decision-makers must constantly be on the lookout for
digital content while screening these materials to ensure that they are high quality,
aligned to the standards, and relevant for students given their specific academic and
social needs.
Finally, technology brings with it a fascinating new opportunity to gain
feedback during the search and decision point phases of the overall decision-making
process. Schools are beginning to experiment with “crowdsourcing” to get ideas and
input on decisions from a broad range of community and school actors.
Crowdsourcing is the practice of gathering ideas through online communities or
specially designed digital hubs for the purpose of solving problems. Or, as defined
in the scientific literature, it is “an online, distributed problem-solving and
production model” (Brabham, 2008, pg. 75). Schools are starting to look to
crowdsourcing techniques as a way of outsourcing the search phase of the decisionmaking process. A 2013 EdWeek article (Davis, 2013), for example, profiled the
Poway Unified School District in southern California, which used a crowdsourcing
approach to determine new safety and security policies for the district. Using an
online platform, all 4,000 school district employees were able to voice their opinions
around new safety measures. Doing so helped the district to avoid the “familiarity”
pitfall by allowing individuals who were not traditionally the “decision-makers”
contribute to the field of alternatives. And it impacted the decision point by
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allowing the decision team to organize the proffered ideas into categories and
tallying their popularity across a broad swath of district stakeholders.
These three trends, while exciting, raise important questions for
policymakers and practitioners. The most important question is how to strike a
balance between data-driven decision-making and educators’ intuition. Data is
certainly useful and is becoming more plentiful every day, but decision-makers run
the risk of not being able to see the forest through the trees if they turn every
decision into a dispassionate analysis of school and student data. And even if we
assume that all decision-makers are expertly trained in data analysis – which most
likely they are not – many will argue that we are still missing the expertise that
comes from working with students every day and understanding their academic and
social needs on a personal level. In essence, this debate is a reformulation of the
“technical” versus “human” sources of information debate that I discuss in Chapter
Five. The trend is certainly toward more technical sources of information,
particularly internally generated student-level data analysis, but schools report that
they still highly value personal connections in which they discuss school needs and
areas for improvement with trusted colleagues.
A second question is how to involve stakeholders in a meaningful way
without adding undue complexity to the decision-making environment. Opening
decisions to a broad range of stakeholders through efforts like crowdsourcing
represents an innovative approach to decision-making, but it also adds complexity
to the political environment because it exposes decision-makers to contrarian
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opinions and political factions (for example strident school board members).
Similarly, investing in personalized learning requires coordination across multiple
stakeholders, most notably parents and the students themselves, which means that
schools may need to engage this broader audience during all stages of the decisionmaking process. If schools do not expertly manage the broadened stakeholder pool,
decisions may veer toward the “garbage can” model that is highly susceptible to
political forces and is chaotic in nature.
Finally, technology-based innovations raise the question of how schools can
keep up with the demands of 21st Century learning tools and decision-making
techniques while also keeping pace with the demands of performance-based
accountability measures. Many technology tools tout their alignment to the
Common Core State Standards, for example, but it is up to school leaders to
determine whether the products will actually help their students achieve to the
standards. Furthermore, while performance-based accountability is moving at a
quick pace, technology tools are moving even faster, which means that schools must
exercise caution before purchasing costly technology, lest these tools misalign to
practical needs for improvement or are incompatible with one another.
Looking into the future, it appears as though, while the No Child Left Behind
Act with its strict 100% proficiency and AYP requirements will soon be a thing of
the past, performance-based accountability is likely here to stay. If this assumption
holds true, it will be the responsibility of policymakers, especially those at state
departments of education, to work with schools and districts to make sure they
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receive the best possible information and the appropriate tools to tackle their
challenges to successful school improvement. In the introduction to this
dissertation, I asserted that performance-based accountability systems provided
clear descriptions of front-end problems and back-end proficiency requirements,
but was opaque in the middle. As my findings in this dissertation show, the middle
of the decision-making process should not be opaque, but rather transparent and
well defined. During the next legislative examination of the federal role in education
policy (should that day ever come), policymakers should provide clear guidelines to
states about their expectations around the three critical phases of the decisionmaking process – problem identification, search, and the decision point. States, in
turn, should provide technical assistance to districts to aid them in making choices
that fit the needs, constraints, and general context of their schools. Additionally, it
is the responsibility of school leaders to carefully analyze their needs, conduct
thorough searches, and minimize the constraints that pose challenges for successful
school improvement. Finally, a new age of performance-based accountability
presents an opportunity for researchers to study how schools and districts respond
to top-down calls for improvement in a changing political environment. It is my
hope that this dissertation provides a theoretical framework and a classification tool
that can be adapted to this changing accountability context.
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APPENDIX A: YEAR 1 PROTOCOL (PRINCIPAL)
Protocol Introduction
To give you a little background, I am working with a team of researchers at the
University of Pennsylvania and we are conducting a study of how schools across the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are attempting to improve student performance. This
is part of a federally-funded research program. This interview is part of our data
collection for the study. In addition to this visit, we hope to return to your school next
year to follow its progress. Your school was selected for this study based a stratified
random sample in combination with factors related to student performance and
demographics. Our conversation is confidential and will be combined with interviews
of others to produce an overall picture of schools across the study. I'd like to ask you to
sign this consent form that explains a bit about the study and describes our
commitment to keeping this conversation confidential, so we hope that you will feel
comfortable being as candid as possible. Also, I'd also like your permission to tape our
conversation. No one other than the research team will have access to this recording,
but it will be helpful in our analysis of all of the information that we collect. Your
participation is voluntary and you are free to stop at any time or skip any questions you
choose not to answer.

Background questions
1. I’d like just a little bit of background. I think I remember you told me you’ve
been principal for __ years? Were you a principal elsewhere? What did you do
before you became principal?

Perceptions and Beliefs
2. Can you tell me a little about:
a) student performance at this school?
b) teacher morale and community at this school?
c) are there particular groups of students or teachers about whom you are
concerned?
3. What are some of your short-term (1 year) goals for this school? Longer-term (3
year) goals?
4. How, if at all, do the state AYP goals influence your goals? (pressure from
district, school, community board, etc.)
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5. How meaningful are the PSSAs as an indicator of this school’s performance?
6. What (other) types of data do you find to be useful? And how do you use them?
Who does the analysis of the data?
Probe for using data inform to decisions about instruction, curriculum,
remediation, resource allocation, professional development

General school improvement strategies
7. We understand that your school was labeled as “in warning” following last
year’s PSSA results. What efforts have been introduced in response to this
label this year?
(Curricular, instruction, resource allocation, test prep, remediation, data use, outside expertise, additional
rewards and sanctions, non-academic issues)

8. How much do these changes affect what teachers do in their classrooms on a
daily basis?
Probes:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

More time for instruction?
Covering more content?
Using more effective instructional strategies?
Focusing on different skills or knowledge?
Better aligning instruction to state standards or anchors?
Focusing on tested skills or question types?

9. Tell me about these programs. How many students and teachers are involved? How
would you describe the overall effort that each of them is receiving?
10. Why were these particular programs chosen? (What need/problem did they seek to
address?)
11. Do you plan for these efforts to be lasting or are they interim measures? Why?

Targeted school improvement
12. Your school did not make AYP last year due to the performance of [insert name of
subgroup]. Are any of the programs that you listed designed to address the needs of
these students in particular?
13. If yes: When were these programs introduced? Were any introduced just this year?
(focus on the new one).
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If no: Are there particular programs introduced this year that you hope will help
these students, among others?
14. Of these programs, which do you think is most important for the [name failing
subgroup]?
15. Walk me though the process of choosing/designing this improvement strategy.
a. Who (or what group of people) were responsible for choosing/designing?
b. Were the programs generated by the school or district or by an external
source?
c. To what extent were teachers involved in the planning and development of
initiatives?
d. In the search for new solutions, what kind of information was taken into
account?
e. What other options, if any, did you consider?
f. What input do you get from the district?
16. Was this selection process similar to the selection process for other initiatives
that you have introduced in this school? How so?
17. Do you believe this program is a good fit for your school? Why or why not?
18. Who has been responsible for the implementation of this program?
a. For the program to be effective, do teachers work independently or is
collaboration required?
19. Is there any type of monitoring/evaluation going on in the school that looks at
how the new strategies are being implemented? Please describe.
20. What successes and challenges have you experienced in implementing this
program?
Probes:
a. How have the teachers and staff reacted to this new program?
b. Have there been unintended consequences of these targeted efforts?
21. How much of a departure from tradition is this for your school? Has your role
changed?
22. Does your school receive outside help to implement this program? Does it need it?
23. Has the central office taken any special interest in this initiative or is their
involvement similar with all of the improvement efforts that you undertake? If
different, why?
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Resource Allocation
24. Did the new program require additional resources?
25. Was the school allotted additional funds to pay for the new program?
26. (If no new funds were made available) What programs/areas were cut to free up
funds for the new program?
27. Thinking again about all of the improvement efforts that you’ve introduced this year,
has there been a reallocation of staff to implement these programs?
28. In general, has there been a district-wide reallocation of staff or funds to address
schools with struggling students?

Program Results
29. Do you see any evidence that the changes made this year are affecting students?
Please describe.
30. We hope to return to visit you and your school next year at about this time. Do
you think that there will be other new programs that we will find in place next
year? What?

Final Question
31. Next year, what would you expect us to see related to the program/s we’ve been
discussing and the particular subgroup that missed making AYP?
32. Do you have any other comments regarding improvement strategies at your school?
Is there anything you would like to add to what you have shared?
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APPENDIX B: YEAR 2 PROTOCOL (PRINCIPAL/ADMIN/TEACHER)
Introduction
As you may remember, I am working with a team of researchers at the University of
Pennsylvania and we are conducting a study of how schools across the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania are attempting to improve student performance. This is part of a
federally-funded research program. This interview is part of the second (and final)
year of data collection for the study. Your school was selected for this study based on a
stratified random sample in combination with factors related to student performance
and demographics.
Our conversation is confidential and will be combined with the interviews of others to
produce an overall picture of schools across the study. I’d like to ask you to sign this
consent form that explains a bit about the study and describes our commitment to
keeping this conversation confidential, so we hope that you will feel comfortable being
as candid as possible. Also, I’d like your permission to tape our conversation. No one
other than the research time will have access to this recording but it will be helpful in
our analysis of all the information we collect. Your participation is voluntary and you
are free to stop at any time or skip any questions you choose not to answer.
Background Questions
1. (Although I know we spoke last year), could you please tell me (remind me of)
your name and position in the school?
2. Has your role in the school changed at all over the past year (since we spoke
last)? If so, how?
General Goals
3. Thinking back on this year, what were your personal goals as a
[teacher/administrator/principal]?
4. Now thinking more broadly about the school as a whole, what would you say
were your goals for the school? Do you think these goals are the same or
different from those of your colleagues in the school? How are they the same or
different?
5. What would you say is this school’s mission or guiding principle? How did you
first become familiar with the school’s mission? How much (do you, does the
principal) stress the importance of incorporating this mission into practice?
(A mission can be set of instructional practices, an educational philosophy, a
content area, vocational focus, etc.)
Accountability
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6. We see that your school is [making AYP, in School Improvement] following last
year when the school was in warning status. Given this change, how, if at all,
have your goals for the school changed?
7. For Principal/Admin: How personally do you take the school’s ability to make
AYP?
For Teachers: How personally do you take your students’ performance on the
PSSAs? How about your students’ academic achievement aside from their PSSA
performance?
8. Why do you think the school [failed to make, made] AYP this year?
(What are the underlying reasons why this change took place?)
9. How has this change in the school’s status affected your day-to-day job
responsibilities, if at all?
Strategies for Improvement
10. When we spoke last year, you mentioned _________ as the major improvement
effort(s) underway in the school. Are these efforts still in place? How are these
efforts going?
11. What successes and challenges has the school faced in implementing these
efforts?
12. Do you think the school will continue these efforts in future years? Why or why
not?
13. If made AYP: To what extent, if at all, do you credit the school’s success in
making AYP this year to these efforts?
If didn’t make AYP: In light of the school’s current difficulties, do you think
that these strategies are appropriate? Are they helping the school to meet its
accountability goals? Why or why not?
14. Did the school adopt any new strategies for improvement this year? What was
the impetus for the adoption of this new strategy?
(Was it adopted due to past PSSA performance?)
(Probe for: Instruction, curriculum, organization, accountability, etc.)
15. Here is a list of areas that schools generally work in. Can you briefly describe
your school’s efforts in each of these areas, and state whether these efforts are
causing student achievement to improve, decline, or stay the same?
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Instruction
Curriculum
Organization
Remediation
Data Use
Accountability
Social Support

16. What do you think is the goal of the new strateg(ies)? Are they intended to
target a particular group of students?
17. Thinking back on all the strategies you’ve mentioned – from both this year and
last year – which would you say consume most of your attention and energy?
Why is this?
18. Last year, your school did not make AYP due to the performance of the ______
subgroup. This year, that subgroup of students [is meeting its goals/ continues
to not make AYP]. What specific activities are underway to address the needs of
these students?
19. Do you think the new strategy is an effective approach? Does it fit well for your
students? Why or why not?
Search and Decision-Making
20. (For Principals): Thinking back to this new strategy (or a strategy adopted last
year), can you tell me how the school selected this particular strategy over other
options?
a. When did you start the process of searching for solutions? How long did
the total process (from search to decision) take?
b. How did you look for potential solutions? Where/who did you turn to for
help in determining what your options were? Did you use school data to
inform your search?
c. What other options were on the table?
d. What factors did you consider when choosing this strategy over others?
How, if at all, did you use data to guide your decision-making?
e. Who did you lean on for support and guidance during the decisionmaking process? Why did you lean on these people?
f. Was the final decision a team decision or an individual decision? Explain.
21. (For Staff/Teachers): When the school decided to implement _______, how
involved were you in the process?
If involved: Use questions in #20
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If not very involved:
a. Would you have liked to be more a part of the decision-making process?
b. Why do you think you were not more involved in the process?
c. Was your experience with this decision-making process typical of how
decisions are made in this school? How so?
d. If you had an idea for a new improvement strategy for your school, do you
feel that your views would be heard? What would the process be for
making your idea a reality?
22. (For Teachers): Have you implemented any new improvement strategies in your
classroom this year or last year? What are they?
(If so, use prompts from #20)
23. When choosing a new strategy for (your classroom or) the school as a whole,
how much does AYP and/or PSSA performance typically figure into the decisionmaking process?
Concluding Questions
24. In general, would you say that student achievement at this school is improving,
declining, or staying the same? Why do you think this is the case? Please
explain.
25. Do you think that the school will meet its NCLB goals next year? Why or why
not?
26. Do you have any other comments regarding improvement strategies at your
school? Is there anything you would like to add that what you have shared?

220

APPENDIX C: YEAR 3 PROTOCOL (DISTRICT PERSONNEL)
Introduction:
I am a student at the University of Pennsylvania and I am conducting a study of how
schools and school districts in Pennsylvania are attempting to improve student
performance. Specifically, I will ask questions about how your district makes decisions
regarding new improvement programs and strategies. Your school district was
selected for this study because researchers at the University of Pennsylvania (including
myself) had previously visited a school in your district to discuss student achievement
efforts. This study is a continuation of that previous study, and our questions will be in
reference to the school that was previously visited.
Our conversation is confidential and will be combined with the interviews of others to
produce an overall picture of schools and school districts across the study. Also, I’d like
your permission to tape our conversation. No one other than myself and my research
advisor will have access to this recording, but it will be helpful in our analysis of all the
information I collect. Your participation is voluntary and you are free to stop at any
time or skip any questions you choose not to answer.
Introduction Questions
1. Two years ago, [school] was labeled in “warning” for not making AYP. Were
you working at the District at the time? If so, what did you perceive to be the
main reasons why the school did not make AYP that year?
Probe for:
a. Resource and funding challenges
b. Curriculum and instruction challenges
c. School climate/community challenges
d. Policy and politics challenges
2. In response to the school’s “warning” status classification, can you recall
what were the main programs or strategies adopted to improve performance
in the school?
3. If you can, walk me through how the decision was made to select [choose one
strategy/program to focus on] as a new strategy or program for the school.
Specific Search Questions
Still keeping in mind the decision to adopt [program or strategy], I’d like to ask some
questions about the search process.
4. Who is responsible for searching for new programs and strategies? What
role do you play in this process?
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5. What were the most important factors under consideration when the district
gathered information on [program or strategy]? In other words, what were
you searching for?
a. How many options were on the table? Were any of the potential
options piloted in any schools or classrooms?
b. How did the district use data to support the search process?
c. To what extent was your search guided by federal or state
accountability policies? (AYP subgroups, anchors, Getting Results
document, etc.)
d. Were there any frameworks or protocols in place to help guide the
search process?
6. There are many resources out there for districts that are searching for new
strategies for the school. When searching for [program or strategy], what
sort of technical or professional resources did the district use most? Why
was this?
Probe for:
a. Research (WhatWorks Clearinghouse, professional associations, Ed
Week, etc.)
b. PA Dept of Education or Intermediate Units
c. Professional development (seminars, conferences, materials, etc.)
d. PA’s Standards-Aligned System (SAS)
e. Vendors
7. Another common source of information is people. When searching for
[program or strategy], who did the district lean on for support?
Probe for:
a. “Word of mouth” recommendations (colleagues, family, friends, etc.)
b. Involvement of school-level personnel (principal, teachers, support
staff)
c. PA Dept of Education or Intermediate Unit staff
8. Of these two sources of information – technical resources and what I’ll call
“personal resources” – which do you trust the most? Why?
9. What factors do you think constrained the search process for [program or
strategy] at the district level?
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Probe for:
a. Time constraints
b. Access to resources
c. Human capital
d. Political constraints
10. Why and how was [program or strategy] ultimately selected for the
district/school?
11. Was the search process for [program or strategy] typical for the district?
Why or why not?
Concluding Questions
12. The classic model of decision-making has 4 steps: Problem identification,
search for solutions, decision, and implementation. We will set aside
implementation, as that’s a whole other can of worms. Of the first three,
however, where do you think the district spends most of its efforts? Why?
Definitions:
a. Problem identification – An issue that is identified by at least one of
the following sources: AYP status, data review, board or
superintendent directed initiative, school-level initiative, or parent
complaints.
b. Search – Any action taken for the purpose of putting options on the
table. May include technical/professional resources, human/personal
resources, piloting, etc.
c. Decision – The process surrounding the selection of a new program or
strategy, which may involve committee selection, the
recommendation of the new program or strategy to the board, and
board/district/school action.
13. In terms of the search process, what do you think the district does well?
Where could it improve?
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